Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons From TSSM Implementation in East Java, Indonesia by Amin, S. (Samia) et al.
   
   
 
Improving Sanitation at Scale:  
Lessons from TSSM  
Implementation in  
East Java, Indonesia 
Final Report 
June 30, 2011 
Samia Amin 
Anu Rangarajan 
Evan Borkum 
 
  
   
   
 
This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
   
   
Contract Number: 
4993/18136 (11) 
Mathematica Reference Number: 
06781.500 
Submitted to: 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
P.O. Box 23350 
Seattle, WA  98102 
Project Officer: Alix Peterson Zwane 
Submitted by: 
Mathematica Policy Research 
P.O. Box 2393 
Princeton, NJ 08543 2393 
Telephone: (609) 799 3535 
Facsimile: (609) 799 0005 
Project Director: Samia Amin 
Improving Sanitation at Scale:  
Lessons from TSSM  
Implementation in  
East Java, Indonesia 
Final Report 
June 30, 2011 
Samia Amin 
Anu Rangarajan 
Evan Borkum 
 
 
 
  
 
   
   
 
This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
   
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Many people contributed in significant ways to the preparation of this report. 
We are extremely grateful to the staff at the Water and Sanitation Programme-East Asia and Pacific 
office, and the Total Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing (TSSM) team in Indonesia for all the support they 
provided for this study. In Jakarta, the core TSSM team led by Almud Weitz and Djoko Wartono, and 
including Wano Irwantoro, Ari Kemasan, Amin Robiarto, and Effentrif spent endless hours describing their 
experiences in implementing TSSM and providing us with relevant documents, data, and materials. Nilanjana 
Mukherjee provided insights on early implementation. At the provincial level, valuable information on local 
program implementation was provided by Pak Saputra, the TSSM regional coordinator, and the staff from 
TSSM partner organizations: Mitrya Samya, Surya Abadi, and ITS Surabaya. In particular, we would like to 
thank Pak Djoko and Pak Saputra for providing us with introductions to various key stakeholders. We would 
also like to thank Sasya Arifin, Pengky Priyono, and Eveline Turang for their assistance in organizing travel 
and meeting logistics. 
At the Water and Sanitation Program’s global head quarters at the World Bank in Washington, D.C., we 
wish to thank Eduardo Perez, the global task team leader for his description of program inception and 
implementation. Bertha Briceño from the World Bank, who is the global impact evaluation leader, and 
Manisha Shah, the principal investigator for the TSSM impact evaluation in Indonesia, kindly shared their 
knowledge and insights on evaluation design and implementation, as well as shared impact evaluation data 
and survey instruments. Jack Molyneaux led the impact evaluation in its initial years. 
We are especially grateful for the support of our project officers at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Alix Zwane and Louis Boorstin. Their support, input, and guidance at all stages of this study have been 
invaluable. 
We owe a deep debt of gratitude to the numerous government officials, sectoral staff, and other 
stakeholders at the national, provincial, district, subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels who allowed us to 
interview them and who looked up documents, data, and other information at our request. We are especially 
grateful to the many households that participated in the survey and focus groups generously and shared their 
experiences with us. 
In particular, we would like to thank our local data collection partners. Risang Rimbatmaja, Yunita 
Wahyuningrum, Abigael Ati, TriHastuti Nur, Maulana Hasan, and Ngatman tirelessly and meticulously 
conducted the qualitative data collection. Their excellent research skills and local and technical knowledge 
allowed us to conduct high-quality data collection. Translation assistance by Ivonne, Nora, and Ratih were 
invaluable in enabling us to participate in the numerous interviews and focus groups conducted as part of the 
qualitative effort. Bondan Sikoki and Wayan N. W. Suriastini from Survey Meter led the quantitative data 
collection. We are extremely grateful for Survey Meter collecting such high-quality data under the project time 
constraints. 
Other Mathematica staff played an important role in the completion of this report. Alexander Persaud 
provided excellent programming, project management, and research support throughout the project. Nancy 
Murray and Robert Wood provided thoughtful feedback on the content of the report. John Kennedy 
carefully edited the report and Jennifer Baskwell provided exemplary production support. 
We gratefully acknowledge these many contributions and accept sole responsibility for any errors or 
omissions in this report. 
Samia Amin 
Anu Rangarajan 
Evan Borkum 
   
   
 
This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 v  
CONTENTS 
ACRONYMS AND INDONESIAN TERMS ........................................................................ xiii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. xv 
I  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
A. The TSSM Program .................................................................................. 2 
B. Research Questions and Study Approach ................................................. 6 
C. Overview of Findings and Road Map of the Report ................................. 10 
II  CONTEXTS OF TSSM IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................ 11 
A. Sanitation Policy Context ....................................................................... 11 
B. Political and Administrative Contexts ..................................................... 13 
C. Key Features of the TSSM Approach ....................................................... 16 
D. Key Steps for Implementing TSSM .......................................................... 16 
III  SETTING UP THE TSSM PROGRAM AND PREPARING  FOR PROGRAM 
IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................................ 19 
A. Adopting a Tiered Program Approach .................................................... 20 
B. Securing Local Commitment and Creating Coordination Mechanisms..... 23 
1. Securing Local Government Commitment........................................ 23 
2. Establishing Tiered Coordination Mechanisms for TSSM 
Implementation in Districts ............................................................. 25 
 
C. Securing and Making Effective Use of Resources for TSSM ..................... 27 
IV  IMPLEMENTATION OF CLTS AT SCALE ........................................................... 33 
A. Preparing for Triggering ........................................................................ 35 
1. Developing a Targeting Strategy that Would Create Momentum 
for Scale Up ................................................................................... 35 
2. Building Capacity of Key Stakeholders............................................. 37 
 
B. Delivering the CLTS Intervention ............................................................ 38 
1. The Pretriggering Planning Activities .............................................. 39 
2. The Triggering Event ...................................................................... 39 
3. Post Triggering Activities ............................................................... 40 
 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 vi  
CONTENTS (continued) 
C. Achieving and Maintaining ODF ............................................................. 43 
1. Strategies to Encourage ODF Attainment ......................................... 43 
2. ODF Verification, Certification, and Awards to Motivate and 
Encourage Replication .................................................................... 45 
3. Post ODF Follow Up Is Important to Maintain ODF Status ............... 47 
 
V  EXAMINING THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SANITATION 
MARKETING IN EAST JAVA ............................................................................ 49 
A. Preparation for Sanitation Marketing...................................................... 49 
B. Competitive Supply Development .......................................................... 52 
C. Development and Dissemination of Sanitation Marketing Materials for 
Behavior Change ................................................................................... 55 
VI  MEASURING TSSM RESULTS PROGRAM MONITORING DATA AND  
IMPACT EVALUATION ................................................................................... 59 
A. Examining Divergences in Program Monitoring and Impact Evaluation 
Longitudinal Data .................................................................................. 60 
B. Lessons Learned for Impact Evaluations of Programs Being 
Implemented at Scale ............................................................................ 64 
1. Ensuring Effective Execution and Implementation of the 
Evaluation ....................................................................................... 64 
2. Ensuring the Impact Evaluation Sample Is Representative of 
Overall Program Scale Up ............................................................... 66 
 
C. Examining TSSM Monitoring Mechanisms .............................................. 67 
D. Lessons Learned About Program Monitoring .......................................... 70 
VII  HOUSEHOLD SANITATION PRACTICES AND BEHAVIORS ................................ 73 
A. Purpose of the Quantitative Analysis ...................................................... 73 
B. Data Collection Approach ...................................................................... 74 
C. Sample Description................................................................................ 74 
D. Latrine Access, Latrine Characteristics, and Defecation Practices ........... 78 
1. Latrine Access ................................................................................ 78 
2. Characteristics of Existing Latrines ................................................. 80 
3. Condition of Existing Latrines ......................................................... 82 
4. Defecation Practices ....................................................................... 84 
 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 vii  
CONTENTS (continued) 
E. Latrine Construction and Costs .............................................................. 85 
F. Knowledge and Attitudes ....................................................................... 89 
G. Factors Related to Latrine Ownership and Defecation Behavior .............. 92 
1. Factors Correlated with Latrine Ownership ...................................... 93 
2. Factors Correlated with Open Defecation ........................................ 94 
 
VIII  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................... 97 
A. Overall Observations of TSSM Implementation ....................................... 97 
B. Recommendations Going Forward ......................................................... 98 
1. Preparing Local Governments for TSSM Implementation .................. 99 
2. Implementing CLTS at Scale ............................................................ 99 
3. Developing and Implementing Sanitation Marketing...................... 100 
4. Creating a Sustainable and Useful Monitoring System ................... 100 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 103 
APPENDIX A:  LIST OF STAKEHOLDER INFORMANTS ................................................... 105 
APPENDIX B:  LIST OF HAMLETS VISITED .................................................................... 109 
APPENDIX C:  DATA PROVIDED BY WSP ON DISTRICT BUDGETS ................................. 113 
APPENDIX D:  LB 1 FORM.......................................................................................... 117 
APPENDIX E:  PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS TABLE ........................................... 121 
 
 
   
   
 
This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 ix  
TABLES 
III.1 District Budget Allocations for TSSM ..................................................... 27 
III.2 Total Expenditures and Per Latrine Expenditures, by Source  
of Contribution ..................................................................................... 29 
VI.1 ODF Rates for Different Samples of Hamlets ......................................... 61 
VI.2 Triggered and ODF Status, by Treatment and Control Hamlets  
in the Impact Sample ............................................................................ 63 
VII.1 Sample Distribution, by District and ODF Status.................................... 75 
VII.2 Characteristics of Household Head ....................................................... 76 
VII.3 Dwelling Characteristics and Household Wealth .................................... 77 
VII.4 Latrine Access and Ownership .............................................................. 79 
VII.5 Latrine Characteristics .......................................................................... 81 
VII.6 Latrine Condition/Cleanliness ............................................................... 83 
VII.7 Defecation Behavior .............................................................................. 84 
VII.8 Latrine Construction ............................................................................. 86 
VII.9 Latrine Costs ........................................................................................ 88 
VII.10 Knowledge and Attitudes ...................................................................... 90 
VII.11 Predicted Probability of Latrine Ownership ............................................ 94 
VII.12 Predicted Probability of Open Defecation .............................................. 95 
B.1 Qualitative Study Locations ................................................................. 111 
B.2 Quantitative Study Locations .............................................................. 112 
C.1 Expenditure on TSSM by District, 2007 2010 ..................................... 115 
E.1 Principal Components Analysis ........................................................... 123 
 
   
   
 
This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 xi  
FIGURES 
1 Cascading Structure of Political and Sectoral Administration ............... xviii 
I.1 The F Diagram and the Fecal Oral Transmission Route .......................... 3 
I.2 Sanitation Ladder ................................................................................... 3 
I.3 TSSM Program Logic ............................................................................... 5 
I.4 Districts and Subdistricts Where Data Collection Was Conducted ............ 8 
II.1 Cascading Structure of Politicial and Sectoral Adminstration ................. 14 
III.1 Timeline of Implementation .................................................................. 21 
III.2 Contributions Under the TSSM Program ................................................ 28 
IV.1 Range of Defecation Facilities ............................................................... 34 
V.1 SaniFOAM Framework ........................................................................... 51 
VII.1 Latrine Access Across All Hamlets ........................................................ 78 
 
 
 
BOXES 
III.1 Introducing Community Led Total Sanitation in Indonesia and  
Adopting TSSM ..................................................................................... 20 
III.2 Strategically Engaging District Heads (Bupatis) ..................................... 25 
III.3 Intended Structure and Responsibilities of Coordinating  
Committees .......................................................................................... 26 
III.4 Perak: Effective Use of Scarce Resources ............................................... 31 
IV.1 Bondowoso: Lack of Early Results Discourages Scale Up ....................... 36 
IV.2 Gresik: Success Through Repeated Socialization and  
Individualized Monitoring ..................................................................... 41 
IV.3 Koncer Darul Aman: Using Health to Motivate Latrine Adoption ............ 42 
 
   
   
 
This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 xiii  
ACRONYMS AND INDONESIAN TERMS 
Bappeda Provincial Planning Office 
Bappenas National Development Planning Agency 
BCC Behavior Change Communications 
BPS Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Board of Statistics) 
Bupati District head 
Cadre Volunteer health worker 
Camat Politically appointed subdistrict leader 
CLTS Community-Led Total Sanitation 
Desa Village 
Dinkes Dinas Kesehatan Provinsi (provincial or district health center) 
Dusun Hamlet 
IE Impact Evaluation 
ITS Surabaya Institut Teknologi Sepulum Nopember 
JMP Joint Monitoring Programme 
Kabupaten District 
Kecamatan Sub-district 
MDG Millenium Development Goals 
MoH  Ministry of Health  
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OD Open Defecation 
ODF Open Defecation Free 
PKK Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Movement) 
PODES Potensi Desa (Village Potential Survey) 
Polindes Pondok Bersalin Desa (village midwife clinic) 
Posyandu Pos Pelayanan terpadu (village integrated health post) 
Propinsi Province 
Puskesmas Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat tingkat Kecamatan (subdistrict health center) 
Pustu Puskesmas Pembantu (village subhealth center) 
Rukun Tetanggas (RTs) Subdivision of hamlet 
Rukun Wargahs (RWs) Subdivision of hamlet 
SToPS Sanitasi Total dan Pemasaran Sanitasi (Indonesian translation of program) 
Tim Penggerak PKK Family Welfare Association 
TSSM Total Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
VIP Ventilated Improved Pit 
WHO World Health Organization 
WSLIC-2 Second Water and Sanitation for Low Income Communities program 
WSP Water and Sanitation Program 
WSSLIC Water Supply and Sanitation for Low Income Communities 
 
   
   
 
This page has been left blank for double-sided copying. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 xv  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Poor sanitation is an urgent health and development challenge for low-income countries. 
Globally, 1.2 billion people do not have access to any sanitation facilities and resort to open 
defecation (World Health Organization [WHO]/UNICEF 2010). Poor sanitation is a key cause of 
diarrheal disease, which inflicts high morbidity and health care costs. Because poor sanitation 
disproportionately affects poor countries, and the poorest populations within those countries, these 
costs are borne by those who are least equipped to shoulder them (United Nations 2010). 
The Water and Sanitation Program (WSP), a multidonor partnership administered by the World 
Bank, launched the Global Scaling Up Rural Sanitation project in 2006 to improve access to basic 
sanitation and eliminate open defecation among the rural poor. The Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation (the Foundation) funded the project, which combined two innovative approaches:  
(1) Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), which had increased demand for sanitation in 
Bangladesh and India; and (2) Sanitation Marketing, which had strengthened supply of and demand 
for sanitation services in Vietnam and several African countries. The Total Sanitation and Sanitation 
Marketing (TSSM) program combined these two interventions and complemented them with efforts 
to strengthen the enabling environment in order to create a holistic, sustainable, and scalable 
program. WSP decided to test the program at scale in East Java, Indonesia; in Himachal Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh, India; and in 10 districts in Tanzania between 2007 and 2010. 
The Foundation contracted with Mathematica Policy Research to conduct a retrospective 
implementation study to understand how the TSSM program was implemented in Indonesia, to 
learn more about how program monitoring data were collected, and to reconcile some apparent 
discrepancies between program monitoring data and impact evaluation data involving program 
progress. This report describes the findings from this study. In particular, it answers the following 
questions: 
1. How were key elements of the TSSM approach implemented and what factors 
affected attainment of open defecation free (ODF) outcomes? 
Program implementation approaches varied significantly across and within districts and 
subdistricts. The thoroughness with which program activities were completed was 
affected by local conditions, existing capacity, and motivation of local officials, as well as 
by differences in the degree to which the TSSM program helped local governments 
prepare for program delivery. In each district, we observed pockets of great success 
where the program was well implemented and ODF status was attained but also many 
instances where this did not occur. The scale of success varied significantly from small 
isolated clusters of ODF hamlets (sub-villages) in some districts to entire subdistricts in 
others. ODF gains were driven primarily by the CLTS component, because 
implementation of the sanitation marketing was delayed and weakly delivered. TSSM 
expansion, where it occurred, resulted from concerted district and subdistrict efforts 
rather than the viral spread of the program driven by hamlet demand that was 
anticipated in TSSM’s theory of change. Critical determinants of program success 
included the degree of early buy-in and commitment for the program, availability of 
sufficient resources, strategic decision making, and degree of multisectoral coordination 
at all administrative levels. 
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2. How effective are the monitoring system and the impact evaluation framework in 
helping assess program progress and can their data be reconciled to provide an 
accurate picture of program progress? 
Monitoring data collection was conducted through a bottom-up process mostly using 
reports from hamlet health volunteers, but there was little systematic monitoring or data 
verification by subdistrict or district officials. Despite this lack of oversight, systematic 
over-reporting of sanitation outcomes did not seem to occur. TSSM monitoring waned 
after the program ended. In order to create sustainable monitoring systems, it will be 
important to build capacity for data use at the district level and for data collection among 
frontline staff and volunteers. Monitoring data and impact evaluation data show similar 
findings after taking impact evaluation locations into account. 
3. What are sanitation practices, knowledge, and attitudes among rural households? 
How do they differ in ODF and non-ODF hamlets? 
Most households own a latrine or have access to a shared latrine and are usually aware of 
the health risks of open defecation. However, latrine access is significantly higher in 
households in ODF hamlets compared with non-ODF hamlets. Exclusive latrine use is 
highly correlated with latrine access and is almost universal in hamlets declared ODF, 
but almost 40 percent of those in non-ODF hamlets openly defecate. Most of this open 
defecation takes place in rivers. For those without latrines, cost is the most common 
reason cited for not having a latrine. In ODF hamlets, increased access is driven by 
higher levels of pit latrine usage compared with non-ODF communities, which suggests 
that TSSM might have encouraged access of simple solutions. 
The study used a mixed-methods approach to answer these questions. Our approach 
drew on both qualitative and quantitative data. We relied heavily on qualitative data gathered in the 
fall of 2010 from a large cross-section of stakeholders at the national, provincial, district, subdistrict, 
and village levels. We met with members of the implementing team and their partners, as well as 
sectoral stakeholders at the national and provincial levels, to frame the context of TSSM. To 
understand program implementation and outcomes in the field, we selected six districts where we 
conducted site visits to meet with officials, health staff and other stakeholders at the district, 
subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels. We also held focus groups among households from hamlets 
that received the program and those that did not to learn about determinants of their sanitation 
behavior. We selected the districts from across the three phases of program implementation, 
ensuring that they were geographically dispersed. The selected districts, subdistricts, villages, and 
hamlets captured a range of levels of progress toward ODF outcomes. 
We selected 36 hamlets in the six districts to conduct surveys with households to learn about 
their sanitation practices. Most of these hamlets were ones we visited as part of the qualitative data 
collection. About half of the hamlets were ODF and half were not. We collected the quantitative 
data in January 2011, conducting surveys with 20 randomly selected households in each of the  
36 hamlets for a total sample of 720 households. In addition to analyzing this data, we also analyzed 
existing monitoring data provided by WSP. Our report draws on and triangulates information from 
all these sources to provide an assessment of program implementation. 
A. The TSSM Program 
The TSSM program in Indonesia was launched in 2007 with a goal of implementing the 
program at scale in the province of East Java. Among its more than 37 million people, East Java has 
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a rural population of 32.8 million. The province includes 29 districts that vary in geography, 
resources, wealth, culture, capacity, size, and population. Rural sanitation coverage in East Java is 
fairly poor, with slightly more than half the rural population having sanitation access. 
Previous government and donor sanitation policies and programs in Indonesia had attempted 
to tackle the problem by providing material or financial assistance for building latrines. Those 
policies had yielded limited results, partly due to households’ reluctance to change behavior. Latrines 
provided to households often fell into disuse and disrepair. Despite substantial investment in 
sanitation, improvements in sanitation were negligible and open defecation persisted as a problem in 
many Indonesian provinces. Thus, TSSM took an approach based on the provision of so-called 
software support in the form of training and technical assistance, rather than hardware support in 
the form of products and subsidies. It promoted collective action for improved sanitation behavior, 
targeted collective outcomes, and recommended an incremental approach to improvement in 
sanitation behavior to ensure that all households, irrespective of their wealth, could take some action 
to eliminate open defecation. 
The TSSM program consisted of three elements: 
1. Stimulating sanitation demand among households and communities by  
(1) conducting triggering events and follow-up activities for households using CLTS 
techniques (such as making households aware of the dangers of open defecation and 
invoking shame) to generate collective commitment for ODF attainment; and (2) using 
behavior change communication (BCC), developed as part of sanitation marketing, to 
raise awareness of affordable latrine options and the dangers of open defecation. 
2. Increasing the supply of sanitation products and services by (1) working with 
manufacturers and providers of sanitation products and services to create and provide 
affordable, context-appropriate sanitation options and train suppliers in their provision; 
and (2) using promotion materials to market these low-cost options to households. 
3. Creating a strong enabling environment by collaborating closely with and supporting 
national-, district-, and local-level political leaders to create policy, institutional, and 
financial frameworks to facilitate implementation at scale. 
To foster sustainability, WSP delivered the program through local governments. The 
TSSM team requested districts to participate in the program and commit funds for TSSM 
implementation and scale-up. It also provided technical assistance to local government officials for a 
certain period. The TSSM team implemented the program in 30 communities in each district, 
providing districts with a ―limited window of opportunity to learn‖ how to implement this 
integrated approach to sanitation promotion (WSP 2009). 
This was a challenging task given the complex political and administrative contexts in 
which the program was implemented. In Indonesia, responsibility for sanitation programs is 
fragmented. Depending on the nature of the sanitation program being implemented, a range of 
sectoral administrative institutions and stakeholders can be involved. These included the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Public Works as well the National Development Planning 
Agency. TSSM worked closely with the MoH and National Development Planning Agency, making 
the former its primary implementing partner. 
Moreover, decentralization reforms had devolved implementing authority from national levels 
to district levels, multiplying the partners with which TSSM had to coordinate. Several levels of 
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government and sectoral administration were relevant to and involved in TSSM implementation. 
These levels, in descending administrative order, are national, provincial (propinsi), district (kabupaten), 
subdistrict (kecamatan), village (desa/kelurahan), and hamlet (dusun). A number of political and sectoral 
stakeholders at each level can affect the implementation of sanitation programs. Figure 1 shows the 
cascading pillars of influence at the provincial and district levels. The first cascading pillar consists of 
political authority within districts that affects the implementation of programs such as TSSM. Even 
though Indonesia is highly decentralized, a top-down culture characterizes the government, 
especially at and below the district level. The elected leaders, from the district head (bupati) down to 
the heads of villages, hamlets, Rukun Wargahs (RWs, or administrative neighborhoods) and Rukun 
Tetanggas (RTs, or neighborhood clusters) comprise a chain of command. The second pillar of 
authority is the program implementation sector, which in the case of TSSM was the health office. 
Figure 1.  Cascading Structure of Political and Sectoral Administration 
B. Implementation of TSSM 
In this section we summarize our findings on the key steps taken to implement the TSSM 
program. We examine (1) the approach TSSM took to prepare for program implementation and 
delivery, (2) how TSSM delivered the CLTS component to strengthen sanitation demand in tandem 
with districts, and (3) how TSSM developed and implemented the sanitation marketing component. 
1. Setting Up the TSSM Program and Preparing for Program Implementation 
 TSSM created a tiered project team to engage with stakeholders at various levels. 
At the national level, a central team secured high-level buy-in from MoH and the National 
Development Planning Agency and designed the technical assistance that the program would 
provide. At the provincial level, a regional coordinator conducted oversight of district activities. At 
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local levels, TSSM hired nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) called resource agencies with local 
knowledge to provide on-site technical assistance to district governments specifically to implement 
CLTS. To provide adequate levels of support to all districts, TSSM assigned districts to one of three 
phases, largely based in order of district interest in participating. The resource agencies worked with 
districts in each phase for approximately nine months providing training and field support to district 
and subdistrict staff for the implementation of TSSM. 
 Greater alignment was needed between the goals of resource agencies and TSSM. 
In most of our field visits, stakeholders appreciated the assistance resource agencies had 
provided with triggering and follow-up. However, the resource agencies might have required greater 
supervision to ensure that resource agencies focused on TSSM’s longer-term goals of building 
capacity and not only on reaching triggering and ODF attainment targets. In a few instances, 
resource agencies’ district consultants appeared to have switched efforts from hamlets resistant to 
behavior change to other hamlets that were closer to being ODF or opted to collect monitoring data 
directly instead of building district capacity. Increased oversight, greater emphasis on longer-term 
objectives, and a clearer delineation of responsibilities could improve resource agency performance. 
 Demand-responsive targeting to create local buy-in did not materialize as 
planned. 
The TSSM program had anticipated that road shows or socialization events would generate 
strong community interest in participating in the program. TSSM’s assumption was that securing 
voluntary and informed participation in the program would engender high levels of commitment to 
implementation. However, district or subdistrict officials usually selected hamlets in a top-down 
process. The road shows were sometimes replaced with socialization events at which village and 
hamlet officials learned of the broad parameters of the TSSM approach that would be implemented 
in their area. Multiple factors constrained the initial demand for TSSM at the lower levels, including 
its nonsubsidy approach and the high level of work it required from local stakeholders with little 
financial support. Thus, implementing a demand-responsive approach from the outset was 
challenging; after gains in some hamlets had been achieved and publicized, securing buy-in of other 
villages or subdistricts was easier. 
 TSSM envisaged multisectoral coordination as a key tenet of implementation, but 
there was inadequate clarity on individual roles and responsibilities. 
The TSSM program required close coordination of stakeholders across sectors, as well as at 
different levels, including the district, subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels. A detailed manual 
describing TSSM’s implementation approach discussed the many steps needed for program success, 
including the formation of committees at various levels to ensure coordination. However, there was 
less clarity about who would undertake particular steps and the specific responsibilities of different 
stakeholders. Subsequent implementation reflected weaknesses in the execution of some of these 
activities, such as the creation of coordination committees. 
 District expenditures on TSSM were typically low, burdening frontline staff. 
Among the districts we visited, the TSSM program resulted in an increase in the amount of 
money districts dedicated to sanitation. However, there was substantial variation in the extent of 
district contributions, as well as the degree to which districts maintained them over time. These 
expenditures were concentrated among a few districts. Five of the 29 districts targeted by WSP 
accounted for 45 percent of district expenditures on TSSM as of February 2010 (WSP 2010b). 
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Insufficient resources placed extra burden on frontline staff. In several places, subdistrict officials 
complained of the numerous ways in which resource and staffing constraints impeded their ability to 
implement the program effectively. The examples they cited included insufficient funds for 
providing food at triggering events or hosting ODF celebration events, lack of transportation to 
conduct follow-up and monitoring, and inability to provide token gifts or compensation to health 
volunteers who assisted with key tasks. In some cases, facilitators or village or hamlet officials had to 
cover program costs themselves. For more systematic and thorough implementation of TSSM, 
districts might have to increase resource allocations to cover some of these costs, and assume some 
of the software costs that WSP had shouldered. 
2. Implementing CLTS at Scale 
 The CLTS training was well developed and executed. Most stakeholders viewed 
the content and format of the training positively and it seemed to generate 
support for the nonsubsidy approach. 
Training content covered the fundamental CLTS principles for triggering household demand 
and exposed participants to newer elements developed by TSSM, including sanitation marketing and 
templates for monitoring progress. Training incorporated adult education approaches that made use 
of participatory methods, including questions and answers, group discussions, games, and 
brainstorming. The interactive nature of the trainings and the practical components made a strong 
impression on most stakeholders we interviewed and helped convince participants about the viability 
of TSSM. 
 We saw pockets of success in each district but also many instances in which 
triggering did not lead to the intended outcomes. 
In some exceptional subdistricts, such as Perak in Jombang and Wringinanom in Gresik, these 
areas of success were substantial, encompassing the entire subdistrict or all the villages under a 
Health Center (Puskemsas). More frequently they consisted of large clusters or significant numbers of 
villages, as we observed in Dampit in Malang. In other subdistricts, the islands of success were fewer 
and more limited in nature, as observed in Bondowoso and Bangkalan. Successful areas shared some 
common characteristics: (1) a high degree of coordination and collaboration across various 
stakeholders at the different levels; and (2) a more purposeful and strategic use of resources in 
targeting, follow-up, and monitoring. Less successful areas were characterized by limited resources 
that were not spent strategically, lower levels of commitment, and closer proximity to a river. 
 The viral spread of CLTS did not occur, leading some districts to revise their 
targeting strategies. 
TSSM initially recommended targeting high-risk hamlets, such as those with limited access to 
sanitation and a high percentage of households exhibiting poor sanitation behavior, so maximum 
impacts could be observed. Many districts learned that triggering only one hamlet per village was not 
adequate for having a strong demonstration effect. ODF attainment at subvillage levels was not a 
sufficiently remarkable achievement for neighboring places to take note and aspire to replicate. In 
some instances, districts became discouraged and stopped focusing on program implementation. In 
other, more successful places, we saw districts shift to alternate strategies that proved more effective. 
These included (1) clustered rather than diffused targeting, in which some districts targeted geographically 
clustered subdistricts and hamlets rather than widely dispersed hamlets; and (2) village rather than 
hamlet triggering, in which some districts found it more effective to switch to triggering all hamlets in a 
village instead of just one hamlet per village. 
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 Triggering itself did not appear to be the pivotal event it was meant to be. Most 
households in focus groups, even those that had attended the event, recalled it 
only upon repeated probing. 
Triggering events were often small, usually attended by 20 to 30 people, and did not appear to 
be a memorable events in the minds of many households in these hamlets (even ones that had 
become ODF). The attendees at the events were typically women, often because the events occurred 
during the day when most men would have been at work. Facilitators were informed of the 
importance of scheduling the triggering events at times that most of the community could attend. 
However, facilitators were faced with multiple responsibilities and limited resources and incentives 
and found it difficult to trigger after work hours, especially if they had to travel far to reach the 
hamlets. 
 Follow-up monitoring was an important program component that was not 
prioritized or funded adequately. 
TSSM recommended a host of follow-up activities after triggering to encourage ODF 
attainment. Where post-triggering follow-up occurred, it consisted primarily of two types of follow-
up activities. These follow-up activities included (1) repeat socialization and messaging and (2) 
targeted monitoring through household visits. We observed better results in hamlets that adopted 
both types of post-triggering follow-up activities through multisectoral coordination and that 
emphasized health benefits of ODF status during follow-up. Post-triggering follow-up was not 
adequately prioritized at all levels for several reasons: lack of resources for post-triggering and 
competing priorities for implementing stakeholders’ time, with subdistrict and village/hamlet staff, 
officials, and volunteers having a wide range of responsibilities. In some cases a lack of motivation 
and insufficient prioritization of the program at higher levels was the reason. Similar factors affected 
post-ODF follow-up rates. 
 Strategies encouraging leveraging of group/community resources also facilitated 
acceleration of ODF outcomes. 
In a number of places, we saw that villages effectively leveraged group resources to help poor 
households gain access to latrines. In some districts, officials described the use of community labor 
in hamlets to assist households, particularly those of the poor or elderly, to build pit latrines, known 
as gotong royong. In some communities, groups of five families worked together to construct cheap 
latrines that those households could use; in other communities volunteers reached out to help 
households dig pit latrines or make lids for existing latrines. Another mechanism was the 
establishment of sanitation revolving funds (known as arisan funding), whereby households made 
monthly contributions to a common savings scheme that would enable one member per month to 
build a latrine. We most often observed these mechanisms for leveraging joint resources in hamlets 
or villages with a tradition of community cohesion; such mechanisms therefore depended greatly on 
the specific culture of the hamlet. 
3. Implementation of Sanitation Marketing 
 Developing sanitation marketing took longer than anticipated, affecting the 
program’s ability to sequence sanitation marketing appropriately with CLTS. 
Conducting extensive market research and developing the interventions and tools for sanitation 
marketing took a long time. CLTS implementation had begun by 2007, but background research was 
not completed until the middle of 2008. This meant that the component was not ready for adoption 
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for Phase 1, which began in November 2007, and the full bundle of interventions was not ready 
until into the implementation of Phase 2. As a result, TSSM was not delivered as a holistic 
intervention in many of the districts, as had originally been anticipated. 
 TSSM tried to improve sanitation supply by training masons; however, this effort 
yielded limited success due to poor targeting. 
TSSM started the effort to improve sanitation supply by focusing on improving the skills of 
masons through mason training. Although masons do not typically sell latrines directly, they can 
inform households about latrine types and recommend, promote, and install low-cost hygienic 
latrines using guidance from WSP’s market research. However, with a few exceptions, masons did 
not actively engage in activities to promote low-cost options. Mason training yielded limited results 
in part because participants for mason training appeared to have been poorly selected. Village heads 
were requested to select masons on short notice, with little information on the intent of the training 
or the criteria to use to select appropriate candidates. Village officials sometimes selected 
nonmasons because they had to indentify someone to send to the training quickly; in other cases, 
selected masons refused to go because they did not want to lose their daily wages. As a result, many 
attendees were not well selected and often not only lacked a masonry background but also had little 
education and limited capacity to absorb the training. 
 TSSM then focused on training small numbers of sanitarians and potential 
entrepreneurs in developing a social franchising model of sanitation solutions. 
The TSSM team adapted the mason training and focused it on sanitarians and other potential 
suppliers or providers hoping to create entrepreneurs who could effectively promote low-cost 
sanitation options. In particular, the TSSM program wanted to replicate the social franchising model 
of a one-stop sanitation shop created by Pak Sumadi, a former mason who had successfully devised 
several upgradeable models of latrines and improved sanitation options using local products. To that 
end, the program conducted intensive training on a considerably smaller scale. People who attended 
the training seemed to find it useful, and we heard that a handful of active entrepreneurs emerged. 
However, it is not clear that this approach alone will be able to strengthen the supply market at scale 
given the limited numbers of people trained and continued limitations in targeting. 
 TSSM produced many promotional materials focused on behavior change, but 
insufficient budgets and weak dissemination networks constrained adoption. 
The TSSM team spent substantial time and effort in developing and market testing attractive 
materials, such as a ready-to-print poster tool kit. However use of these materials was limited. 
District officials indicated they had received posters and stickers from TSSM, but we saw limited 
evidence that these posters were disseminated widely at lower levels. Although we occasionally saw 
sanitation posters in the Puskesmas, for the most part sanitarians and staff at lower administrative 
levels were not aware of or familiar with these posters. The main reasons noted for limited use of 
these materials were (1) insufficient budget to print and disseminate these posters on a large scale; 
(2) weak dissemination networks, which often resulted due to poor coordination between the heath 
promotion division and the environmental health office, and shortages of health promotion staff; 
and (3) districts often preferred to use their own materials, citing their unique local knowledge. 
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 TSSM developed an informed-choice catalog for upgrading latrines. Those who 
had seen it considered it very useful, but many had not seen it. 
TSSM developed an informed choice catalog that would enable households to understand the 
features of healthy latrines, learn about options for adopting progressive approaches to latrine 
upgrades, and increase their awareness of low-cost options. These catalogs illustrated different 
combinations of latrine options, ranging from the lowest- to the highest-cost options for each of 
three latrine components: below-ground, ground-level, and above-ground structures. The training of 
masons and entrepreneurs used the informed choice catalog. The TSSM program’s intent was to use 
the manual after a community had become ODF and reached the first step of the sanitation ladder, 
so households would not be distracted from using more basic options to reach ODF status quickly. 
However, some stakeholders who had seen the catalog (or to whom we showed it during our field 
visits) thought it would have been useful to use during or soon after triggering and follow-up, when 
interest in exploring latrine options is highest. Earlier use of this catalog might be particularly 
valuable in hamlets near a river, where changing behavior using basic options (pit latrines) might not 
work. 
C. TSSM Program Monitoring System 
WSP established a monitoring system for tracking TSSM progress that drew on the 
participation of stakeholders at various levels of the program. The monitoring system was distinctive 
in that it placed monitoring responsibility on local officials, rather than opting for independent 
monitoring mechanisms. WSP’s objective in adopting this system was to create a culture of data 
tracking and data use at these administrative levels. It was hoped that demonstrating the feasibility of 
collecting sanitation data and its utility for policy and program decisions would result in districts 
being willing to continue data collection after TSSM ended. 
TSSM’s intent was that subdistrict officials and health center staff were to record progress from 
all triggered hamlets on a monthly basis. They were to verify the accuracy of the information 
collected by conducting monitoring visits to households with updated statuses and sending the 
verified data to the district. Subdistrict-level officials, mainly the sanitarians, received a specific form 
that recorded the types of sanitation access among households in the hamlet, disaggregated by 
latrine type and by household wealth. 
 Sanitation data was collected through a bottom-up process mostly using reports 
from hamlet health volunteers, but there was little systematic monitoring by 
subdistrict or district officials. 
Generally, the flow of information about progress toward ODF outcomes involved health 
volunteers/facilitators gathering information and updating subdistrict health center staff, either 
directly or through the village head or midwife. The subdistrict official transferred this information 
to the district. Although data collection of sanitation indicators occurred in all places, we observed 
little systematic monitoring by subdistrict and district staffs, and the periodicity of reporting was not 
regular. Usually the village health volunteer would report to the midwife or sanitarian when she 
heard of the construction of some new latrine. The health volunteer might then visit the household 
to confirm reports of latrine construction; however, verification by the sanitarian was far less 
frequent. 
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 TSSM had mixed success introducing a short message system (SMS) to 
encourage more regular reporting. 
TSSM designed a new SMS system, using mobile phone text updates, aimed to encourage more 
regular reporting. It simplified the process of submitting and aggregating data and eliminated the 
travel and time costs required for submission of paper updates. We observed a range of attitudes 
toward this system. Some liked this reporting system and thought it saved them time. Others had 
heard about it and waited for training. Still others had either not heard about it or had difficulty 
using it. We heard a number of reports of duplicative efforts. Facilitators provided updates using the 
SMS system but still had to submit paper reports. Among the districts we visited, there was limited 
evidence of district-level ownership of this system, so it is unclear how useful this system will be. 
 Sanitation access indicators evolved over time, which created some confusion 
and might have affected data quality. 
More than two-and-a-half years into program implementation, the TSSM team changed the 
classifications to try to make the sanitation access measures align more closely with the Joint 
Monitoring Programme classification system and to better capture households’ progress up the 
sanitation ladder. Definitions changed from improved latrine, unimproved latrine, sharing, and open 
defecation to the following: permanent latrine, semipermanent latrine, and open defecation. Officials 
in several districts and subdistricts reported that they found the new latrine categories confusing. As 
a result, data collectors often used the old indicators at the hamlet levels and officials at subdistrict 
or district levels subsequently reclassified the data to fit the new template. They did not always do 
this with sufficient accuracy or discretion, and they sometimes lacked the data to confirm the shared 
nature of the latrines. 
 Despite little independent verification by district or subdistrict officials, we did 
not observe systematic misreporting of latrine construction or ODF status. 
We saw no evidence that the hamlet-level volunteers or facilitators had incentives to provide 
false reports of latrine construction. Reports were more likely to be made when latrines were built 
than when they broke down, simply because the latter might have been less noteworthy events in the 
hamlet. However, given that those with latrines would eventually repair them or build new ones, we 
do not expect these differences to be large in magnitude. Districts generally stopped reporting to 
WSP when they perceived the TSSM program was over, and we observed instances in which more 
communities had become ODF than the TSSM program monitoring data reported. 
 The impetus for tracking outcomes waned when hamlets achieved ODF status. 
We found that even routine monitoring in the hamlet became a less urgent priority after 
achievement of ODF status. The exceptions were hamlets in groups of villages or when an entire 
subdistrict had achieved ODF status. There was great community pride in the achievement of ODF 
status, often leading to some type of more frequent monitoring. This lack of tracking outcomes after 
hamlets attain ODF status will make it difficult to track any continued progress up the sanitation 
ladder or regressions back to open defecation among some community members. 
D. Survey Findings on Household Sanitation Practices and Behaviors 
To understand in a more systematic manner the extent to which households in these rural 
communities have access to latrines and practice hygienic defecation, and to understand the  
factors related to latrine access and defecation behavior, we collected and analyzed data from  
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720 households in 36 communities, including ODF and non-ODF communities. We examined the 
overall sanitation situation in the surveyed hamlets and looked at differences in access to latrines and 
defecation practices based on a hamlet’s ODF status. 
We are careful not to attribute all observed differences in practices between these two groups 
directly to the TSSM program, because these communities were not randomly selected and hamlets 
that became ODF could be different from the non-ODF hamlets. In fact, one of our primary goals 
in examining the practices of the two types of hamlets is to ascertain if indeed there was any 
difference in observed practices. If we observe no differences in practices across these two sets of 
hamlets, it calls into question the standards used to designate hamlets as ODF or the duration for 
which program effects persist. However, we find that the two sets of communities are very similar in 
observed characteristics, and large differences in outcomes for these two communities suggest that 
the TSSM program might have influenced these behaviors. 
Below, we focus on some of the main findings from this descriptive analysis. 
 Most households own a latrine or have access to a shared latrine. Among those 
with latrines, two-thirds have a flush latrine and one in three have a pit latrine. 
More than 80 percent of the households own a latrine or have access to a shared latrine. Nearly 
two-thirds of the surveyed households own a latrine; another 13 percent have access to a latrine 
owned by another household. Use of a communal latrine is relatively uncommon (about 5 percent of 
households); 18 percent of the households do not have any latrine access at all. 
 Latrine access is significantly higher in ODF hamlets compared with non-ODF 
hamlets. 
We observe clear differences in rates of latrine access by hamlets’ ODF status: fewer than  
4 percent of households in ODF hamlets have no access to a latrine, whereas slightly more than  
30 percent have no access in non-ODF hamlets. The almost-universal access to latrines in ODF 
hamlets is consistent with the TSSM program’s intent to improve latrine access as an essential step 
to eliminating open defecation. 
 Households in ODF hamlets were more likely to have pit latrines. 
The difference in latrine access across the two sets of communities comes from the ODF 
hamlets having more access to nonflush latrines. This is consistent with the intent of the TSSM 
program, which encouraged households to build any type of latrine as a first step to improving 
sanitation practice, even if these latrines were of a fairly basic variety, rather than wait until they 
could afford to build more expensive flush latrines. Latrines in ODF hamlets also were of a more 
basic variety. 
 Exclusive latrine use is almost universal in hamlets declared ODF, but almost  
40 percent of those in non-ODF hamlets openly defecate, mostly in rivers. 
Overall, more than three-quarters of the respondents report having exclusively used a latrine in 
the previous week, whereas about one in five did not use one at all. Very few respondents had access 
to a latrine and still openly defecated. Almost all of those with access to latrines therefore tend to 
use them, despite the fact that many of the latrines are in poor or dirty condition. There are large 
differences in latrine use by hamlet ODF status: 94 percent of individuals in ODF hamlets 
exclusively used latrines in the previous week, whereas only 61 percent in non-ODF hamlets did so. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 xxvi  
 Cost is reported as the most common reason for not having a latrine. 
Among those with no access, almost 90 percent reported high cost as the main reasons they did 
not have a latrine. In addition, in non-ODF hamlets, in which more than 30 percent have no access 
to latrines, about 60 percent of those without access were dissatisfied with open defecation, 
suggesting that many of them would like to change behavior if the cost issue is addressed, perhaps 
through low-cost options. 
 Latrine construction is funded mainly out of household savings and income. 
Personal savings or income account for the vast majority of funding for latrine construction  
(86 percent), rather than other sources, such as loans. This suggests that, in practice, families invest 
in latrines only after accumulating sufficient savings. This could clearly represent a barrier to latrine 
construction for households that do not have such savings. 
 Respondents generally have a high degree of knowledge about sanitation, except 
regarding the health hazards of openly defecating in a river and openly defecating 
far from where people live. 
The average respondent has a relatively high degree of knowledge about sanitation, the spread 
of disease through touching feces, and the transmission of disease. Nearly 45 percent did not know 
that defecating in a river was a problem and nearly 30 percent thought defecating openly was not a 
problem so long as it was far from where people lived. This suggests that an important gap in 
knowledge exists regarding the transmission of contamination and diseases from open defecation 
when feces do not visibly contaminate the immediate environment. Because we saw earlier that the 
vast majority of open defecation takes place in rivers, this implies that a lack of information 
regarding the health hazards of defecating in rivers might still be a particularly important barrier to 
eliminating open defecation. 
 Knowledge about sanitation was higher in ODF communities than in non-ODF 
communities. 
Sanitation knowledge is significantly better in ODF hamlets, consistent with the idea that the 
program successfully disseminated information about good sanitation practices to a greater extent in 
these communities. Specifically, there is less of a knowledge gap about the dangers of defecating in a 
river and openly defecating far from where people reside in ODF hamlets. 
 Latrine ownership is significantly lower in households with younger heads and 
lower socioeconomic status, for those who perceive low latrine use in their 
hamlets, and for those with lower levels of knowledge about sanitation. 
These findings are consistent with the previous evidence that latrine construction in these 
settings typically requires an expensive payment out of household savings: younger families might 
not have accumulated sufficient resources. There are strong differences in the probability of latrine 
ownership by household socioeconomic status. Compared with the wealthiest quartile, in which the 
probability of ownership is nearly 90 percent, ownership in the other quartiles is significantly less 
likely (67 to 47 percent among the poorest). 
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E. Lessons Looking Forward 
Our findings suggest that TSSM is a promising approach the implementation of which can be 
further refined in order to achieve its targets for large-scale ODF gains and increased access to 
improved latrines. Next, we describe some lessons for the implementation of TSSM going forward. 
 Conduct program advocacy to create high levels of buy-in among multiple 
stakeholders, especially the bupati. 
Because TSSM requires substantial investment from a wide range of stakeholders at all levels, it 
is important to generate broad-based support for the program. Strong and ongoing program 
advocacy to the bupatis is especially necessary because their support can motivate stakeholders at 
every level of government to devote the substantial time, effort, and resources required to make the 
program a success. 
 Create strong coordination mechanisms. 
TSSM implementation is strongest when there are high levels of multisectoral coordination at 
all administrative levels. Specific steps and responsibilities should be identified in determining how 
program implementation will facilitate this coordination. 
 Ensure adequate commitment of resources for implementation at all levels. 
TSSM requires significant resources at different levels for various aspects of implementation 
and follow-up. Districts might need technical assistance to anticipate the required levels and types of 
resources needed for implementation of various components at district, subdistrict, village, and 
hamlet levels. They might also need assistance in budgeting adequately to meet these needs and in 
identifying existing resources to leverage. 
 Build capacity to conduct strategic selection of triggering locations. 
Areas that saw strong results were strategic about how they chose and sequenced subdistricts, 
villages, and hamlets for program implementation. In particular, choosing geographically clustered 
places, conducting concentrated triggering in those places (that is, triggering all hamlets in target 
villages), and conducting joint triggering (that is, facilitators from multiple villages trigger each village 
together) appear to result in greater success in securing ODF attainment outcomes. These strategies 
generate greater program momentum and competition among villages, allow better leveraging of 
resources, and facilitate sharing of program knowledge. 
 Introduce targeting of specific groups. 
The program could consider developing targeted approaches tailored to specific households 
and people who have a high probability of open defecation. Based on our analysis, this includes 
youth, the less educated, households outside the wealthiest quartile, and those living near a river. For 
example, the program could develop youth education programs at schools. 
 Conduct and devote resources for post-triggering follow-up. 
Triggering on its own was rarely sufficient for changing household sanitation behavior. Both 
attainment and maintenance of ODF outcomes depend on the degree to which there is post-
triggering follow-up (that is, repeat socialization of TSSM messages and targeted follow-up with 
households through monitoring visits). These extra steps can entail substantial time and travel costs 
and require the allocation of explicit resources for them to occur consistently in target areas. 
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 Stress health benefits to improve hamlet and household demand for sanitation. 
Publicizing the health benefits of improved sanitation (for example, showing data on declining 
diarrhea rates) might have to occur on a wider scale. In the few places that did so, we observed that 
it strengthened commitment to implementing TSSM among district, subdistrict, and hamlet officials 
and increased household willingness to access improved sanitation. Paying special attention to 
illustrating the links between river defecation and disease will be especially important. 
 Adopt a phased approach to training large numbers of carefully selected 
suppliers/providers concentrated in a few locations.  
For the supply-strengthening component of TSSM, more careful planning is necessary about 
what it would take to improve delivery at scale. It seems unlikely that triggering a few entrepreneurs 
in each district would result in improvements at scale, even if they were well selected. Similar to the 
phased approach adopted in CLTS, TSSM might be well advised to target a few districts and 
subdistricts at a time and concentrate its training efforts on these administrative units. This would 
allow dedication of resources for more careful selection of trainees, because this seems to be a 
critical determinant of training efficacy. It would also enable the program to conduct a greater 
degree of follow-up and monitoring of trainees, which seems important for gauging whether training 
improves the supply of low-cost options at scale. In the meantime, TSSM could build district 
capacity by creating district master trainers who can phase in training to other areas in the future. 
 Improve the distribution mechanisms of sanitation marketing materials.  
The demand-strengthening component of TSSM requires more and better strategies and 
mechanisms for disseminating sanitation promotion materials and informed choice catalogs. We 
recommend dedicating greater effort to distributing the informed choice catalog, because local 
stakeholders found that useful but seemed to prefer developing their own posters and other 
promotion materials. 
 Deliver training and sanitation promotion more intensively for poorer hamlets 
and soon after triggering for households near a river. 
Both components of sanitation marketing should focus more intensively on poorer households 
and hamlets. For these households cost can be a prohibitive constraint on upgrading to improved 
latrines, so additional strategies to provide financing might be necessary. Low-cost options should be 
introduced earlier and promoted more vigorously (soon after triggering) for households near a river 
that are usually averse to pit latrines and want to transition directly from open defecation to 
improved latrines. 
 Improve district capacity for data collection and use. 
Data collection at lower levels, even when conducted, is usually reported upward only when 
there is consistent demand at higher levels. District and national officials are likely to request data 
from lower levels regularly and exercise data quality control if they derive some benefit from the 
data. This suggests that in future iterations of the program, districts might need strong technical 
assistance in using data and establishing mechanisms for more regular collection of data. 
 Simplify monitoring indicators for more effective use of scarce district resources. 
In the interim, while districts are still strengthening capacity for data collection, it might be 
worthwhile to reduce and simplify the indicators on which monitoring data are collected. This would 
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facilitate more frequent and systematic data collection by reducing the burden on frontline 
stakeholders (such as village health staff or hamlet health volunteers) who are responsible for data 
collection. 
 Provide greater support for volunteers who form the front line of data collection. 
Provide training to frontline data collectors and find ways to provide token compensation or 
recognition for volunteers to motivate regular data collection or leverage other programs that might 
already provide such compensation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Poor sanitation is an urgent health and development challenge for low-income countries. 
Globally, 1.2 billion people do not have access to any sanitation facilities and resort to open 
defecation (World Health Organization [WHO]/UNICEF 2010). Poor sanitation is a key cause of 
diarrheal disease, which inflicts high morbidity and health care costs. Because poor sanitation 
disproportionately affects poor countries, and the poorest populations within those countries, these 
costs are borne by those who are least equipped to shoulder them (United Nations 2010). According 
to the WHO, diarrheal disease was the third-leading cause of death in low-income countries and 
second-leading cause of death for children younger than 5 in 2004 (WHO 2011a). The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which all member countries of the United Nations have adopted, aim 
to reduce the under-5 mortality rate by two-thirds and reduce the proportion of people without 
access to basic sanitation by half between 1990 and 2015 (United Nations 2011). 
The Water and Sanitation Program (WSP), a multidonor partnership administered by the World 
Bank, focuses on helping poor people obtain affordable, safe, and sustainable access to sanitation 
and water services. In 2006, the WSP launched the Global Scaling Up Rural Sanitation project, 
funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (the Foundation), to improve access to basic 
sanitation and eliminate open defecation among the rural poor. The project sought to create a 
―large-scale demand responsive sanitation program that focus[ed] on behavior change and market 
development to ensure the provision and use of sustainable and affordable sanitation services‖ 
(World Bank 2006). It hoped to reduce diarrhea and to improve health outcomes by making large 
segments of the rural population in target countries open defecation free (ODF). The project 
combined two innovative approaches to stimulating sanitation demand and supply: (1) Community-
Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), which had proven effective in triggering demand for sanitation in 
Bangladesh and India; and (2) Sanitation Marketing, which had shown promise in Vietnam and 
several African countries for strengthening supply of and demand for sanitation services. The Total 
Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing (TSSM) program combined these two interventions and 
complemented them with efforts to strengthen the enabling environment with the objective of 
creating a holistic, sustainable, and scalable program. 
Cognizant that limited piloting was not always effective at identifying whether the program 
would work when applied more broadly, WSP decided to test the program at scale from the 
beginning. TSSM is being piloted at scale in East Java, Indonesia; in Himachal Pradesh and Madhya 
Pradesh, India; and in 10 districts in Tanzania. The three countries were selected because they were 
representative of ―areas of the world where sanitation coverage is the lowest‖ (WSP 2006). To 
examine the effectiveness of this at-scale application, TSSM was designed as a learning program. It 
incorporated a cross-country impact evaluation and learning efforts to identify effective tools and 
strategies for program implementation and replication. A grant from the Foundation funded 
program implementation, which occurred mostly between 2007 and 2010. 
The Foundation contracted with Mathematica Policy Research to examine the implementation 
of the TSSM program in Indonesia, where it is known as Sanitasi Total dan Pemasaran Sanitasi (SToPs), 
and to reconcile some apparent discrepancies in program progress data from two different sources. 
Designed as a learning program, TSSM incorporated several internal studies on different aspects of 
the program, an independent impact evaluation of program effects, and an assessment of changes to 
the enabling environment. However, the learning strategy had not incorporated an external 
implementation analysis to provide details on program execution. As apparent discrepancies 
surfaced between interim findings of the impact evaluation and monitoring reports from TSSM 
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administrative data collection in Indonesia, the Foundation felt it was important to reconcile these 
differences. The Foundation was also interested in a retrospective implementation study to 
understand how the program was implemented in practice and how monitoring data were collected. 
Our study focuses primarily on the implementation of the demand- and supply-strengthening 
components of TSSM in East Java. We did not focus much on the enabling environment because a 
separate study on the topic is currently underway (Robinson 2008). 
The report has three main objectives. First, we explain how key elements of the TSSM model 
were implemented in East Java and identify factors that facilitated success or posed barriers to 
implementation based on visits to six districts in that province. Second, we focus on the data 
monitoring and reporting processes in an attempt to reconcile the differences in findings between 
the two sources. In doing so, we also describe some implications of our observations for 
interpreting the impact findings and lessons for strengthening the data monitoring system. Third, we 
use quantitative data collected from 36 subvillages (known as hamlets) in the six districts to describe 
the sanitation practices of communities in East Java and to compare the sanitation behaviors and 
attitudes of households in communities that have been declared ODF compared with those from 
non-ODF communities. 
In this chapter, we introduce WSP’s approach to improving sanitation access through TSSM in 
Section A. Next, in Section B, we describe the study design, including the research questions we 
examined, the data sources we used, and our approach to the analysis. In Section C, we conclude by 
summarizing our key findings and providing a road map to the remainder of the report. 
A. The TSSM Program 
WSP sought to create and demonstrate a viable sanitation approach that could be implemented 
at scale. Such an approach had to have the following features: (1) it had to be effective in eliminating 
open defecation and increasing sanitation access and (2) it had to be sustainable and implemented in 
a way that fostered its replication at scale even after the TSSM program ended. 
To create an effective approach, WSP began by considering optimal strategies for 
reducing diarrhea. Diarrhea is the second-leading cause of death among children younger than 5 
globally; nearly one in five child deaths, about 1.5 million each year globally, is due to diarrhea 
(WHO/UNICEF 2009). Diarrhea is caused in large part through the spread of pathogens found in 
human excreta of infected individuals. These pathogens can be transmitted to others through the 
fecal-oral transmission route that describes the principal pathways for the spread of infectious 
diarrheal diseases shown in Figure I.1 (Hunt 2006). This cycle is fuelled by the ―five Fs‖: fluids 
(drinking contaminated water); fingers (unwashed hands preparing food or going into the mouth); 
flies (spreading disease from feces to food and water or directly to people, particularly problematic 
where open defecation is the norm); fields (the contamination of soil and crops with human fecal 
matter); and food (eating contaminated food). WSP designed TSSM to block these pathways, 
focusing initially on increasing access to safe sanitation facilities for households, thereby preventing 
the spread of disease through flies, contamination of drinking water, and contamination of soil as 
represented by the first set of barriers in blue in Figure I.1 (WSP 2006). 
WSP recognized that individual household progress would not be sufficient for reducing 
diarrheal diseases and adopted a collective approach. It was important for an entire community to be 
ODF for individuals to avoid contact with fecal matter. Otherwise, households not defecating in the 
open would still be exposed to contamination from other households in the community that did  
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Figure I.1.  The F Diagram and the Fecal Oral Transmission Route 
Sources: Hunt (2006) and WSP (2006). 
defecate in the open and through contamination of public places and water sources. To ensure that 
entire communities could make progress toward becoming ODF, the TSSM program design 
incorporated two elements: (1) it promoted collective action for improved sanitation behavior and 
set collective outcomes as its target; and (2) it recommended an incremental approach to 
improvement in sanitation behavior to ensure that all households, irrespective of their wealth, could 
take some action to eliminate open defecation, thereby sustaining broad-based engagement in the 
program. The sanitation ladder shown in Figure I.2 indicates the stages of household sanitation 
behavior change. 
Figure I.2.  Sanitation Ladder 
Sources: TSSM Jakarta presentation 2010; TSSM Manual, pp. 16 19. 
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Rather than prescribing a particular type of latrine, the program encouraged local innovation 
and choice to ensure that communities found ways of getting on the sanitation ladder. The TSSM 
program to promote collective progress up the sanitation ladder consisted of three elements: 
4. Stimulating sanitation demand among households and communities by working 
closely with local government and community stakeholders to raise sanitation awareness 
and promote hygiene. The program did this in two ways: (1) by holding ―triggering‖ 
events and related follow-up activities for households in target areas using CLTS 
techniques (such as making households aware of the dangers of open defecation and 
invoking shame) to generate collective commitment for ODF attainment;1 and (2) by 
using behavior change communication (BCC), developed as part of sanitation marketing, 
to raise awareness of affordable latrines options and the dangers of open defecation. 
5. Increasing the supply of sanitation products and services by (1) working with and 
supporting manufacturers and providers of sanitation products and services to create 
and provide affordable, context-appropriate sanitation options and train suppliers in 
their provision; and (2) using sanitation marketing promotion materials to market these 
low-cost options to households. 
6. Creating a strong enabling environment by collaborating closely with and supporting 
national-, district-, and local-level political leaders to create policy, institutional, and 
financial frameworks to facilitate implementation at scale. 
WSP planned on implementing this three-pronged TSSM program at scale. In Indonesia, it 
created a TSSM implementation team with which it worked closely to implement the program in all 
districts of East Java.2 Within each district, the TSSM team would demonstrate implementation of 
the program in 30 hamlets. Districts would then be responsible for scaling up the program. 
To foster sustainability and scalability, WSP decided to implement the program directly 
in collaboration with districts. The TSSM team would solicit district demand for participation and 
require districts to provide funds to co-invest in program delivery. It would assign districts to one of 
three phases based on the order in which districts expressed interest to participate and demonstrated 
availability of funds to implement the program. The TSSM team would implement the program in 
30 communities in each district, providing districts with a ―limited window of opportunity to learn‖ 
how to implement this integrated approach to sanitation promotion (WSP 2009). 
The TSSM team assumed that the three elements of the TSSM program—strengthening 
demand, increasing supply, and improving the enabling environment—would work in 
conjunction to eliminate open defecation. In Figure I.3, we map TSSM assumptions on how the 
program would result in scaled-up improvements in access to sanitation, ultimately leading to 
                                                 
1 Triggering is a process that was pioneered by Dr. Kamal Kar of India, and first implemented in Bangladesh, to 
mobilize communities to eliminate open defecation completely. The approach entails using a facilitated process to trigger 
self-realization of community members that they need to change their own behavior. The triggering process is described 
in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
2 For simplicity, we often use the term ―TSSM team‖ or ―TSSM‖ in this report when referring to actions taken by 
either the core TSSM team or jointly with WSP staff. 
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Figure I.3.  TSSM Program Logic 
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reduced incidence of diarrhea and health improvements.3 The program logic underlying the TSSM 
approach is shown in the top half of Figure I.3. The assumption was that CLTS and sanitation 
marketing, conducted in a strengthened enabling environment, would decrease open defecation and 
increase sanitation access, and in the longer term lead to ownership of improved latrines. Making 
households aware of the nature and consequences of open defecation through CLTS techniques 
would result in collective action to improve sanitation behavior. BCC from the sanitation marketing 
component would increase progress toward ODF attainment and encourage maintenance of ODF 
status when it was achieved. As communities became ODF, sanitation marketing would increase 
demand for better sanitation products and training of sanitation marketing suppliers would increase 
supply. This would result in increased access and use of improved sanitation products, enabling 
households to move up the sanitation ladder. 
The lower half of Figure I.3 shows how scale-up would occur. The first step would be to 
demonstrate effectiveness by successfully implementing the program in a target set of hamlets. 
Scale-up would occur as this success created demand for replication of the approach in other areas. 
TSSM’s efforts to strengthen capacity for program implementation among local government 
officials would facilitate expansion to these areas. 
The TSSM team requested districts at the outset of the program to commit funds for TSSM 
implementation and scale-up. They also provided technical assistance to local government officials 
for a certain period. TSSM based its program targets for scale-up on the assumption that TSSM-
targeted hamlets would become ODF and that districts would scale up the program, making 
additional hamlets ODF. In East Java, the target was that 1.4 million people would become ODF in 
the course of program implementation (WSP 2006). Successful outcomes in target areas coupled 
with efforts to build capacity and strengthen the enabling environment would result in the approach 
being scaled up even after the TSSM program ceased to operate until full coverage was achieved. 
B. Research Questions and Study Approach 
The purpose of this report is threefold: (1) it examines program implementation to assess what 
worked and what did not; (2) it assesses the extent of divergence between program monitoring and 
impact evaluation data, reconciles data from the two sources, and identifies ways of strengthening 
monitoring and evaluation processes; and (3) it uses survey data to understand household sanitation 
practices in East Java and compare sanitation behaviors and attitudes of households in ODF and 
non-ODF communities. 
The key research questions that are the focus of this study are as follows: 
 How were key elements of the TSSM approach implemented? What steps 
were taken to prepare local stakeholders for program implementation? How were 
                                                 
3 WSP based its approach and assumptions on certain diagnosis of the factors constraining improved sanitation at 
scale. It assessed that failure to achieve the first step of the sanitation ladder (eliminating open defecation) was a result of 
insufficient household awareness and education regarding the dangers of open defecation. A focus on latrine 
construction and provision of subsidies had failed to empower communities to devise and adopt solutions. It had also 
weakened the private sector’s incentives and capacity for generating cost-effective and attractive solutions. The rural 
sanitation sector was insufficiently developed to provide attractive, low-cost solutions that would enable newly ODF 
households to ascend the sanitation ladder. Moreover, national and local governments had not developed sufficient 
capacity and strategies to enable ―islands of success‖ to be scaled up and replicated quickly in other areas (WSP 2006). 
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CLTS and sanitation marketing components implemented? To what degree was 
there fidelity to intended designs? What were the key issues faced in implementing 
various aspects of the program? Did these differ based on the characteristics of the 
places where the program was implemented? 
 What were some of the key factors affecting attainment and persistence of 
ODF outcomes? What factors constrained or facilitated maintenance of ODF 
status? What strategies did the program and local governments adopt to encourage 
attainment of ODF outcomes? What steps did the program take to maintain ODF 
results? Are elements not factored into program designs critical prerequisites for 
achievement and maintenance of desired outcomes? 
 How effective is the monitoring system and the impact evaluation framework 
in helping assess program progress? Why do these two sources appear to show 
different progress, and how can they be reconciled? What are the lessons learned 
from examining these two sources of data? 
 What are sanitation practices among rural households in the districts we 
visited? What are the knowledge and attitudes toward sanitation in these districts? 
How do household sanitation behaviors and attitudes differ in ODF and non-ODF 
hamlets? 
 What lessons can we identify to strengthen program implementation and results 
measurement? What are some lessons learned about program implementation? What 
are some enhancements that might be needed to facilitate continued sustainability and 
scale-up? 
To answer these questions, we used a mixed-method approach. We relied on qualitative data 
gathered through field visits to six districts. We also used quantitative data that encompassed both 
program monitoring data and survey data that we collected for this study. 
Qualitative data. We relied heavily on qualitative data gathered from a large cross-section of 
stakeholders at the national, provincial, district, subdistrict, and village levels. Appendix A provides a 
list of the types of stakeholders we interviewed at the various levels of government. We met with the 
WSP headquarters team in Washington, D.C., and conducted extensive discussions with the WSP 
staff and TSSM team in Jakarta. We interviewed sectoral stakeholders and other sanitation 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) staff at the national and provincial levels. At the provincial 
level, we spoke with staff from the two resource agencies and the Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember 
(ITS), known locally as ITS Surabaya, which conducted the training for masons. 
To understand program implementation and outcomes in the field, we selected six districts 
where we conducted site visits to meet with district officials, and also visited and interviewed 
stakeholders in subdistricts, villages, and hamlets. We selected two districts from each phase of 
program implementation. We also sought to ensure some geographic representation and included 
districts in the center, north, west, east, and south of East Java. The districts we visited included 
Bangkalan, Bondowoso, Gresik, Jombang, Malang, and Trenggalek, which are represented in the 
map shown in Figure I.4. 
We selected two subdistricts in each district, one or two villages in each subdistrict, and one or 
two hamlets per village that we visited (Appendix B includes a full list of the hamlets we visited). In 
order to understand how program implementation worked, and which aspects worked well and 
which did not, we attempted to select subdistricts and hamlets with some variation in performance. 
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Figure I.4.  Districts and Subdistricts Where Data Collection Was Conducted 
We usually selected one subdistrict with strong performance and one that might not have performed 
as well, using information from the latest monitoring data provided by WSP, dated May 2010. In 
each subdistrict, we selected one or two villages. Within these villages we sought to visit three types 
of hamlets: (1) hamlets that received the program and became ODF, (2) hamlets that received the 
program but did not become ODF, and (3) hamlets that did not receive the program. 
We met with governmental, political, and sectoral authorities at the district, subdistrict, village, 
and hamlet levels, especially those from the divisions implementing the program. We also 
interviewed a range of other stakeholders, including health volunteers, masons, and households 
(Appendix A). During our visits to hamlets, we conducted focus groups with households to 
understand determinants of sanitation choices and learn about household experiences with TSSM 
program implementation. In the hamlets we visited, we conducted transect walks through the hamlet 
and along the river (if there was one) and conducted direct observations of toilet facilities of various 
types in a few households. 
We used a systematic approach to gathering information from a variety of stakeholders. We 
identified key areas or domains in which we wanted to obtain information and the types of 
information we wanted for each domain. We developed a source grid, which identified the sources 
that could reliably provide information on each domain of interest. We then developed a set of 
semistructured protocols to ensure that we covered all key items and collected data in a standardized 
fashion so we could obtain consistent information across all six districts. The protocols also 
included open-ended questions to collect information about unanticipated challenges or successes. 
We conducted our first site visit to Jombang in July 2010. Based on the input from that visit, we 
further refined our protocols and conducted the remaining five site visits in October 2010. We 
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worked closely with a team of local researchers that arranged the visits with relevant stakeholders or 
program implementers at the provincial, district, subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels, with 
introductions to provincial and district officials provided by the WSP team in Jakarta. Guided by our 
protocols, the local researchers conducted most of the interviews and all of the focus groups. We 
attended and participated in most of the interviews and focus groups (using local translators who 
translated on a real-time basis) enabling us to ask follow-up questions as appropriate. 
Quantitative data. We examined information from the program monitoring data gathered and 
maintained by TSSM staff and used information from the baseline survey and longitudinal 
monitoring data provided by the impact evaluation team.4 We also selected 36 hamlets in which we 
conducted surveys among randomly selected households to learn about the sanitation practices of 
households. We had included most of these hamlets in our field visits. They consisted of 
approximately half that were ODF and half that were not ODF (some might have been triggered 
but had not become ODF, whereas others were not triggered). We developed a survey instrument to 
address key dimensions of sanitation in the rural Indonesian context, using as inputs previous 
surveys on sanitation and context-specific knowledge and information gained through our field visits 
and focus groups. Two international sanitation consultants reviewed the instrument and provided 
valuable input. Survey Meter, our local data collection partner, piloted the instrument and refined it 
in light of the findings to arrive at the final version. Data collection was conducted in January 2011 
and included surveys with 20 randomly selected households in each of the 36 hamlets for a total 
sample of 720 households. 
Review of relevant literature. In addition to reading the more general relevant literature on 
sanitation in Indonesia, we also conducted an extensive review of TSSM materials. These materials 
consisted of learning products and other reports produced by WSP; program materials and 
documents, including the TSSM manual produced for Indonesia; and other materials provided by 
the WSP team in Jakarta or obtained from the districts. 
Analysis approach. We based our approach to analyzing the qualitative data on the conceptual 
framework underlying the TSSM model as well as the planned implementation of the program. We 
examined the extent to which the program was able to deliver the intervention as planned for the 
various components and explored reasons for deviations when they occurred. We also focused on 
learning about program successes and challenges, and the potential reasons underlying these. Key 
elements of our analysis of the qualitative data were as follows: (1) we used more than one 
perspective on key domains; (2) we examined the consistency (or lack thereof) of types of 
information across the districts we visited, as well as across the levels of respondents we interviewed; 
and (3) we triangulated the information we received from various qualitative sources, assessing the 
extent to which multiple respondents provided similar inputs and insights. This helped provide us 
with a fuller understanding of program implementation. 
Our analysis of the quantitative data included both descriptive tabulations and multivariate 
modeling; we describe such modeling in greater detail in Chapters VI and VII, where we describe 
the findings from these analyses. 
                                                 
4 We also had several conversations with the TSSM impact evaluation lead at WSP in Washington, D.C., as well as 
one of the lead researchers conducting the impact evaluation in Indonesia, to learn more about the impact evaluation 
design and the randomization process. 
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Limitations of our study. Because the study was commissioned in the final year of the 
program, largely after implementation had ended, some limitations exist: 
 Asking about program implementation three years after the program began meant 
we were entirely dependent on respondents’ recall. We did not have the opportunity 
to observe implementation activities or to assess knowledge and attitudes about a 
program currently under implementation. 
 Turnover in staff positions within the WSP and TSSM teams and among political and 
administrative officials at various levels of government made it difficult at times to learn 
about specific details related to program adoption and implementation. 
C. Overview of Findings and Road Map of the Report 
This report focuses on our findings about TSSM program implementation. Overall, we 
observed pockets of great success in TSSM implementation among districts and subdistricts, but 
also instances of weak implementation and limited results. ODF gains were driven primarily by the 
CLTS component, because implementation of the sanitation marketing was delayed and weakly 
delivered. District and subdistrict variation in performance and success was bound to occur given 
differences in local conditions, existing capacity, and motivation of local officials. In addition, how 
well the TSSM program helped local governments prepare for and implement the program 
influenced district performance. Critical determinants of program success included the degree of 
early buy-in and commitment for the program, availability of sufficient resources, strategic decision 
making, and the extent of multisectoral coordination and commitment at all administrative levels. In 
this report we intend to examine the nature and determinants of variances in implementation and 
results to identify lessons for future program improvement and scale-up. 
In Chapter II we describe the policy, political, and administrative contexts for TSSM 
implementation to facilitate an understanding of program execution. The next three chapters explain 
how different components of the program were implemented, based on information from our field 
visits in East Java. In Chapter III, we describe how the TSSM team worked with the national, 
provincial, and local governments to prepare them for program execution, and how the team 
identified strategies for implementation. In Chapter IV, we examine how the TSSM team designed 
and delivered CLTS with the goal of creating sustainable and scalable mechanisms for triggering 
demand for sanitation among households and communities. In Chapter V, we assess how sanitation 
marketing—which included BCC, product development, and training of suppliers and providers—
was implemented to strengthen supply of and demand for sanitation products and services. 
In Chapter VI, we describe our use of monitoring data and information from our field visits to 
explore reasons for apparent divergences between the program monitoring and impact evaluation 
data. We also assess the process used for obtaining program monitoring data, and draw some 
lessons for enhancing the process of obtaining monitoring data in a more sustainable manner as the 
program scales up, as well as lessons for future impact evaluation studies of programs at scale. In 
Chapter VII, we use survey data to understand sanitation behaviors among households in the six 
districts that are the focus of our study, and we compare sanitation practices of households in ODF 
and non-ODF communities. In Chapter VIII, we conclude by distilling lessons learned for program 
implementation, scale-up, and monitoring. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 11  
II.  CONTEXTS OF TSSM IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of any large-scale initiative must be understood in the context in which it 
operates. TSSM was a new and ambitious program that was implemented in complex policy, 
political, and administrative contexts. The program devised a three-pronged approach to tackling the 
task of ending open defecation: (1) it sought to trigger community consciousness of the dangers of 
open defecation to encourage improved sanitation behavior (Community-Led Total Sanitation [CLTS]); 
(2) it used BCC to try to strengthen demand for sanitation products and conducted product 
development and training to enhance supply (sanitation marketing); and (3) it attempted to strengthen 
the enabling environment by developing institutional, financing, and policy frameworks. TSSM 
combined these three components in East Java in an effort to achieve rapid gains in eliminating 
open defecation. 
In this chapter, we provide contextual information to help shed light on the program design 
and execution, as well as the implementation successes and challenges we describe in subsequent 
chapters. In Section A we provide background on the sanitation policy context that might have 
influenced how TSSM was received. In Section B, we describe the political and administrative 
contexts in which the program was executed, which affected TSSM implementation. In Section C, 
we highlight some features that made TSSM different from earlier approaches to sanitation that had 
been adopted in Indonesia. Finally, in Section D, we delineate the broad categories of tasks the 
TSSM team had to execute to implement the program successfully. 
A. Sanitation Policy Context 
Inadequate access to sanitation has been a longstanding problem in Indonesia and is particularly 
acute in rural areas. In 2005, 38 percent of the rural population in Indonesia defecated in the open, 
compared to 16 percent of the urban population (WHO/UNICEF JMP 2010). Open defecation in 
rural areas has decreased over time (a 10 percentage point decrease compared to rates in the 1990s). 
However, Indonesia needed to accelerate progress in this area to meet the MDG target of halving 
the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation by 2015 (WHO/UNICEF JMP 2010). 
Improving sanitation is a priority because of the high economic and health costs of poor 
sanitation and hygiene in Indonesia. A WSP study estimated the economic costs to be as high as 
Indonesian Rupiah Rp56 trillion (US$6.3 billion) in 2006. The same study estimated that poor 
sanitation and poor hygiene contributed to 120 million disease incidents and 50,000 premature 
deaths annually (Napitupulu and Hutton 2008). All these factors underscored the urgent need to 
find a replicable and scalable solution to increase rural access to sanitation. 
In the past, sanitation policies and programs had attempted to tackle the problem by providing 
material or financial assistance. Starting in the 1960s, the Government of Indonesia and donors 
experimented with a variety of interventions to improve water and sanitation standards and 
outcomes. They focused on free latrine construction or infrastructure development for villages or 
households, or on the distribution of subsidized building materials and loans. The central 
government started adopting subsidy-oriented programs in the 1970s (Mukherjee and Shatifan 
2009). Similarly, the World Bank’s first Water Supply and Sanitation for Low Income Communities 
(WSSLIC) loan and grant project to Indonesia, which was administered between 1993 and 1999, 
built communal toilets to encourage improved sanitation outcomes. The second Water and 
Sanitation for Low Income Communities (WSLIC-2) project in Indonesia, administered between 
2000 and 2008, focused on sustainable water and sanitation systems, including community 
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participation to promote sustainable systems. It also experimented with providing revolving funds to 
help finance latrine construction for poor families. 
These programs yielded limited results for several reasons. Despite substantial investment in 
sanitation, open defecation persisted as a problem in many Indonesian provinces. A rapid 
assessment of the WSLIC-2 project found that, despite a US $2.1 million investment by the project 
in revolving funds, less than 1 percent had been repaid and access to sanitation was negligible among 
the poor households of target communities (Willets et al. 2009). WSP attributed the failures of 
previous latrine construction and revolving funds projects to the following reasons. First, ―elite 
capture‖ of subsidized latrines and loans occurred, whereby wealthier and better-connected 
households—rather than the poorer households that were the intended beneficiaries—received 
program benefits. Second, constraints on the government’s ability to finance these expensive 
approaches at scale limited the reach of these programs. Third, even if these programs succeeded in 
reaching the rural poor, they could not change households’ attitudes toward sanitation. The 
government and donors noted that latrines provided to households often fell into disuse or disrepair 
(Mukherjee and Shatifan 2009; Frias 2008; Robinson 2005).5 Many households simply did not appear 
to consider access to and use of latrines a priority. Nor did they consider open defecation, 
particularly in moving water such as rivers, to be a health risk. The fact that water washes away the 
feces led many households to believe open defecation was a hygienic practice. Since open defecation 
was by and large a culturally acceptable practice, households faced little social pressure to adopt or 
use latrines (Nielsen Indonesia 2009). 
National-level stakeholders recognized that an alternative approach focused on behavior change 
might be necessary. Since previous efforts had not been successful, these officials were open to 
moving national policy away from subsidy- and infrastructure-driven approaches and toward 
behavior change interventions, such as CLTS. They began by piloting CLTS in a few WSLIC-2 
districts and subsequently became willing to adopt TSSM at scale. (The process for introducing 
CLTS is described in greater detail in Chapter III). The key element of the TSSM program was the 
provision of ―software‖ support in the form of training and technical assistance, as opposed to 
―hardware‖ support in the form of products and subsidies. WSP chose not to use subsidies because 
it felt that provision of subsidized or free materials, in the absence of household awareness, would 
not result in genuine and lasting behavior change to eliminate open defecation. 
However, local officials and stakeholders were less convinced. Despite these national-level 
changes in the policy environment, district and village stakeholders and households reportedly 
remained habituated to subsidy-driven sanitation programs. Expectations of similar assistance posed 
challenges to a program that was not subsidy-driven and did not offer material or financial support. 
WSP recognized that TSSM implementation entailed convincing these stakeholders of the 
importance of behavior change and the related health benefits; to meet that need, it incorporated 
―road shows‖ or socialization workshops and meetings at all levels of government to advocate and 
build support for a non-subsidy approach. 
                                                 
5 These findings were confirmed by several stakeholders we interviewed at the national, provincial, and district 
levels, who noted that, even when eligible households received latrines, they often allowed the latrines to fall into 
disrepair or used them for alternate purposes such as storage. 
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B. Political and Administrative Contexts 
The political and administrative contexts in which a program operates play an important role in 
the implementation of most large-scale interventions. These contexts are particularly important in 
the case of TSSM because, in a decentralized environment, local governments were primarily 
responsible for administering and delivering the program. 
After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, widespread opposition to the highly centralized 
nature of government resulted in decentralization reforms that devolved power primarily to districts, 
bypassing provincial governments. Local district governments led by elected heads known as bupatis 
became very powerful. These administrative reforms had a major effect on the implementation of 
health sector programs. Before decentralization, national governments selected, funded, and 
implemented sanitation programs. The provincial governments executed them with assistance from 
the districts and subdistricts. After decentralization, the role of the central government shifted to 
setting national priorities and strategies that districts would implement. Provincial authorities 
provided guidance, oversight, and limited funds to the districts, while districts wielded the majority 
of the decision-making, budgetary, and implementation authority over programs. 
WSP, therefore, worked with national and provincial governments to strengthen the enabling 
environment for TSSM, but primarily partnered with district governments to implement the 
program. 
Several sectors are involved in setting national sanitation policy. Depending on the nature 
of the sanitation program being implemented, a range of sectoral administrative institutions and 
stakeholders can be involved. At higher levels of government, the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the 
Ministry of Public Works are usually responsible for the adoption and implementation of sanitation 
programs. (These are known as the Health Office and Public Works Office at subnational levels.) 
The division of responsibility for sanitation between the Health and the Public Works ministries is 
not always clear and can vary based on the nature of the program. Historically, the MoH runs 
behavior change and rural sanitation programs in Indonesia, whereas infrastructure-oriented 
programs, such as those that focus on latrine construction or urban sanitation programs including 
waste management and drainage, fall in the domain of the Ministry of Public Works. The relative 
distribution of budgets, which can differ from year to year, can also affect the roles of the two 
departments. The National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) has significant 
responsibilities—it allocates budgets, coordinates multisectoral programs, and assists with national 
policy and strategy development (The agency is known as Bappeda at subnational levels). In principle, 
these three entities should coordinate closely when implementing sanitation programs. Other 
ministries—such as Home Affairs, Environment, Education and Culture, and Finance—can also 
play a role depending on the nature of the intervention. 
Several levels of government and sectoral administration are relevant to TSSM. These 
levels, in descending order of administrative levels, are national, provincial (propinsi), district 
(kabupaten), subdistrict (kecamatan), village (desa/kelurahan), and hamlet (dusun). East Java, where 
TSSM was implemented, consists of 29 rural districts (or regencies) and nine cities; it has a 
population of more than 37 million people, with a rural population of 32.8 million (Badan Pusat 
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Statistik 2009).6 Districts vary in geography, resources, wealth, culture, capacity, size, and population. 
In East Java, a district can consist of between 12 and 25 subdistricts. Subdistricts in turn typically 
contain seven to nine villages.7 The village is the lowest organizational level of government with 
elected officials. Villages, however, are further divided into hamlets (usually four to five per village), 
which have hamlet heads who are responsible for local administration. Some hamlets, especially 
larger ones, are subdivided into smaller administrative neighborhoods known as Rukun Wargahs 
(RWs), which may in turn be divided into even smaller administrative household clusters known as 
Rukun Tetanggas (RTs). In the interest of simplicity, we group the dusuns, RW, and RT levels into one 
category, and typically refer to them as hamlets.  
A number of political and sectoral stakeholders at each level can affect the implementation of 
sanitation programs. To varying degrees, political leaders can influence the adoption and 
implementation of programs such as TSSM. Their influence can affect the resources dedicated to a 
program and can prioritize and mobilize support for implementation. As implementation partners, 
sectoral stakeholders can more directly influence program execution. Figure II.1 shows the cascading 
pillars of influence at the provincial and district levels. 
Figure II.1.  Cascading Structure of Politicial and Sectoral Adminstration 
                                                 
6 Provinces are divided into regencies/districts (kabupaten) and cities (kota). Because TSSM is focused on rural 
sanitation, kotas are not relevant to our discussion. 
7 There are two types of villages: (1) the desa, which is a rural subdivision, and (2) the kelurahan, which is generally 
an urban subdivision and therefore not relevant to our discussion. 
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The first cascading pillar consists of political authority within districts that affects the 
implementation of programs such as TSSM. Even though Indonesia is highly decentralized, a 
top-down culture characterizes the government, especially at and below the district level. The elected 
leaders, from the district head (bupati) down to the heads of villages, hamlets, RWs, and RTs (kepala 
desa, kepala dusun, kepala RW/RT), comprise a chain of command.8 In general, the bupati sets the 
agenda and priorities for district government, which the political and administrative authorities 
below him must support, promote, and implement. These elected officials can influence program 
implementation with their legal powers (that is, the ability to issue decrees and directives) and their 
moral authority as elected and appointed officials. Even the subdistrict head (camat), who is an 
appointed civil servant, can draw on his authority as a representative of the district head to issue 
directives relevant to sanitation and ensure disbursements of funds for sanitation. 
The second pillar of authority is the program implementation sector, which in the case of TSSM 
was the provincial health office (Dinas Kesehatan [Dinkes]) Provinsi) and the district health offices 
(Dinas Kesehatan Tingkat Kabupaten). Within the Dinas Kesehatan departments at each level, two 
divisions are particularly relevant to implementation of the TSSM program: (1) the Environmental 
Health division (Dinas Kesehatan Lingkungan [Kesling]), the primary implementing unit for sanitation 
programs, and (2) the Health Promotion division (Promosi Kesehatan [Promkes]), which focuses on 
raising awareness about health issues. 
Each subdistrict has a Health Center (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat [Puskesmas] Tingkat Kecamatan) 
that reports to the district health office. Puskesmas are instrumental in the implementation of health 
and sanitation programs, as well as for frontline health service delivery. In addition to the head of 
the Puskesmas, other relevant stakeholders include the sanitarian, the midwife, and the health 
promotion officers. Puskesmas oversee a range of village-level offices, including the Integrated Health 
Post (Pos Pelayanan Terpadu [Posyandu]), the Subhealth Center (Puskesmas Pembantu—[Pustu]), and the 
village midwife clinic (Pondok Bersalin Desa (Polindes). In addition to the official staff at these village-
level institutions, the Puskesmas can traditionally draw on the services of a wide network of village- 
and hamlet-level volunteers, known as cadres (WHO 2011b). 
Administrative personnel in each sector report to their institutional superiors and to the 
relevant political authority at their level. For example, the district planning, health, and public works 
offices follow the agenda of the district head. However, the guidelines, regulations, and codes issued 
by their relevant national ministries and the standards devised by the higher-ranking provincial 
departments also influence them. Because the district heads (bupati) wield executive power and 
control the largest share of the district’s budget, they tend to have the greatest direct influence on 
policies and programs. 
This hierarchical set of political and administrative stakeholders illustrates the extent of 
coordination and degree of planning and sequencing necessary for program implementation. 
                                                 
8 Except for the subdistrict level, where district heads appoint the subdistrict heads (camats), other government 
levels down to the village have formally elected political representatives as their leaders. The formal reporting structure 
encompasses elected officials of the lowest administrative levels (that is, village heads) reporting directly to the elected 
district head (bupati). In practice, the official representative at each level influences his or her counterparts at the lower 
levels. Thus RW and RT heads take their cue from the head of hamlet, who in turn follows the instructions of the head 
of village. The head of village in turn is influenced by the subdistrict head (camat), who executes the priorities of the 
bupati. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 16  
C. Key Features of the TSSM Approach 
TSSM consisted of several features that were novel in the context of Indonesian sanitation 
programs. Implementation within a decentralized administrative context and a sanitation policy 
context with a long history of subsidy interventions compounded the program design’s complexity. 
TSSM was an ambitious, new approach that tested and implemented multiple 
components in a short time frame. The TSSM program sought to strengthen multiple dimensions 
of the sanitation sector simultaneously, making it a complex intervention to implement. CLTS, a key 
element of TSSM, had been tested with some success in a few subdistricts in Indonesia but had not 
been implemented at scale (Mukherjee and Shatifan 2009). Sanitation marketing had been 
successfully adopted in other countries, such as Vietnam, but it was a new approach that had never 
been combined with CLTS in Indonesia. The program also sought to strengthen the enabling 
environment and to establish local ownership of the interventions. To execute TSSM successfully, 
the team had to develop, test, improve, and implement multiple program components within three 
years. 
This approach had an ambitious target of province-wide scale-up. The TSSM program 
differed from the previous implementation of the CLTS approach in Indonesia in that, rather than 
implementing the program in certain target communities on a small scale, its goal was province-wide 
implementation in ways that would lead local governments to fund, adopt, and replicate the program 
in the future. In doing so, the program had to strike a balance between competing objectives. It had 
to provide enough support and specific technical assistance to ensure a robust implementation with 
a strong demonstration effect. At the same time, it had to allow local governments to take the lead in 
program decision making and implementation authority to ensure that they developed capacity and 
took ownership so they could implement at scale. 
To foster sustainability, WSP delivered the program through local governments, a 
challenging task. To make the program sustainable, WSP had to focus not simply on delivering the 
intervention but also on building district capacity and buy-in so that districts could implement and 
sustain the intervention. WSP’s approach was to provide technical assistance to local governments 
for implementation. In doing so, it had to contend with low levels of district capacity compared with 
some other countries that had implemented TSSM (Rosensweig and Kopitopoulos 2010). WSP had 
to plan for great diversity among district partners in terms of capacity, engagement, resources, and 
culture. It had to devise a program design that was structured enough to provide meaningful support 
to all districts, but flexible enough to accommodate the many differences among the districts and 
their component subdistricts. 
D. Key Steps for Implementing TSSM 
To implement the program in a sustainable and scalable way, TSSM had to strategize its key 
activities carefully. Given the features of the TSSM program—and the sanitation and political and 
administrative context in which it was implemented—WSP had to accomplish the following broad 
tasks for successful implementation. 
Develop the program approach and help national, provincial, and local governments 
prepare for program implementation. In order to implement the program, WSP had to introduce 
the approach in Indonesia effectively and secure national and provincial buy-in for its adoption. 
Then WSP had to assemble a TSSM implementation team with the requisite expertise and work with 
it to determine an organizational model that would allow effective collaboration with various levels 
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of local stakeholders. Then, the TSSM implementation team had to find ways to help local 
governments develop program delivery mechanisms and secure the buy-in of key stakeholders for 
successful implementation. The team had to plan and execute these tasks in a manner that would 
establish the framework and conditions for sustainable and scalable TSSM delivery. 
Determine how to deliver CLTS with a view to ensuring sustainability. CLTS had been 
previously implemented in Indonesia and several of its key features had been tested. TSSM now had 
to adapt the approach for delivery of CLTS at scale through local governments. The first step was to 
prepare districts, subdistricts, and villages for ―triggering‖— helping hamlet members recognize the 
need to change sanitation behaviors. This included helping districts develop strategies for identifying 
locations for triggering, and building capacity at all levels for conducting the CLTS triggering and 
monitoring activities. The next step was to conduct triggering in a set of hamlets and perform 
follow-up activities to achieve ODF outcomes, which local authorities would then replicate in more 
hamlets. The final step consisted of developing strategies to promote ODF attainment in 
communities, verifying community reports of ODF achievement and providing awards, and 
conducting follow-up to encourage maintenance of ODF gains. 
Determine how to develop and deliver sanitation marketing. Unlike CLTS, sanitation 
marketing was an entirely new approach in Indonesia that the TSSM team had to design from the 
beginning. TSSM first had to invest time and resources to learn about market conditions, prepare 
sanitation marketing content and strategy, and build support for its adoption. Actual implementation 
of sanitation marketing consisted of developing and disseminating sanitation marketing materials for 
behavior change to strengthen demand. At the same time, TSSM developed and implemented 
supplier training to enhance the supply of hygienic and affordable latrine options. 
The next three chapters describe how TSSM approached each of these activities, and identify 
strategies that worked well and those that need improvement. 
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III.  SETTING UP THE TSSM PROGRAM AND PREPARING  
FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
When complex programs are introduced at scale in a country, the early stages of development 
and planning are important in setting the course for program performance. The initial set-up 
activities were particularly important in the case of TSSM because the intervention consisted of 
multiple components and implementation required the participation and support of many types of 
stakeholders at different government and administrative levels. 
This chapter examines the initial set of activities that WSP undertook in collaboration with local 
stakeholders to develop the program and prepare for implementation.9 In Section A, we discuss the 
team that WSP assembled to implement TSSM and the organizational model it devised to ensure 
adequate engagement of relevant stakeholders. In Section B, we describe the TSSM team’s strategies 
for securing local government buy-in and establishing coordination mechanisms. Finally, in Section 
C we assess district resource allocations for effective and sustainable implementation.   
We base our descriptions of implementation in this and subsequent chapters on observations 
during field visits to six districts in the summer and fall of 2010. As noted earlier, we conducted 
those visits more than three years after the program started, during a period when program activities 
were nearing completion. We relied on discussions with the TSSM team and stakeholders at the 
national, provincial, district, subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels, trying to draw on as many relevant 
stakeholders as possible who were familiar with the program. However, given the timing of the  
                                                 
9 In this chapter, we focus largely on the preparations for implementation of the CLTS component of the program. 
Preparations for the sanitation marketing component are described in Chapter V. 
Key Findings 
 TSSM adopted a tiered approach to program implementation. A central team secured high level buy in from the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) and the National Development Planning Agency. At local levels, TSSM hired resource 
agencies with local knowledge to provide on site technical assistance to district governments. 
 Resource agencies were a suitable mechanism for providing hand on support. Greater alignment was needed 
term capacity building and scale
up objectives. 
 TSSM initially anticipated that adopting a demand responsive targeting approach would automatically generate 
local buy in, a prerequisite for program success. Instead, selection of hamlets occurred as a top down process. 
 Sustained engagement of the bupati and district political leadership proved to be a more effective lever for 
influencing buy in and ultimately program success. Over time, TSSM developed ways to stimulate district/bupati 
commitment, by fostering competition among districts, such as collaborating with JawaPos to include a 
sanitation metric of performance. 
 The TSSM manual indicated the creation of coordination committees as a key step and described the structure 
of needed committees. Its lack of clarity on the responsibilities of the TSSM team, resource agencies, and 
districts in establishing and guiding these committees may have resulted in such coordination committees being 
rare. 
 Local district allocations for TSSM implementation, though critical for program success, were fairly low. This 
placed excessive burden on front line staff. 
 District allocation of funds may need to increase significantly once external TSSM supports ends or the program 
expands to poorer and more challenging areas. 
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study and the fact that there was some turnover in key staff, we also relied on a detailed 
implementation manual developed by TSSM to guide program execution, particularly to provide 
insights on the program’s intent (WSP n.d.). 
A. Adopting a Tiered Program Approach 
A key step for WSP involved assembling a team with requisite expertise to engage with the 
various stakeholders of relevance for TSSM implementation. The TSSM team had to mobilize, 
engage, and build the capacity of multiple stakeholders in order to set in motion a replicable and 
scalable program to eliminate open defecation. 
Creating a tiered TSSM project team was a key step. TSSM project implementation team 
involved a network of staff and consultants responsible for engaging with governmental and sectoral 
partners at national, provincial, and local (subprovincial) levels. At the national level, WSP assembled 
a central TSSM team in Jakarta to generate national support for TSSM and design the technical 
assistance that the program would provide. This team was led by a task leader and consisted of a 
range of technical experts, including a training specialist (who received training from Dr. Kamal Kar, 
pioneer of the CLTS approach), a marketing specialist, and data collection specialists. The central 
team was responsible for securing high-level buy-in, designing TSSM activities, developing materials, 
and supervising and facilitating various program activities, including training and monitoring. WSP 
and the TSSM team leveraged previous efforts to pilot CLTS to build support and momentum for 
introducing and institutionalizing TSSM. (See Box III.1 for a history of CLTS piloting and TSSM 
adoption.) WSP identified MoH and the National Development Planning Agency as key partners 
given their roles in the adoption of sanitation and multisectoral programs. TSSM chose MoH as its 
primary implementing partner and worked closely with the Environmental Health division that 
headed the technical CLTS working group established in 2006. 
Box III.1.  Introducing Community Led Total Sanitation in Indonesia and Adopting TSSM 
The groundwork for TSSM was laid when WSP first introduced CLTS in a pilot as part of the second Water and 
Sanitation for Low-Income Communities (WSLIC-2) program. WSP staff had been impressed by Bangladesh’s successful 
adoption of CLTS during a visit there. They organized a study tour to Bangladesh and India in 2004 to demonstrate 
CLTS’s effectiveness to high-level Indonesian officials from the Planning Agency and the Ministries of Health, Public 
Works, and Home Affairs. Health office staff from two districts also joined the tour. As a result of the visit, officials from 
Planning and MoH became eager to test the approach in WSLIC-2 villages in East Java starting in 2005. Rapid progress 
toward ODF attainment in several of these pilot locations built momentum for adopting the approach more widely in 
other villages and districts. It also started to convince initially skeptical stakeholders that a nonsubsidy approach could 
work. By late 2006, a technical working group on CLTS was established at MoH’s Environmental Health division with the 
express purpose of developing an operational strategy for scaling up CLTS nationwide. A similar study visit in 2005 to 
Vietnam to observe private sector development for improving sanitation supply built support for experimenting with the 
introduction of a sanitation marketing component (Mukherjee and Shatifan 2009). 
After TSSM began, WSP expanded its efforts to create support for TSSM and generate a strong enabling 
environment. It worked closely with MoH, as well as with a range of stakeholders, including MoH’s Central Working 
Group on CLTS and national and district sanitation working groups to stimulate policy dialogues on sanitation. MoH led 
these discussions and focused them on developing and finalizing a strategy document. This strategy drew on the previous 
sanitation policy (National Policy for Development of Community-Based Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation, 
adopted in 2003), past experience with sanitation programs, and learning from CLTS implementation. WSP incorporated 
lessons learned from challenges faced during CLTS replication in pilot districts in WSLIC-2 to make the case for adding 
additional strategies to strengthen the enabling environment and sanitation supply networks. This generated support for 
the holistic TSSM program among working group participants. It ultimately culminated in the issuance of the Ministerial 
Decree and Strategy for Community-Based Total Sanitation in 2008. This strategy made CLTS a central pillar for 
generating community demand for improved sanitation, and included a focus on improving supply and generating 
institutionalization (Mukherjee and Shatifan 2009). 
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WSP seems to have experienced some success in generating strong national-level 
support for TSSM. Although our study focused more on district implementation than the national 
or provincial enabling environment, our discussions with national stakeholders suggest that WSP 
successfully generated buy-in among a wide range of stakeholders for the program and was 
instrumental in forging a supportive policy environment. Most stakeholders we interviewed at the 
national level showed a strong degree of consensus for adopting a participatory, zero-subsidy 
approach for sanitation and an eagerness to adopt supply-strengthening mechanisms. In particular, 
we met several strong advocates within the Planning Agency and MoH. Nonetheless, some 
exceptions existed. For example, the Ministry of Public Works reportedly continued to have some 
reservations that TSSM would result in adoption of low-quality latrines and therefore maintained its 
preference for hardware-focused interventions, such as building latrines. 
At the provincial level, the team hired a regional coordinator who was responsible for providing 
technical assistance to the provincial health office and working closely with other relevant 
departments. The regional coordinator also provided oversight to the various district activities and 
monitored progress. The regional coordinator seemed to have established a strong working 
relationship with the Environmental Health division (Kesling) and seemed to be a point person in 
program implementation. 
At subprovincial levels, WSP relied on local organizations for program implementation. At 
district, subdistrict, and hamlet levels, TSSM delivered the program with the assistance of two 
regional NGOs hired by the TSSM team (also known as resource agencies): (1) Mitra Samya, 
responsible for program implementation in the western half of East Java; and (2) Surya Abadi, 
responsible for program implementation in the eastern half of the province. Staffing of the resource 
agencies included district consultants (one per district), two training specialists, a community 
development specialist, a marketing specialist, and sometimes a technical officer, if required. The 
staff received intensive initial CLTS training and periodic refresher training from the TSSM team. 
The regional coordinator supervised the staff. The role of the resource agencies was to provide 
technical assistance to district implementers. To ensure that resources agencies were able to provide 
adequate levels of support to all districts, TSSM assigned districts to one of three phases, largely 
based in order of district interest in participating. Phase 1 included 10 districts, Phase 2 included 11 
districts, and Phase 3 included 8 districts. The resource agencies planned to work with districts in 
each phase for approximately nine months (Figure III.1). As part of the technical assistance, the 
resource agencies helped districts prepare for implementation and scale-up, build capacity, and 
conduct implementation. For the sanitation marketing component, the TSSM team relied on 
assistance from ITS Surabaya for mason training. It later drew on resource agency staff for training 
of entrepreneurs. 
Figure III.1.  Timeline of Implementation 
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The use of resource agencies with their knowledge of the local context was a strategic 
move on the part of the TSSM team to leverage existing resources. Resource agencies were 
critical for both their local knowledge and their ability to provide on-site, hands-on assistance. The 
district consultants hired by the resource agencies were from the local regions and based in the 
districts. They were, therefore, quickly able to establish relationships with the district and subdistrict 
officials. In most of our field visits, stakeholders repeatedly mentioned district consultants by name 
and appreciated the support they had provided with triggering and follow-up. 
However, there might have been insufficient alignment between agencies’ short-term 
goals of program execution and TSSM’s longer-term capacity-building and scale-up 
objectives. TSSM’s goals were to build capacity at the district level for sustainable scale-up. There 
was a risk, however, that the resource agencies might interpret their mandate more narrowly and 
consider their responsibility to be primarily about triggering and achieving ODF status in the 30 
hamlets for which they were responsible. The resource agencies might focus on program 
performance for the duration of their contracts rather than on TSSM’s longer-term goals. Our field 
visits revealed that the resource agency staff sometimes focused mainly on reaching triggering and 
ODF attainment targets, and perhaps not as much on sustained follow-up. We heard of a few 
instances in which resource agencies’ district consultants appeared to have switched efforts from 
triggered hamlets that proved resistant to behavior change to other hamlets that were closer to being 
ODF in order to show results. They might have done this because they felt pressure to ensure that 
at least some hamlets attained ODF status. 
Monitoring data collection is another area in which the resource agencies might not have 
adequately focused on capacity building. In some instances, for example in Malang and Bondowoso, 
we heard that resource agencies collected data directly from village volunteers or facilitators and 
passed the data on to district officials and WSP staff. Thus, after the period of technical assistance 
ended, data on progress toward ODF goals were no longer regularly collected and collated at the 
district level because no local mechanism for collecting and transferring data had been set up. A 
more appropriate strategy might have focused on training district and subdistrict officials more 
intensively to develop data monitoring systems and helping them build capacity to use the data to 
increase ownership over the data collection process. 
More oversight for resource agencies might be necessary in the future to ensure close 
alignment of TSSM and resource agency goals. If future program expansion will depend on 
technical assistance provided by resource agencies, additional oversight might be necessary. 
Resource agencies might need explicit training and emphasis on the need to build capacity at various 
levels of local government partners. Similarly, setting explicit targets related to capacity building on 
various dimensions of program focus could be important so that resource agencies focus equally on 
these goals. It would also be beneficial to have regular oversight on the activities of the resource 
agencies by including spot checks to find out from beneficiaries and local partners how the resource 
agencies are implementing the program. Such close oversight can provide valuable and timely 
information for course corrections and help to make the resource agencies more accountable for 
sustained improvements. 
A greater clarification of the responsibilities and relationships among the TSSM team, 
resource agencies, and local government partners might also be necessary. The TSSM 
program required action by stakeholders at various levels of administration. WSP developed a 
detailed and lengthy implementation manual to indicate the key steps of TSSM execution and the 
roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders (WSP n.d.). Our review of this manual suggests 
that many steps needed for program success received a great deal of thought; the scope of issues 
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addressed was fairly comprehensive. However, the manual did not always clearly describe who 
would undertake particular steps; the specific responsibilities of the TSSM team, the resource 
agencies, and the district officials were unclear. As a result, subsequent implementation reflected 
weaknesses in execution of some of these activities. We are also not sure when the manual was 
developed and how it was distributed to district-level stakeholders. Although the manual is very 
detailed and might be a good guide for resource agencies or other implementing staff, it could also 
be useful to develop a shorter implementation and program organization guide with clear delineation 
of responsibilities that implementing partners could share and use to inform discussions of progress 
over time. 
B. Securing Local Commitment and Creating Coordination Mechanisms 
The district was the main unit of implementation at scale. Preparing local district governments 
for implementation of TSSM and creating conditions for success among partner districts was critical. 
The most important steps were (1) securing local government commitment and buy-in; and  
(2) establishing effective coordination mechanisms for cross-sectoral implementation.   
1. Securing Local Government Commitment 
From the beginning, the TSSM team recognized that program success depended on high levels 
of local stakeholder commitment within districts. Because TSSM was designed to be implemented 
using primarily local government resources, generating early buy-in was necessary to mobilize both 
the monetary and human resources necessary for implementing the TSSM program. 
TSSM’s key strategy was to adopt a demand-responsive approach to targeting. TSSM’s 
assumption was that securing voluntary and informed participation in the program would engender 
high levels of commitment to implementation. The TSSM manual described the process for 
generating demand-responsive approaches through road shows at various levels. These road shows 
consisted of workshops or socialization events to which relevant stakeholders were invited to learn 
about the key features of the TSSM program and express their interest. To that end, the TSSM team 
held a provincial workshop to which it invited districts’ political and administrative authorities, such 
as the heads of the district and health offices, to explain the TSSM approach and solicit 
participation. This workshop sought to inform districts of the advantages of the TSSM approach 
and to defuse any expectations of subsidies. TSSM also provided technical assistance to districts to 
conduct similar road shows or socialization events at subdistrict and village levels to inform them 
about the program (WSP n.d.). Ideally, these road shows would result in spontaneous expressions of 
demand by subdistricts and hamlets for participation in TSSM. 
A demand-responsive approach did not materialize. In the districts we visited, district 
officials reported holding road shows for subdistricts to inform them of the program. In a few 
districts, all subdistricts were invited to these road shows, whereas in others fewer subdistricts were 
invited, based on district officials’ assessment of locations with adequate resources or their 
perception of a greater likelihood of success. For example, Gresik limited road shows to the three 
subdistricts in which district officials thought there was the greatest likelihood of program success. 
Road shows were less likely to be held at village levels and district or subdistrict officials usually 
selected hamlets. The road shows were sometimes replaced with socialization events at which village 
and hamlets officials learned of the broad parameters of the TSSM approach that would be 
implemented in their area. 
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Our field visits indicate that a demand-responsive approach, particularly at the village or hamlet 
level, was challenging to implement for a number of reasons. Multiple factors constrained the initial 
demand for TSSM at the lower levels. Primarily, this was a nonsubsidy program that included only 
technical assistance. In the sanitation sector, households and local governments were habituated to 
subsidy- and material-intensive interventions. Thus, there was little reason for subdistricts or villages 
to volunteer, as the program entailed substantial additional work for subdistricts’ Puskesmas staff with 
little financial support. For elected village officials, again, there was little incentive to participate in 
the program because it did not bring any subsidy or hardware investments that could be used to 
leverage votes for reelection. Thus, implementing a demand-responsive approach from the outset 
was challenging; after some gains had been achieved and publicized, securing buy-in was easier. 
TSSM shifted to using alternate strategies, such as fostering competition and 
generating district competition and pride, to generate buy-in. Over time, TSSM began to 
explore ways to spur competition among districts and experimented with additional methods of 
generating sustained buy-in. One particularly innovative example was TSSM’s collaboration with a 
respected regional newspaper, JawaPos, which gave prestigious annual ―autonomy awards‖ for 
district performance. At TSSM’s request, JawaPos included sanitation indicators as one of the metrics 
of district performance. In most of the districts we visited, stakeholders mentioned the JawaPos 
award’s inclusion of sanitation indicators as having helped raise the profile of sanitation. In Gresik, 
stakeholders even used it to lobby successfully for more funds for the sanitation sector. Other 
mechanisms included showcasing particularly successful performances of districts, subdistricts, or 
villages. Additional, more sporadically adopted methods included securing buy-in from prominent 
stakeholders by inviting them to high-profile sanitation events in Jakarta or abroad to raise the 
profile of sanitation. 
These attempts should be supplemented with sustained efforts to engage political 
leadership and greater outreach to key agencies. In most places in which we observed success, 
there was excellent coordination and support across departments and high levels of political buy-in 
from political authorities, such as the district head (bupati). Engaging the bupati on an ongoing basis 
might be a particularly effective lever for more widespread engagement, akin to a domino effect. 
When the bupati makes a program a key priority, all the administrative departments at the district and 
lower levels typically follow suit. The planning office allocates funding to the program and the 
various divisions of the district health office focus on using these funds for effective 
implementation. In addition, political and administrative stakeholders at lower levels—including the 
heads of subdistricts, villages, and hamlets—become more motivated to find and devote resources 
to making the program a success when they know it is a priority of the bupati. In Trenggalek, the 
strategic engagement of the bupati had remarkable dividends (see Box III.2). Further, in many of the 
districts we visited, stakeholders—particularly in the health office—noted that issuance of a 
sanitation-related decree by the bupati would have been instrumental in giving them the political and 
administrative authority to push for progress on sanitation outcomes. The subdistrict head can use a 
bupati-issued decree as a basis for issuing a similar decree, in turn empowering village heads to issue 
village regulations. 
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Box III.2.  Strategically Engaging District Heads (Bupatis) 
In Trenggalek, the TSSM team 
collaborated closely with the health office to 
convert the bupati into a strong advocate. Key 
members of the TSSM team devoted 
considerable effort to convincing the district 
head of the value of adopting TSSM and the 
health benefits and savings that could be 
realized from preventative approaches to 
sanitation. An invitation to the bupati to 
participate in sanitation workshops in Jakarta 
and Washington, D.C., proved especially 
critical for transforming the sanitation sector 
into a priority for him. On his return, he 
expanded the budget substantially and became 
engaged in monitoring the program’s progress 
and participating in ODF award ceremonies. 
As a result of the district head’s keen  
attention, the various departments at the 
regional level began to conduct more vigorous 
implementation. One measure that seems to 
have been particularly effective was the bupati’s ―Ramadhan Safari‖ for promoting sanitation. In this effort, the bupati 
visited all subdistricts and a large number of villages during the Muslim holy month of Ramadhan to promote ODF 
attainment and TSSM implementation. It appears to have been extraordinarily effective at raising awareness about TSSM 
and the need to become ODF at lower levels of government. In order to sustain the district head’s commitment to the 
program, the health office presented him with statistics related to the decline in diarrhea and computations of the cost-
effectiveness of this approach. In Trenggalek, as a result in part of high capacity among the district health office and high 
bupati commitment, village triggering rates and ODF attainments rates are very high and a concerted strategy seems to be in 
place for attaining district-wide open defecation elimination. 
2. Establishing Tiered Coordination Mechanisms for TSSM Implementation in Districts 
TSSM desired cross-sectoral coordination to be a key element of program implementation. It 
envisaged the creation of coordination committees as a key mechanism for joint execution of the 
program. According to the TSSM manual, coordination committees would be created for program 
implementation at the district, subdistrict, and village levels, with TSSM providing technical 
assistance to these committees. The committee would secure the engagement of all relevant 
stakeholders (including political, administrative, and civil society sectors). The committees would 
serve two critical purposes: (1) ensuring multisectoral coordination and ownership and  
(2) implementing key program execution tasks. For committees at the higher levels, these tasks 
might include conducting a situational analysis, identifying existing resources and creating budgets, 
developing implementation strategies, and monitoring and oversight. At lower levels, for example at 
the village level, the committees would focus more on frontline activities, such as triggering, follow-
up, and ODF verification and monitoring. (Box III.3 provides a description of the intended 
composition and responsibilities of the coordinating committees at each level.) 
The coordination committees existed and worked well at the national level, but they 
were less effective at the provincial level and often did not materialize at district levels and 
below. In general, multisectoral coordination through committees was high at the national level but 
weaker at lower levels of government. The program had great success establishing coordination 
committees at the national level, which led to the adoption of a sanitation strategy, convergence on a 
nonsubsidy demand-stimulation approach, and a focus on supply enhancement interventions. At the 
provincial level, the sanitation coordination committee existed but the level of multisectoral 
convergence appeared somewhat lower. The provincial health office was the primary implementer 
Receiving an ODF certificate during the Ramadhan Safari 
Source: Trenggalek District Health Office. 
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of TSSM and perhaps did not adequately engage other departments. At the district, subdistrict, 
village, and hamlet levels, we rarely saw the creation of TSSM-specific coordination committees or 
more general sanitation coordination committees. There were some exceptions. Bondowoso had a 
formal district coordination team (or tim koordinasi kabupaten, TKK), which included officials from 
several departments including Health, Education, Public Utility, and Planning departments. Malang 
was another district that had a sanitation coordination group at the district level, but stakeholders 
reported limited cross-sectoral collaboration. In Perak subdistrict of Jombang, strong coordination 
across various health officers at the Puskesmas, as well as with the subdistrict head (camat) and related 
officials, led to effective implementation of the program and to high rates of ODF achievement in 
the subdistrict. 
Taking steps to ensure the creation and effective functioning of desired institutional 
relationships, such as program coordination committees, is important. TSSM will have to 
provide districts with technical assistance on how to set up these committees, define the roles and 
responsibilities of the various partners, and operate the committees effectively. The TSSM manual 
contained a fairly extensive discussion of the nature of the committees and their functions and roles 
Box III.3.  Intended Structure and Responsibilities of Coordinating Committees 
At the national level, a steering committee was supposed to be established that consisted of high-level (Echelon I) 
officials from relevant ministries, including the National Development Planning Agency, Health, Public Works, Home 
Affairs, Education and Culture, and Finance, for devising appropriate policies. A technical team consisting of 
implementing (Echelon II) officials from these ministries was to be created. This technical team would elaborate on the 
operational activities established by the steering committee, allocate funds, and monitor performance. A TSSM program 
secretariat was also going to be developed to support decision making by the steering committee and technical team. 
At the provincial level, a coordinating team was supposed to be created under the leadership of the provincial 
planning office (Bappeda). The team would encompass the following provincial offices: Planning, Health, Public Works, 
Village Community Empowerment Office, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and mass women’s associations such 
as Women and Family Welfare Association (Tim Penggerak PKK and Fatayat). This coordinating team was to be responsible 
for oversight of program implementation, monitoring and evaluation at the district level; advocacy; and allocation of 
budgets and provision of regional budget funds to support interdistrict TSSM activities. 
At the district level the coordinating team would be composed of the following institutions: Planning, Health, Public 
Works, NGOs, and women’s organizations. Its responsibility was to devise TSSM program implementation policies, 
prepare and propose funding to implement the TSSM program, organize responsibilities among the different stakeholders, 
track progress toward ODF attainment, oversee ODF certification of villages, devise competitions among areas to 
motivate ODF attainment, carry out periodic monitoring and evaluation, share information and lessons learned regarding 
effective strategies, and integrate TSSM with other social programs to maximize impact. 
At the subdistrict level, a coordinating team was supposed to be created that consisted of the subdistrict and health 
center (Puskesmas) heads, the sanitarian, community development officers, public works, NGOs, and women and mass 
organizations. The coordinating team was to be led by the subdistrict head and its secretary was to be the Puskesmas head. 
Its responsibilities included providing training for volunteers, preparing a budget for TSSM and proposing it to the district 
government, collaborating with the district coordinating team to certify ODF areas, conducting periodic monitoring and 
evaluation of TSSM progress, integrating the TSSM with other programs, providing technical guidance for TSSM program 
development, and sharing information on lessons learned. 
At the village level, a committee representative of the community as a whole was to be democratically elected. The 
committee was to strive for gender balance, include both poor and rich members of the community, and involve 
community leaders. (The committee could also be established before triggering). The committee would undergo triggering 
training in order to develop self-managed sanitation programs, carry out participatory monitoring of TSSM progress, 
trigger and motivate the community about the importance of access to latrines and hygienic sanitation facilities, develop 
TSSM promotion activities and integrate them with other village-level activities, work with the community to equip schools 
with sanitation facilities, and, together with the community, determine when the area was ODF. 
Source: Based on information from the TSSM Implementation Manual (WSP n.d.). 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 27  
at each level; it also indicated that TSSM would provide training to these committees (WSP n.d.). 
However, it did not explain the responsibilities of the TSSM program relative to district 
responsibilities in the creation of these committees, nor TSSM’s role in ensuring that these 
committees performed the critical implementation tasks to which they had been assigned. This 
lacuna in specification of responsibilities might have resulted in districts often not forming the 
committees, or the committees not maximizing their potential even when created. Some of the risks 
from not forming such committees were lower multisectoral coordination; fewer opportunities to 
gain the support of political authorities; and less clarity regarding who had responsibility for strategy 
formation, budgeting, oversight of implementation, and planning. To avoid these risks in the future, 
TSSM might have to provide assistance to district-level officials to help them understand the 
importance of establishing these institutional relationships. It should also help districts devise 
strategies regarding the alternative implementing relationships and distribution of responsibilities 
that should be pursued in the event that these structures cannot be created. 
C. Securing and Making Effective Use of Resources for TSSM 
Securing adequate resources for TSSM implementation was critical both for early program 
success and longer-term program sustainability. As we shall see in later chapters, TSSM was a 
resource intensive program requiring substantial time and effort from government officials, health 
staff, and a range of unofficial contributors such as health volunteers. Budgeting adequately to 
support the activities of these individuals was important for ensuring thorough program 
implementation. Budget allocations also indicated district prioritization of TSSM to stakeholders at 
all levels and were an early signal to stakeholders of the importance of the program to political and 
sectoral authorities. 
District expenditures on TSSM were typically low; however, substantial variation in 
expenditure levels existed across districts. The TSSM program made co-investment a 
precondition of district participation and worked with MoH to create an enabling environment that 
encouraged investment in sanitation. Its efforts bore mixed success. Among the districts we visited, 
the TSSM program resulted in an increase in the amount of money districts dedicated to sanitation. 
However, as seen in Table III.1 there was substantial variation in the extent of district contributions, 
as well as the degree to which these were maintained over time. For example, among our study sites, 
Trenggalek reported allocating over U.S. $115,000 in total for TSSM program implementation, 
whereas Malang reported allocating less than U.S. $9,000 for the program. Bondowoso started with 
a significant budget but scaled back rapidly.  
Table III.1.  District Budget Allocations for TSSM 
Year Bangkalan 
Bondowoso  
(US$) 
Gresik  
(US$) 
Jombang  
(US$) Malang 
Trenggalek  
(US$) 
2007 33,333 0 0 NA NA 14,222 
2008 0 27,444 0 NA NA 53,333 
2009 17,778 15,000 16,667 NA NA 45,444 
2010 21,111 1,444 33,333 NA NA 2,778 
Total 72,222 43,889 50,000 28,811 8,889 115,778 
Source: Data on Bangkalan, Bondowoso, Gresik and Trenggalek budgets was provided by districts 
during Mathematica site visits. Data on Jombang and Malang budgets is drawn from WSP 
administrative data (WSP 2010b). 
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Data provided by WSP on district budgets, shown in Appendix C, confirmed this skewed 
distribution of expenditure for TSSM. Only 5 of the 29 districts targeted by WSP accounted for  
45 percent of district expenditure on TSSM as of February 2010. The lowest spending district 
Lamongan allocated less than U.S. $3,500 to the program despite having a sizable population that 
was twice that of the high spending district Trenggalek (WSP 2010b). On aggregate, WSP estimates 
of the overall contributions under TSSM by different sources show that local governments account 
for less than 7% of expenditure on the program, which is one-third of WSP’s contributions, and 
one-tenth of household contributions in TSSM target areas (See Figure III.2 below).10 
Figure III.2.  Contributions Under the TSSM Program 
Insufficient resources placed extra burden on front-line program implementers. During 
our field visits, we heard from a range of stakeholders that resources were insufficient. Officials in 
districts such as Gresik cited inadequate resource availability as the reason for limited monitoring of 
program results. Subdistrict facilitators, and sanitarians in particular, cited numerous examples of the 
ways in which resource and staffing constraints impeded their ability to effectively implement the 
program. These examples included insufficient funds for providing food at triggering events or 
hosting ODF celebration events, lack of transportation for conducting follow-up and monitoring, 
and inability to provide token gifts or compensation to health volunteers who assisted with key 
tasks. Saddled with competing responsibilities, it was challenging for these staff to undertake 
additional duties without adequate resources. These constraints were particularly onerous in places 
where Puskesmas staff filled dual posts due to staffing constraints, as observed, for example, in 
                                                 
10 WSP estimates of households’ expenditure on TSSM presumably encompass expenditures on latrines incurred 
by households in target areas since TSSM began. 
aWSP 2011.
bUSAID 2010 and WSP 2011.
cWSP 2010, and WSP 2011.
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Bangkalan. In a number of cases, subdistrict staff working on TSSM reported feeling isolated and 
unsupported in their efforts to implement the program. 
In some cases, facilitators or village or hamlet officials ended up paying for some program costs 
themselves. For example, in Kokop subdistrict in Bangkalan, the village midwife used her own 
resources to make the food and other preparations for the celebratory event when the district head 
(bupati) attended the ODF declaration at the village. In Gresik the female head of the village of 
Katimoho used her personal funds to buy uniforms for TSSM volunteers. Similarly, in Jombang 
sanitarians reported using their own money to provide token gifts for health volunteers who assisted 
with monitoring. For more systematic and thorough implementation of TSSM, districts may need to 
provide resources to cover some of these costs. 
Expenditures under the TSSM program consisted of different kinds of costs, which 
were borne by different sources. In the table below we present data on per-latrine expenditures 
born by different stakeholders. Computing per-latrine costs allows us to understand the level of 
expenditures in relation to outcomes. We did not collect detailed expenditure data for this study. 
However, we used the data provided by WSP on contributions by different sources and change in 
access to latrines under the program to compute very approximate estimates of per-latrine 
expenditure (See Table III.2).11 According to these rough estimates, local government expenditure 
per latrine was relatvely low (U.S. $5 per latrine). These expenditures were mostly for ―software‖ 
inputs, such as triggering activities, training, and so on. WSP contributed U.S. $14 per latrine for 
program development and implementation activities. Households contributed the largest share of 
expenditures (U.S. $46). There contributions were primarily for ―hardware‖, that is for latrine 
construction or improvements. 
Table III.2. Total Expenditures and Per Latrine Expenditures, by Source of Contribution 
 
Total Expenditure  
(in U.S. Dollars) 
Per Latrine Expenditure  
(in U.S. Dollars) 
WSP contributions 2,989,000 $14 
Government contribution 1,000,000 $5 
Household financial contributions 10,000,000 $46 
Total 13,989, 000 $78 
 
Sources: USAID 2010 and WSP 2011. 
Note: Per latrine calculations are based on the estimate that 215,856 new latrines were built or 
accessed under the program as of December 2010. In private correspondence with 
Mathematica, WSP indicated that 906,362 people had gained access to improved latrines as of 
December 2010. To translate this number to an estimate of new latrines built or accessed, we 
use an average household size of 4.2 drawn from our household survey data and assume that 
each household gained access to just one latrine. 
                                                 
11 These calculations should be treated with caution due to the very approximate nature of component data. For 
example, the household financial contribution data provided to us is likely to be an estimate because we observed limited 
data collection of household expenditures on sanitation in districts. Similarly, all the data points are reportedly as of 
December 2010—since we are not relying on primary data collection we cannot verify whether they are all indeed 
collected in the same time period. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 30  
As the program scales up districts may need to assume a greater share of expenditures. 
During TSSM, many of the program implementation costs had been borne by WSP. Some of these 
were one-time costs incurred in establishing the program and developing content and materials for 
training, capacity building, and marketing. However, other activities, like training and monitoring, 
were recurring ones. Many of these recurring software costs will have to be assumed by the districts 
for continued scale-up. Moreover, under the current zero-subsidy approach of TSSM, households 
shouldered the bulk of the ―hardware‖ costs for latrines. As the program expands to poorer areas, if 
districts decide to provide additional material or financial support to the poorest households for 
latrine construction, they will need to factor in some additional costs. 
Technical assistance to help districts conduct systematic planning for effective use of 
limited resources may be needed. Districts have limited resources and they may need help 
figuring out how to use these resources more effectively. Given the additional costs that districts 
may have to assume in the future that were described above, districts may need assistance offsetting 
increased costs through more strategic use of funds and investing more in activities with higher pay-
offs. 
The TSSM manual indicated that coordination councils should conduct situational analyses to 
determine available and required resources and devise budgets accordingly, as well as to identify 
existing programs and resources to leverage. However, it did not indicate how these activities should 
be conducted, the role of TSSM or other parties in these activities, and who should assume these 
responsibilities in the absence of coordination committees. Our observations were that the TSSM 
team and district officials appeared to underestimate the resources required for thorough program 
implementation. As a result, there appeard to be inadequate district financial planning for budgeting 
and distributing resources to subdistricts and village implementers. In the future, technical assistance 
for budget planning could help districts to: 
 Anticipate the various types of resources they will need so that they can 
adequately budget for them. This entails anticipating the needs of the full range of 
stakeholders involved in TSSM implementation and identifying the critical supports they 
need to function effectively. These supports are important both for staff assigned to the 
program and health volunteers (cadres) who were slated to play such a large role in 
follow-up and monitoring. We frequently heard from midwives and sanitarians about 
how it would be important to provide these volunteer workers with token financial 
incentives to give them some motivation to take on additional responsibilities. 
 Leverage resources from other programs and sectors. Some subdistricts, particularly 
more creative or proactive ones, overcame resource constraints by leveraging existing 
programs to conduct follow-up and monitoring. These included programs such as the 
Jumantik (dengue fever elimination) or the Desa Siaga (Healthy Village) program. For 
example, Jombang added monitoring of TSSM indicators to the tasks of volunteers paid 
by the Jumantik program to conduct monthly data collection visits to households. Some 
districts were effective at finding alternate means to motivate volunteers (including praise 
or pressure from the village head or recognition from the subdistrict or district head). 
Some, like Perak subdistrict in Jombang, successfully engaged the private sector to make 
progress towards attaining ODF status (See Box III.4). Highlighting innovative practices 
from districts like Jombang can help motivate other districts to replicate these strategies. 
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 Make more effective use of available funds. Where resources are scarce, it is 
important to develop mechanisms to identify strategies that are working and those that 
are not and re-allocate resources accordingly. For example, when it was clear that 
triggering isolated hamlets was not producing the type of yields that the TSSM program 
had expected, districts might have been encouraged to spend their resources triggering 
fewer sites more intensively by including greater post-triggering follow-up, rather than 
simply targeting larger numbers of communities to trigger.  
The following chapters can help inform decisions to improve resource use by detailing the steps 
taken to implement CLTS and sanitation marketing and indicating which steps were most effective. 
 
Box III.4.  Perak: Effective Use of Scarce Resources 
The Perak subdistrict in Jombang is a good example of resourcefulness. It had almost fully attained ODF, despite 
having limited funds. Subdistrict officials forged close collaboration among stakeholders at all levels to conduct triggering 
and follow-up with the community. They also successfully engaged the private sector to assist with TSSM implementation; 
for example, they invited a prominent cigarette manufacturer to an ODF celebration event, which in turn donated funds to 
buy a large number of latrine components for poorer members of the community. Although the kind of coordination and 
strategic approach to implementation that we saw in Perak was supposed to be routinely conducted, in practice it seemed 
to be more frequent in places that already had a culture of strong intersectoral coordination and where there was clear 
political and social support for the program. Finding ways to replicate this level of coordination, innovation, and resource 
leveraging in lower-capacity subdistricts will be the key to cost-effective scale-up. 
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IV.  IMPLEMENTATION OF CLTS AT SCALE 
One of the key sanitation challenges in Indonesia is the difficulty of getting households to 
appreciate the importance of defecating in hygienic latrines (range of defecation facilities is shown in 
Figure IV.1). Open defecation, especially in rivers, is often culturally acceptable and frequently 
considered to be hygienic. WSP sought to implement CLTS at scale to change this mindset. The 
CLTS approach is specifically designed to stimulate community awareness about the dangers of 
poor sanitation behavior and trigger shame regarding poor sanitation practices. This is intended to 
motivate the hamlet to adopt collective action to eliminate open defecation. The premise is that 
CLTS triggering will encourage households to quickly cease defecating in the open by adopting 
simple, low-cost approaches (for example, digging a pit, sharing a latrine, or making a lid for an 
unimproved pit latrine). After eliminating open defecation, post-triggering follow-up and sanitation 
marketing can encourage households to continue progress up the sanitation ladder. 
As part of TSSM, CLTS was to be implemented at scale and applied province-wide in all 
districts of East Java. TSSM’s theory of change was that if TSSM was able to trigger a set of  
30 hamlets in each district and make them ODF, these hamlets would have a demonstration effect 
and inspire other hamlets and villages to request the intervention. Districts’ participation in 
introducing the program in the original 30 hamlets would build capacity for scale-up in other areas, 
enabling them to expand the program. The combination of increased demand for CLTS combined 
with increased district capacity to deliver the intervention would result in the so-called viral spread 
of the program. The goal of the program was to build district capacity, commitment, and 
momentum to eventually scale up the program to all areas in each district, leading to rapid 
improvements in sanitation outcomes. 
On aggregate, in each district we observed some areas of success in implementing CLTS, but 
also areas where hamlets were triggered to no avail. In some exceptional subdistricts, such as Perak 
in Jombang and Wringinanom in Gresik, these area of success were substantial, encompassing 
Key Findings 
 In each district we visited, we observed some pockets of success, but the scale of success varied 
significantly from small, isolated clusters of ODF hamlets in some districts to entire subdistricts in others. In 
all districts we also observed hamlets that had been triggered but had not become ODF. 
 These pockets of success shared some common characteristics: (1) a high degree of coordination and 
collaboration across various stakeholders at the different levels; (2) a more purposeful geographic clustering 
or village triggering approach (rather than targeting isolated hamlets in villages); and (3) more intensive and 
systematic post triggering follow up and monitoring activities. 
 We were more likely to see lack of progress in places that conducted  diffuse triggering, that is, where a 
hamlet in a village had been triggered but not other nearly hamlets. In these communities, village/hamlet 
heads and households often had only limited awareness of the program. Progress was poorest in 
communities close to a river, regardless of the amount of effort expended. 
 The strategy of triggering individual hamlets did not create a viral effect of inspiring other communities to 
request the CLTS intervention and become ODF, as anticipated by the program. Triggering by itself did not 
appear to be the pivotal event it was meant to be. Most households in focus groups, even those that 
attended the event, recalled it only upon repeated probing. 
 Follow up was an important program component that was not adequately prioritized. Reasons were lack of 
resources for follow up and monitoring and comp
observed when there was repeated socialization, and targeted monitoring through household visits. 
 It will be important to determine how to leverage community resources or support for the poorest 
households, which might not be able to afford even low cost options. 
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Figure IV.1.  Range of Defecation Facilities 
the entire subdistrict or all the villages under a Puskemsas. More frequently they consisted of large 
clusters or significant numbers of villages, as was observed in Dampit in Malang. In other 
subdistricts, the islands of success were fewer and more limited in nature, as observed in 
Bondowoso and Bangkalan. Successful areas shared some common characteristics: (1) a high degree 
of coordination and collaboration across various stakeholders at the different levels; and (2) a more 
purposeful and strategic use of resources in targeting, follow-up, and monitoring. Less successful 
areas were characterized by limited resources that were not spent strategically, lower levels of 
commitment, and closer proximity to a river. As we examine the key activities involved in 
implementing CLTS at scale in this chapter, we will draw out these themes in greater detail. 
Implementing CLTS at scale included three related sets of activities. The first was to prepare local 
governments for triggering, including identifying a strategy to select 30 hamlets for triggering in each 
district and to build capacity for delivering the intervention in target districts, subdistricts, villages, 
and hamlets. The second involved the delivery of the CLTS intervention by triggering hamlets and 
conducting post-triggering follow-up. The third set of activities was to encourage ODF attainment, 
verify and award ODF status in hamlets that eliminated open defecation, and conduct post-ODF 
follow-up.12 
                                                 
12 Routine monitoring of triggered hamlets is discussed in Chapter VI on measurement of TSSM outcomes. 
River Defecation Open Pit Latrine
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A. Preparing for Triggering 
Key elements of local government preparation for triggering included selecting the hamlets to 
trigger and then developing the capacity to trigger them. 
1. Developing a Targeting Strategy that Would Create Momentum for Scale-Up 
Regardless of whether hamlets to be triggered were identified through voluntary demand or 
top-down selection, districts had to identify criteria to prioritize the types of hamlets to trigger. In 
order to have a strong demonstration effect, districts had to develop a targeting strategy that would 
facilitate successful implementation in the intervention hamlets and replication of the program 
beyond those hamlets. 
To promote program ownership, TSSM provided initial guidance on how to select 
hamlets, but left the selection of a targeting strategy to the districts. TSSM began by 
encouraging districts to target high-risk, high-impact hamlets. TSSM’s implementation manual 
identified the following criteria for districts to use in selecting intervention hamlets: (1) the hamlet 
has low access to sanitation or a high percentage of households exhibit poor sanitation behavior,  
(2) the hamlet has high diarrhea rates, and (3) the hamlet is not targeted by externally subsidized 
sanitation programs. To maximize leveraging of local government funds, it recommended triggering 
just one hamlet per village (WSP n.d.). It was hoped that rapid progress in the triggered hamlet 
would encourage other hamlets in the village to trigger themselves. Early on, districts often followed 
these guidelines. Some added their own criteria, such as the existence of a water supply program or 
prior experience with sanitation programs or CLTS. 
As program implementation progressed, the TSSM team and many districts refined 
their targeting techniques. Although TSSM started by suggesting that districts target places that 
had poor baseline sanitation practices, the team soon 
realized that in some hamlets where open defecation 
habits were deeply entrenched it might be very hard to 
change behavior in a short time. Hence, they would not be 
able to provide the desired demonstration effect. The 
program shifted to recommending that districts choose 
hamlets farther from a river where program gains might be 
easier to achieve. Our field visits confirmed the premise 
that behavior change was extremely difficult to induce in 
hamlets near rivers. Irrespective of the strength of CLTS 
implementation, persuading poorer households to cease 
river defecation by adopting simple low-cost latrine 
options, such as pit latrines, was extremely difficult. 
Although these households preferred owning flush 
latrines, an option that they often could not afford, over 
going to the river to defecate, they universally preferred 
defecating in rivers to using pit latrines. They considered 
pit latrines unhygienic and difficult to maintain, especially 
during the rainy season when latrines flooded. 
On the other hand, in remote hamlets located far from a river, encouraging pit latrine use was 
much more effective. Remote and mountainous Kokop subdistrict in Bangkalan had nearly become 
Pit latrine in flooding-prone area
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completely ODF by promoting pit latrines. Villages there lacked access to a river and most 
households did not have latrines, so residents often used the woods or fields to defecate openly. 
After triggering occurred, many households became ODF by building and using pit latrines. 
Similarly, ODF attainment was higher in the Dampit subdistrict, which also has mountainous 
topography, compared with other subdistricts in Malang district. 
The viral spread of CLTS did not materialize, leading some districts to revise their 
strategies. Many districts learned that triggering only one hamlet per village was not adequate for 
having a strong demonstration effect. ODF attainment at subvillage levels was not a sufficiently 
remarkable achievement for neighboring places to take note and aspire to replicate. In some 
instances, districts became discouraged and stopped focusing on program implementation (see  
Box IV.1). In other more successful places, we saw districts shift to alternate strategies. Some of the 
strategies we observed in our field visits include the following: 
Box IV.1.  Bondowoso: Lack of Early Results Discourages Scale Up 
Located at the eastern end of East Java, Bondowoso is characterized by high rates of poverty (more than 60 percent) 
among its residents. Bondowoso joined the TSSM program in 2008. With the support of WSP, the district triggered  
30 hamlets in 2008, selecting places for triggering based on whether the subdistrict had an active sanitarian and whether the 
village had received water from WSLIC-2. The program experienced poor outcomes; it succeeded in converting only one 
village (desa) to ODF status by 2009. (Even though hamlets were triggered, the district required the entire village to become 
ODF in order to recognize ODF status.) Health office officials noted that only about 10 percent of the hamlets selected in 
2008 showed interest in participating in SToPS; the rest were appointed to the program. Officials cited high rates of 
poverty, lack of support, and pressure from higher-ranking administrators for sanitation as a priority as likely reasons for 
poor program performance. With high poverty rates, the economy and poverty reduction were the highest priorities of the 
district government. The only village to attain ODF status in Bondowoso, Kabuaran in Grujugan subdistrict, became ODF 
because the facilitators in that community were quite interested in the program and the sanitarian received significant 
support from the village heads and other officials. In addition, many households already had latrines and the village was far 
from a river. Given the poor rate of success from triggered places in the first year, health office officials felt fiscal 
responsibility to the district government and requested cutting the funding program for the program by 50 percent in 2009. 
As a result, only 15 hamlets were triggered that year. However, none of these villages had become ODF, and in 2010 health 
officials further cut the funds and conducted only monitoring activities. 
Many districts learned that triggering just one hamlet per village was not adequate for 
having a strong demonstration effect. The more successful districts adopted or shifted to the 
following strategies: 
 Clustered rather than diffused targeting. Some districts targeted geographically 
clustered subdistricts and hamlets rather than widely dispersed hamlets. For example, 
Gresik initially chose to target only three neighboring subdistricts in the south of the 
country; Jombang, on the other hand, began by triggering hamlets in 14 subdistricts. 
Gresik favored geographic concentration of resources (clustering) to achieve more 
comprehensive and visible progress within a few subdistricts, rather than district-wide 
breadth of coverage. In Bangkalan, the district began with a diffused approach in which 
hamlets in more than a dozen subdistricts were originally triggered, but district staff 
switched to concentrating their resources on a single subdistrict (Kokop). Kokop was 
nearly ODF during the time of our visit (except for a few hamlets in one or two villages), 
and the district was ready to replicate this approach soon in another subdistrict. 
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 Village rather than hamlet triggering. 
TSSM initially recommended triggering a 
single hamlet within a village, allowing 
the triggered hamlet to spark demand 
among its neighbors. Although a few 
districts followed this approach, several 
others—including Trenggalek, Gresik, 
and Bangkalan—found it more effective 
to switch to triggering all hamlets in a 
village. District officials felt this gave the 
households a greater sense of purpose 
and encouraged the village to become 
ODF. In fact, in some places the district 
recognized the achievement of ODF only 
when the entire village became ODF, 
rather than one hamlet. 
Geographic clustering or triggering all hamlets in a target village often proved more 
successful than triggering a single hamlet per village in the hopes of kindling replication. 
The TSSM team has already discovered and shared the lesson that a clustered approach is more 
effective than diffused targeting. An equally critical lesson relates to the potential benefits of 
triggering all hamlets in a village at the same time (or in quick succession). In a few isolated 
instances, we observed that triggering a single hamlet led to replication in other hamlets in the 
village. In the Dampit subdistrict of Malang district, triggering a single hamlet motivated the 
remaining hamlet heads to request and receive triggering and become ODF. However, this seemed 
to be an anomaly. In most cases, we observed that triggering just one hamlet or subhamlet was not 
powerful enough to lead to village-wide behavior change. Almost all successful districts and 
subdistricts that we observed adopted the approach of triggering all hamlets in the village. It seemed 
to promote more knowledge of the program, allowed sharing of resources and techniques (for 
example, joint triggering of all sites by all facilitators), and enabled local officials to harness 
competition to generate more momentum for program implementation. 
2. Building Capacity of Key Stakeholders 
The TSSM team helped local governments prepare for CLTS adoption by training facilitators 
and other key staff at the district level. The training aimed to improve knowledge of TSSM and 
create capacity for implementing and monitoring the program. The TSSM team hoped to use these 
trainings to create a core team of reliable and skilled facilitators to support the implementation of 
the TSSM program. The purpose of the training was to build capacity for triggering and for district 
staff to train additional facilitators in subsequent rounds of training as needed. The target audience 
for the training included district and subdistrict government and health officials and coordination 
committee members (where they existed), as well as representatives from the villages. Selection of 
participants at each level was originally intended to be conducted by coordination committees. In 
the absence of such committees, district and subdistrict staff typically conducted selection. 
CLTS training for local stakeholders consisted of multiple types of instruction. Training 
content covered both the fundamental principles of CLTS and tactics for triggering household 
demand. This component was based on tested CLTS techniques. The training also exposed 
stakeholders to newer elements developed by TSSM, including principles of sanitation marketing 
Targeting all hamlets in a village
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and templates for monitoring progress, collecting data, and verifying ODF status. Training 
techniques incorporated adult education approaches that made use of participatory methods, 
including question-and-answer techniques, group discussions, games, and brainstorming. Training 
generally lasted for four days. In addition to in-class instruction, training consisted of in-class 
simulation, live field practice in triggering hamlets with resource agency training staff, and a plenary 
discussion to analyze lessons from field implementation and plan next steps. During the trainings 
TSSM trainers hoped to help facilitators create a follow-up plan for attaining ODF status at village, 
subdistrict, and district levels. Overall, in each district, the resource agency triggered 15 hamlets for 
demonstration purposes and supervised trained facilitators while they triggered another 15. 
The content and format of the trainings were positively viewed and seemed to generate 
support for the nonsubsidy approach incorporated in CLTS. Nearly all of the stakeholders we 
interviewed who had participated in training thought that the sessions were conducted well and were 
very useful. In particular, the interactive nature of the trainings seemed to make a strong impression 
on many participants. The practical component of the training was also considered effective. It likely 
played an important role in convincing participants about the viability of the TSSM approach. For 
example, district officials in Gresik indicated that these trainings were instrumental in convincing 
skeptical subdistrict officials and health center (Puskesmas) heads that a nonsubsidy approach could 
work; in the absence of this conviction, implementing the program would have been difficult. 
Training efforts need to expand to encompass village and hamlet staff who are often on 
the frontline of program delivery. Much of the CLTS training focused on district- and subdistrict-
level staff. Some of these staff were to be trained as facilitators, whereas others were trained so they 
could know more about the program or so they could help with future trainings, rather than direct 
facilitation. Although training higher level district and subdistrict officials is important for program 
success, effective triggering also seems to require the participation of trained facilitators who belong 
to the target village and hamlet. In Gresik, after the first round of triggering conducted by district 
officials failed in several hamlets, the Puskesmas held a follow-up training for stakeholders from the 
village who were then able to use their local knowledge to effectively retrigger the hamlets. 
Conducting trainings at periodic intervals in which village and hamlet officials and volunteers are 
included is likely to be an ongoing need as districts try to scale up. 
Greater attention might have to be paid to creating a well-trained core of district master 
trainers for training facilitators at the village and hamlet levels as the program scales up. We 
observed variation in the degree to which districts had developed this capacity to conduct such 
additional training. In some cases, district and subdistrict officials conducted these village-level 
trainings themselves; in others they drew on resource agency assistance. Some districts hired these 
staff to help with the training even after the WSP program implementation had ended. For long-
term sustainability, a greater emphasis on creating a district core of master trainers might be 
necessary. 
B. Delivering the CLTS Intervention 
In order to instill the will to eliminate open defecation among hamlets, TSSM planned on 
helping districts use a range of techniques to trigger hamlets and conduct follow-up. The triggering 
process itself was conceived as a sequence of three activities: pretriggering planning, triggering, and 
post-triggering. 
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1. The Pretriggering Planning Activities 
Pretriggering planning activities consisted of preparing the logistics for the triggering events and 
conducting a preliminary investigation of the hamlet. Knowledge gained about the hamlet would be 
used to customize the triggering approach. In a number of hamlets we visited, facilitators briefed 
and strategized with village, hamlet, or subhamlet officials before triggering. They sometimes also 
conducted baseline data collection beforehand to inform their triggering approach. This mapping 
exercise sometimes served as a mechanism for village officials to gain a better understanding of their 
hamlets. For example, in the Dampit district of Malang, village and hamlet officials commented that 
mapping made them aware of the severity of sanitation problems in their hamlets and increased their 
dedication to participating in triggering and post-triggering activities. 
2. The Triggering Event 
The triggering event was designed to be a pivotal hamlet-wide occasion for bringing together 
the entire community to spark collective determination to eliminate open defecation. The triggering 
process itself was to be guided by an emphasis on learning from households about their perceptions 
about sanitation, making them aware of the dangers of open defecation, and allowing them to devise 
solutions. 
TSSM prescribed guidelines and 
provided training on the techniques to be 
used for triggering, leaving facilitators free 
to improvise based on the local context. The 
triggering process generally started with some 
introductions and questions about current 
practices, using CLTS tools. These could include 
conducting a focus group discussion; engaging 
the households in drawing a social map to 
indicate where they live, where they defecate, 
and the kind of sanitation facilities that they use; 
and conducting a transect walk through the 
village to see evidence of open defecation. The 
next step was to trigger disgust through tactics 
that included the use of chaff to represent the 
amount of human waste produced or the contamination of water with a hair dipped in mud or feces 
followed by questions to the hamlet members about whether they would drink that water. These 
tactics aimed to make households aware of the dangers of contamination resulting from open 
defecation. Subsequently, the facilitators obtained a collective commitment to eliminate open 
defecation, as well as individual commitments from households that defecated in the open. The 
facilitators would identify natural leaders who would motivate the hamlet to fulfill these 
commitments, transfer the social map onto paper for future use in tracking progress, and discuss 
cheap latrine options as necessary. 
Most triggering events followed this format, although some places adhered to 
prescribed techniques more closely than others. Facilitators and other district-level staff who 
might have participated in triggering were likely to describe the triggering process as containing 
many of these elements. During our focus groups, when we prompted participants about the 
triggering event, the usual elements they remembered included attempts to evoke disgust by 
contaminating water with feces or by estimating the amount of waste produced by households. 
Social map
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Occasionally, participants recalled social maps being made or transect walks being conducted as part 
of the triggering. Districts sometimes added their own variations to this basic triggering. For 
example, facilitators in Gresik found that using the story of a man being bitten by a snake while 
defecating in the river was very effective. We heard this example from stakeholders at every level 
within the district, suggesting that it had made quite an impression. 
Triggering did not appear to be the pivotal event it was meant to be among hamlet 
members; many households had difficulty recalling the event. Only a handful of focus group 
attendees recalled attending the triggering event, which might have been due to the size and timing 
of the events. Triggering events were often small affairs attended by 20 to 30 people. The attendees 
were typically women, often because the events were held during the day when men might have 
been at work. Although facilitators were informed of the importance of scheduling the triggering 
events at times that were convenient for the households, they were not necessarily provided with 
incentives to overcome the additional inconvenience of triggering after work hours. This was 
especially true for facilitators from the district or subdistrict levels who were not from the local 
hamlet, and when target hamlets were remotely located. Among participants in our household focus 
groups, even people who had attended the triggering event did not instantly recall that they had 
done so and remembered details only when they were probed and had their memories jogged. In 
general, we also observed little recognition among households of terms such as SToPS (Sanitasi Total 
dan Pemasaran Sanitasi, the Bahasa term for the program) or TSSM, triggering, ODF, and so on. 
Partly, this might have been because triggering could have occurred as long as two or three years ago 
in some of the hamlets we visited, making it difficult for people to remember the event. It also 
appears that households were often invited to hamlet events without much information on the 
purpose of the meetings. This likely made it difficult for them to distinguish triggering from a host 
of other socialization events that occur in the hamlets. Nonetheless, the triggering did not appear to 
be a memorable event in the minds of many households in these hamlets (even those that had 
become ODF). 
Some communities took a joint triggering approach, which seemed to yield more 
success. Typically, a few facilitators from the subdistrict conduct triggering in a hamlet by 
collaborating with village and hamlet stakeholders. In a few places we saw a departure from this 
approach. In these instances, the full Puskesmas staff engaged in the triggering effort. For example, in 
Kokop subdistrict of Bangkalan, the doctor who headed the Puskesmas involved his entire staff in 
triggering all the villages. They organized the villages in Kokop into roughly three groups, each to be 
triggered in successive years. Because the doctor, nurse, midwife, and various other Puskesmas staff 
were all engaged in the triggering, they were able to focus household attention on the importance of 
behavior change. The team successfully engaged natural leaders from the villages, and members 
from one village helped those in a neighboring village build latrines and provide other program 
follow-up support. Similarly, the Wringinanom subdistrict in Gresik and the Gandusari district in 
Trenggalek adopted a joint triggering approach. Here, all trained village-level facilitators from 
different villages jointly triggered each of the target villages in the subdistrict. They felt that this 
approach to triggering allowed them to have a greater impact on households and facilitated cross-
site learning. 
3. Post-Triggering Activities 
TSSM designed a range of post-triggering activities, which were conducted less frequently than 
anticipated. TSSM designed these activities as a means to reinforce the messages delivered during 
triggering. The TSSM manual suggests that facilitators and natural leaders identified during triggering 
are to conduct the following activities: follow-up triggering, household visits to encourage progress, 
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disseminating knowledge of the different contamination paths though which poor sanitation results 
in disease, and introduction to low-cost options. Additional steps included creation of interaction 
networks of natural leaders from hamlets in the village to encourage cooperation, learning, and 
competition among hamlets, as well as helping village leaders devise contests among hamlets. 
However, in many instances, these post-triggering activities were not systematically conducted. 
Where post-triggering follow-up occurred, it consisted primarily of two types of follow-
up activities. These follow-up activities included (1) repeat socialization and messaging and  
(2) targeted monitoring through household visits. Several of the more successful hamlets conducted 
repeat socialization and messaging, whereby religious and political authorities and health staff or 
volunteers stressed the importance of becoming ODF through existing congregational avenues and 
communal gatherings. These included prayer meetings, women’s group meetings, savings scheme 
meetings, and health outpost visits or events. Repeat socialization often seemed to have had more of 
an effect on households than the initial triggering event on its own. Targeted monitoring through household 
visits included subdistrict and village officials, staff, and volunteers regularly visiting households that 
defecated in the open to encourage behavior change until the households adopted latrine use. We 
observed considerable variation across subdistricts and villages in the extent of follow-up conducted: 
frequently none was conducted or was conducted only with households that had made a 
commitment during triggering events. In a few instances, facilitators followed up with all openly 
defecating households in the community, sometimes by using the social map. 
Adoption of both types of follow-up resulted in more lasting behavior change. Better 
results were observed in hamlets where both types of post-triggering follow-up activities were 
adopted through multisectoral coordination and where health benefits of ODF status were 
emphasized during follow-up. In places with strong performance, we frequently observed repeat 
socialization in several forums and sustained, ongoing follow-up with households. These types of 
follow-up activities tended to occur more frequently in places where there was high commitment 
among key people at the subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels, such as we observed in Wringinanom 
subdistrict in Gresik (see Box IV.2). In places where ODF attainment was driven by a less holistic 
approach, the gains in ODF might have been more transitory. For example, the Kedamean 
subdistrict of Gresik attained ODF largely because officials and volunteers conducted repeat visits 
to the households until they became ODF, without repeat socialization or ongoing monitoring after 
hamlets achieved ODF. In those hamlets, the sanitation facilities of the households we observed 
were of poor quality. Hamlet awareness of the link between open defecation and disease was also 
less strong. 
Box IV.2.  Gresik: Success Through Repeated Socialization and Individualized Monitoring 
In the Wringinanom subdistrict of Gresik, which managed to attain subdistrict-wide ODF status, Puskesmas and 
village officials and volunteers used a combination of repeat socialization and individualized monitoring visits to homes to 
convince households to cease open defecation. They used multiple venues, such as the weekly prayer group (Tahlilan) 
meetings and the funeral prayer (Yasinat) congregations, village meetings, and events at the health post to reinforce the 
importance of good sanitation behavior. They were particularly effective at making households realize the importance of 
the health dividends of being ODF. During these follow-up events and house visits, the facilitators seemed to have 
successfully communicated the principles of contamination routes linking poor sanitation to disease. As a result, 
households’ primary motivation in maintaining their ODF status was to prevent diarrhea and other diseases. The sanitarian 
was also diligent about visiting people’s households in order to inspect facilities and observe whether they were 
maintaining ODF status, earning him the nickname ―Latrine Police.‖ During focus groups in Wringinanom, households 
suggested that if an ODF cash reward were offered it should be given to these facilitators for their instrumental role in 
helping their hamlets attain and maintain ODF status. 
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Post-triggering follow-up was not adequately prioritized at all levels for a number of 
reasons, despite stakeholders’ recognition of its importance in driving ODF attainment. 
Districts and subdistricts appeared to focus disproportionately on pretriggering and triggering 
activities and prioritized them relative to post-triggering activities. This emphasis was driven by a 
lack of resources for post-triggering, which we discussed in the previous chapter. An additional 
constraint was competing priorities for implementing stakeholders’ time, with subdistrict and 
village/hamlet staff, officials, and volunteers having a wide range of responsibilities. In some cases a 
lack of motivation (and not enough prioritization of the program at higher levels) was the reason. 
Some successful strategies for increasing post-triggering follow-up that we observed were  
(1) provision of increased resource allocation, including small token financial rewards for facilitators and 
volunteers; (2) provision of nonmonetary rewards or leveraging recognition from political authorities for 
improved commitment to follow-up; and (3) use of health data to convince officials of the need for 
follow-up. In a few villages in Gresik and Trenggalek, we observed that subdistricts’ provision of 
data on changes in diarrhea incidence in the village after triggering motivated the village head and 
village stakeholders to intensify their post-triggering follow-up efforts. Similarly, concern about 
diarrhea prompted adoption of TSSM in the Koncer Darul Aman village, which was one of the few 
islands of success in Bondowoso (see Box IV.3). 
Box IV.3.  Koncer Darul Aman: Using Health to Motivate Latrine Adoption 
Although TSSM progress in Bondowoso was poor, it did contain a few interesting islands of success. At the time of 
our visit in October 2010, Koncer Darul Aman in Tenggarang subdistrict, which had been triggered in 2009, was fairly 
close to becoming ODF. Our team was invited to the village to support its commitment to becoming ODF. When the 
SToPS program was introduced, the sanitarian asked about the possibility of implementing the program in Darul Aman 
because it had a high prevalence of diarrhea cases. The success in Darul Aman is partly attributable to its using a less 
conventional facilitation process, using health as a major issue, and having a low-cost pour flush latrine option in the 
community. Finding that the community members were not enthusiastic about the conventional triggering process, the 
facilitator used other methods, including watching the rivers in 
which people usually defecate openly and following up with 
them in their houses a few days later about their behavior; 
persuading them to build latrines; and if they did not have 
funds, suggesting a collective fund as a solution. The facilitator 
also used the religious setting (pengajian or reading of the 
Quran); with the cooperation of the religious leader he would 
sit with the people and trigger those around him. The facilitator 
was a farmer who talked about sanitation with farm workers 
during their lunch breaks including the health problems from 
openly defecating. Diarrhea, typhoid, and hepatitis were health 
issues in the area; in particular, diarrhea had resulted in several 
deaths in the village. The midwife (bidan) supported the 
facilitator by triggering people who came to her office with 
diarrhea cases, immediately asking them if they had a latrine 
and explaining the contamination links. These measures 
motivated the community to utilize its own funds to construct 
latrines. Many of their latrines had gooseneck ceramic bowls 
but lacked roofs and had simple bamboo or plastic tarpaulin 
walls, which made them very cheap. Because households were 
clustered, usually five households collected funds and built a 
shared latrine. There was only one pit latrine in the whole 
village. One of the masons who attended the mason training 
helped build some of these latrines. At the time of our visit, 
only five households in the village had been unable to build 
their own latrine; those households used the public toilet when 
possible but still openly defecated in the river at times. Village 
officials promised to do their best to make the whole village 
ODF by the following month. 
Pour flush latrines with tarp walls
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C. Achieving and Maintaining ODF 
After hamlets have been triggered and are undergoing post-triggering activities, districts also 
have to create mechanisms to encourage ODF attainment in those hamlets. After those efforts 
culminate in hamlets becoming ODF, districts must verify that a real change of behavior has 
occurred and offer public recognition of households’ achievement to encourage adherence to new 
sanitation behaviors. Finally districts must continue with follow-up efforts in ODF hamlets to 
encourage continued improvement in sanitation choices. 
1. Strategies to Encourage ODF Attainment 
TSSM advised districts to adopt a range of strategies to encourage progress toward ODF 
achievement, including encouraging competition among hamlets and offering rewards on ODF 
attainment. At the district level, TSSM sought to establish interdistrict competitions by collaborating 
with JawaPos to include sanitation in the indicators for evaluating district performance. However, 
encouraging within-district performance and fostering competition among subdistricts and hamlets 
was the responsibility of district stakeholders. 
Local governments adopted a variety of strategies for encouraging ODF attainment: 
 Fostering competition. Some subdistricts sought to encourage competition among 
Puskesmas, villages, and hamlets through comparisons in public forums, such as 
subdistrict and village meetings, on which localities would attain and be declared ODF 
first. For example, the Gandusari subdistrict of Trenggalek employed this technique 
successfully when it persuaded some village leaders to redouble efforts to attain ODF 
status. 
 Offering rewards upon ODF declaration. Nonmonetary or monetary rewards were 
sometimes used to incentivize achievement of ODF. Nonmonetary rewards included the 
district head (bupati) personally presenting ODF certificates to the hamlet or village head 
or attending the ODF declaration ceremony. Monetary rewards included cash rewards to 
hamlet or village chiefs when their areas became ODF. Among the districts we visited, 
the cash awards ranged from Indonesian rupiah (Rp) 750,000 (U.S. $83) per hamlet in 
Jombang, to Rp 5 million (U.S. $556) for an entire village achieving ODF in Trenggalek. 
Allocation of the rewards was often at the discretion of the hamlet or village head. In 
Jombang, a hamlet head used the rewards to help poor families build latrines. In 
Trenggalek, a village head used the funds to create low-cost ceramic latrines for 
distribution. However, in most districts—such as Gresik, Malang, Bangkalan, and 
Bondowoso—no monetary rewards were awarded. In some cases this was because the 
district did not have any money for this purpose. For example, in Bangkalan district, 
staff mentioned several times how they would have liked to reward Kokop subdistrict 
because most of its villages had become ODF, but they did not even have the resources 
to support the ODF ceremony.13 
                                                 
13 Although the TSSM manual encouraged districts to incentivize ODF by providing development assistance (such 
as building a communal well or latrines for schools) to newly ODF hamlets rather than cash rewards, we saw limited 
evidence of such rewards being offered among the places we visited. 
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 Triggering clusters of sites and making ODF declaration contingent on collective 
progress. Although the general TSSM model indicates that individual hamlets can be 
declared ODF as soon as they become ODF, some districts adopted an alternate 
approach. They sought to accelerate ODF attainment by indicating that ODF declaration 
could occur only when a cluster of target areas (villages, clusters of villages, or a 
puskesmas or subdistrict) became ODF. 
Requiring collective progress for ODF attainment seemed to be an effective strategy. 
Requiring collective progress had several key advantages. First, when an individual hamlet’s goals 
were part of a larger set of goals (such as ODF achievement at the level of a village or cluster of 
villages) more stakeholders were tracking progress towards achieving ODF status. Second, it also 
gave hamlet households a sense of belonging to a larger group and more accountability. Third, when 
a larger cluster of hamlets achieved ODF status, rather than a single hamlet, the scale was more 
likely to attract attention and replication from neighboring villages. In the Wringinanom subdistrict 
in Gresik, the achievement of ODF status by all villages triggered by one Puskesmas was effective in 
motivating the other Puskesmas to renew their efforts and follow suit. Finally, it was also a more cost-
effective way of using existing resources. For example, by focusing existing resources on a few 
clustered areas, districts could minimize travel and time costs of following up and monitoring 
households in triggered hamlets. 
The effectiveness of other techniques, including financial rewards or district pressure, 
was more ambiguous. Financial rewards did not seem to be particularly effective in encouraging 
ODF attainment among the sites we visited; in some instances, few people other than the hamlet or 
village head were even aware that a financial reward had been received. District pressure to 
accelerate ODF attainment could be an important lever for progress but could also, on occasion, be 
counterproductive. We observed a few instances in which district pressure to attain ODF targets 
quickly led to facilitators identifying strategies that would permit quick ODF attainment. These 
included switching to or selecting areas with high existing baseline access to sanitation or switching 
from sites close to rivers with hard-to-change behavior to hamlets that were farther away and 
perceived to be easier to change. Although the original purpose of selecting easier places might have 
been to have a few early success stories to inspire other hamlets, in practice having individual 
hamlets become ODF quickly did not seem to inspire replication unless there was a concerted effort 
by stakeholders to trigger and show progress in additional locations. 
Strategies encouraging leveraging of group resources facilitated acceleration of ODF 
outcomes. TSSM encouraged the use of collective resources to achieve ODF outcomes. In a 
number of places, we saw that villages effectively leveraged group resources to help poor households 
gain access to latrines. One common method was the use of community labor in hamlets to assist 
households to build pit latrines (known as gotong royong). In many districts we heard of villages where 
gotong royong had been used for latrine construction, especially to assist poorer households or the 
elderly and the poor to make pit latrines. In the Koncer Darul Aman village in Kabuaran subdistrict 
in Bondowoso, groups of five families pitched in to construct cheap pour flush latrines that those 
households could use. In the Dampit subdistrict in Malang, the Perak subdistrict in Jombang, and 
the Kokop subdistrict in Bangkalan, we heard of communities reaching ODF through volunteers 
helping households dig pit latrines, or making lids for existing latrines. Another mechanism in some 
places we visited, such as Perak in Jombang, was the establishment of revolving funds (known as 
arisans) for sanitation, whereby households made monthly contributions to a common savings 
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scheme that would enable one member per month to build a latrine. Although TSSM sought to 
foster more widespread adoption of these approaches, we most often observed these mechanisms 
for leveraging joint resources in hamlets or villages with a tradition of community cohesion; such 
mechanisms therefore depended greatly on the specific culture of the village or hamlet. 
Proximity to a river made progress toward ODF outcomes extremely difficult as 
households would not consider low-cost pit latrine options; other strategies might have to 
be considered in such communities. The program had the most difficulty achieving behavior 
change in hamlets located near a river. Households in such areas were averse to using pit latrines, 
and considered defecating in the river superior to using pit latrines. Several respondents in our focus 
groups mentioned that they thought defecating in the river was cleaner because it simply washed 
away the feces. Some of the weaknesses of pit latrines that households cited included feces 
overflowing whenever the river floods, collapse of latrines due to the soil sagging in the rainy season, 
and the danger of people and livestock falling into the pit. However, these households preferred to 
defecate in pour flush latrines, but often could not afford them. This suggests that customized 
triggering approaches and strategies focused more directly on identifying an affordable supply of 
cheaper permanent latrines might be necessary in places near rivers. 
2. ODF Verification, Certification, and Awards to Motivate and Encourage Replication 
As a hamlet becomes ODF, the TSSM program recommends that local stakeholders conduct 
ODF verification and offer certification awards and rewards. These activities aim to encourage a 
sense of accountability toward ODF commitments among hamlets, verify and confirm the quality of 
self-reported progress among households, and recognize the accomplishments of the hamlet and 
enable it to act as a role model for other places. 
The TSSM program advised the adoption of a rigorous process for ODF verification that 
included thorough inspection by independent observers of the hamlets’ sanitation facilities. 
According to the TSSM manual and a WSP learning note, when a hamlet neared ODF achievement, 
it was to notify the subdistrict Puskesmas. The Puskesmas would then notify the district and schedule a 
verification visit. The verification team was to consist of staff from the Puskesmas and district, and 
include independent observers, such as government officials and facilitators from neighboring areas 
and nearby Puskesmas. Using the social map, the verification team would split up to visit all 
households in the hamlet using a checklist of 10 indicators developed by the TSSM program. 
Houses that met these standards would receive an ODF sticker to enhance pride in ODF attainment 
and motivate replication by other households. After conducting the visits, the verification team 
would reassemble to collate results and announce to the hamlet whether it was found to be ODF. 
Hamlets that were not ODF received reasons for the negative assessment and advice on remedial 
steps. Districts provided ODF certificates to successful hamlets and held special award ceremonies 
attended by district or subdistrict heads. 
ODF verifications were usually not as intensive or independent as advised by TSSM, 
but did not appear to be systematically biased. Overall, the process of verification varied 
significantly from place to place, but appeared to be more ad hoc and much less stringent than the 
recommended procedures. We encountered four types of verification among the hamlets we visited:  
(1) almost no verification (health volunteer indicates hamlet is ODF and the hamlet is certified);  
(2) verification by the sanitarian; (3) verification by a team of Puskesmas staff and subdistrict officials; 
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and (4) verification by a team that included independent observers from a different Puskesmas or 
district, and/or district health office staff. The first two processes for verification were most 
frequently adopted, particularly as the program progressed beyond the initially triggered locations. 
According to the accounts we heard, only a small sample of houses was selected for verification, and 
the examination procedures did not appear to have been as thorough as those stipulated in the 
TSSM model. 
Nonetheless, ODF declaration did not appear to be systematically inaccurate. Our 
observations through transect walks, discussions with households, and examining the latrines of 
households in hamlets declared ODF suggest that in these communities households primarily used 
latrines and did not defecate in the fields or rivers.14 However, the condition of the latrines 
households used varied to some extent. Whereas in some places that had been declared ODF we 
observed clean and hygienic latrines, in others we observed more lax standards. For example, in 
some hamlets declared ODF, we noted that though pit latrine users owned lids, they were of poorer 
quality and less diligently used. Lower-quality latrines were more likely to be observed in places that 
had become ODF with less intensive triggering or post-triggering processes, or in places triggered in 
isolation. In contrast, in locations where there was great pride in ODF attainment or a greater 
appreciation of the immediate health risks of open defecation, we observed that the lids were more 
sturdily built and more diligently used. For example, in the Wringinanom subdistrict of Gresik 
district, officials, health volunteers, and households all knew and seemed to apply pit latrine 
standards defined by the district. The few pit latrines we visited in an ODF hamlet in this subdistrict 
were all firmly sealed with heavy lids, had clean water readily available, and were sufficiently far from 
the house, in accordance with the rules. A corresponding knowledge of the health reasons that 
necessitated application of those standards accompanied this knowledge of the rules. 
ODF verification and declaration did not always seem of great importance to hamlets 
and were a higher priority for districts than for hamlets. The TSSM model posits that the ODF 
declaration should be a critical event for the hamlet. The premise is that the hamlet tracks its own 
progress toward ODF status, applies for ODF verification when it is ready, and takes pride in the 
ODF declaration and certification when the hamlet receives it. However, with a few exceptions, we 
found that district staff or subdistrict Puskesmas staff were the most anxious about making sure that 
hamlets were declared ODF. (This trend seemed to gain impetus with the inclusion of sanitation as 
one of the criteria used in the JawaPos awards to evaluate district performance.) It was rarer for us to 
encounter hamlets actively concerned about applying for ODF verification. We sometimes even 
encountered hamlet or village officials who knew their hamlet had been declared ODF but were 
uncertain what the term meant or how they had achieved the declaration. Similarly, households had 
seen banners with the ODF logo but were uncertain of what they implied. 
Again, our observations were that the lack of interest about ODF declaration was greater for 
hamlets in which ODF gains were realized through minimal investments, either because baseline 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that in most hamlets that we visited households consider ODF to be the use of latrines instead 
of rivers, fields, and other open areas. It is rare for households to think of ODF in terms of using latrines of a minimum 
quality (for example, with proper sealed lids and slabs). 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 47  
access was high and only a handful 
of households had to change 
behavior or because households 
already used open pit latrines that 
needed minimal upgrades to 
become ODF. However, even in 
hamlets in which ODF attainment 
was a priority, the actual verification 
and declaration process seemed less 
of a momentous occasion, recalled 
by none or very few of the 
households in our focus groups. In 
a few instances, hamlets held formal 
awards ceremonies, usually entailing 
a district or subdistrict head visiting 
the first hamlet to become ODF. In 
most other cases joint award 
ceremonies were held at a central 
location or the ODF certificate was 
simply delivered to the hamlet. 
3. Post-ODF Follow-Up Is Important to Maintain ODF Status 
It is also important for facilitators to encourage households in ODF hamlets to improve latrines 
and make further progress up the sanitation ladder. The TSSM manual suggests that the program 
envisaged post-ODF follow-up as a mechanism for encouraging improvement of additional 
sanitation behaviors, including hand washing, safe treatment and storage of water and food, 
treatment of liquid and solid household waste, and safe disposal of garbage. Our field visits indicate 
that an additional reason for conducting post-ODF follow-up is to ensure that ODF gains are 
maintained over time and that households continue to look for ways to improve their latrines on an 
incremental basis. 
Post-ODF follow-up was quite infrequent and more likely to occur when the hamlet had great 
pride in ODF attainment and/or received many external visitors. In the few places that had made 
exceptional and concerted progress toward ODF outcomes, or in which there was high program 
ownership and pride, we saw some evidence of post-ODF follow-up that focused primarily on 
sanitation conditions and use. This was usually in the form of continued socialization during village 
gatherings or prayer meetings. Few other places had conducted follow-up. 
Hamlet officials and households on many places we visited indicated that continued monitoring 
of households through house visits is critical for maintaining ODF status. They also noted that such 
visits require resources. Some village officials even indicated that external monitoring visits from 
district or subdistrict staff could help reinforce the importance of staying ODF. In our observations, 
many of the visibly ODF hamlets that maintained latrine quality were ones in which some form of 
post-ODF follow-up and monitoring occurred. To encourage maintenance of ODF and facilitate 
continued ascension up the sanitation ladder, TSSM might have to explore more mechanisms for 
encouraging post-ODF follow-up and help districts find ways to mobilize resources for this activity. 
In conclusion, some elements of the CLTS component appeared to be more critical to program 
success than others. These include strategic targeting of geographic clusters and triggering all 
ODF declaration banners and monuments
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hamlets in target villages; training hamlet-level stakeholders and involving them in the triggering 
process; conducting systematic and intensive post-triggering follow-up through repeat socialization 
by a broad coalition of stakeholders; publicizing the health benefits of ODF practices; and 
conducting post-ODF follow-up to ensure maintenance of ODF behaviors. Additional resources 
must be dedicated to ensure wider adoption of these key measures. 
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Key Findings 
 The development time for sanitation marketing was longer than TSSM anticipated at the outset, affecting the 
 
 TSSM tried to develop supply of sanitation by training masons. Unfortunately, the mason training effort 
failed to have the anticipated results, in part because of poor targeting and selection of masons. 
 TSSM shifted its efforts to providing training to small numbers of sanitarians and business minded 
individuals on developing a social franchising model of sanitation solutions. This approach alone is on too 
small a scale to strengthen the supply market substantially. 
 TSSM produced many promotional materials focused on behavior change, but adoption was limited, largely 
because of insufficient budgets and weak dissemination networks. 
 TSSM developed an informed choice catalog to inform households of options for progressively upgrading 
latrines. Considered very useful by facilitators and sanitation providers who had seen it, its impact was 
curtailed by late and limited circulation. It might be useful to introduce this catalog early on with triggering 
and post triggering activities, particularly in communities close to rivers where behavior change is more 
difficult to accomplish. 
 Explicit strategies will be needed for poorer households unable to afford improved latrines, such as using 
revolving funds (arisans) or partial support from community development funds. 
V.  EXAMINING THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION  
OF SANITATION MARKETING IN EAST JAVA 
 WSP’s examination of global applications of CLTS led it to conclude that although CLTS 
effectively generated demand for eliminating open defecation,  it was not by itself sufficient for 
driving adoption of improved latrines. WSP believed that ODF gains would be hard to sustain over 
the longer term if households were unable to upgrade to more permanent latrines (WSP 2009; Frias 
2008). To drive progress up the sanitation ladder, WSP adopted sanitation marketing to strengthen 
the market supply and demand for sanitation products and services. Its strategy in the TSSM 
program was to first trigger households using CLTS and encourage them to quickly become ODF 
by adopting the simplest and most readily available solutions possible. The program would then 
build on this community-level behavior change by using sanitation marketing to encourage ODF 
households to upgrade slowly and incrementally to improved and better-quality latrines. 
The sanitation marketing component aimed to enhance both the supply of and demand for 
safe, healthy, and hygienic sanitation products. This component would make use of behavior change 
communication (BCC) to reinforce anti-open-defecation attitudes and encourage greater household 
demand for and investment in improved sanitation facilities. It would also use supply-enhancement 
measures to encourage the market to deliver improved sanitation options that catered to a range of 
consumer segments, particularly those that could afford only low-cost solutions. 
To execute this approach, TSSM undertook three clusters of activities, which we discuss in the 
following three sections of this chapter. In Section A, we describe preparation for the development 
and implementation of sanitation marketing. In Section B, we examine efforts to enhance 
competitive supply. In Section C, we discuss the creation and dissemination of sanitation marketing 
materials for behavior change. 
A. Preparation for Sanitation Marketing 
Unlike CLTS, which had previously been tested in Indonesia, sanitation marketing was an 
entirely new intervention in Indonesia that had to be designed from the beginning. This was a 
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challenging task given the dearth of existing market research on sanitation choices and lack of 
knowledge among implementing stakeholders regarding what sanitation marketing entailed. The 
preparations for sanitation marketing and design of appropriate tools based on the research took 
almost 18 months to complete (WSP 2009). As a result, sanitation marketing began full 
implementation only well into the second phase of the project. Finding appropriate staff with the 
marketing, sanitation, and contextual expertise to develop the component was difficult; translating 
the market research findings into usable tools was a challenging and time-intensive exercise. 
The TSSM team began by conducting a situation assessment followed by a detailed 
market analysis to inform the strategy and design of the sanitation marketing intervention. 
The TSSM team believed that marketing solutions would be most effective if based on context-
specific knowledge. A situation assessment conducted for WSP in 2007 indicated that although there 
was no shortage of sanitation suppliers (people or businesses selling latrine construction materials) 
and providers (people offering latrine installation and maintenance services), they often lacked 
formal training in sanitation masonry. The situation analysis indicated that demand for latrines was 
low, households did not prioritize latrine acquisition, and people were comfortable with open 
defecation. Lack of supply was not the main constraint on demand but households appeared to 
overestimate the costs of installing improved latrines (Frias 2008). 
The situation assessment was followed by a consumer research market analysis conducted in 
2008 that drew on household surveys, focus group discussions, and in-depth interviews with 
sanitation experts. The market research on the demand side began in two districts in East Java, 
Probolinggo and Pacitan, with focus group discussions involving three kinds of households: open 
defecators, owners of unimproved facilities, and owners of improved facilities. In-depth interviews 
with sanitation experts and household surveys in 29 districts followed the focus groups. The 
research on the supply side consisted of conducting a rapid assessment of the sanitation supply 
chain. It encompassed masons and owners of construction material stores selling supplies for toilet 
construction, as well as their suppliers and buyers (Nielsen Indonesia 2009). 
In the course of this research, WSP developed a strategic framework to guide analysis of 
behavior change determinants. It was called SaniFOAM, short for the Sanitation Framework of 
Opportunity, Ability, and Motivation (see Figure V.1). This framework helped WSP analyze the data 
from the market research conducted in East Java (Devine 2009; WSP 2010). This analysis revealed a 
number of factors constraining adoption of approved latrines. On the demand side, households did 
not prioritize investment in sanitation because they perceived (1) flush latrines to be expensive, 
yielding lower benefits compared with alternate investments; (2) disease to be a result of poverty 
and/or destiny and unrelated to sanitation behavior; and (3) sanitation to be a waste of clean water 
in water-scarce areas. Open defecation, rather than latrine use, was considered the norm (Nielsen 
Indonesia 2009). 
On the supply side, a number of constraints also surfaced. Although supply of sanitation 
materials and services generally appeared plentiful, sanitation suppliers, retailers, and providers all 
thought of relatively expensive options when asked about the total cost of a hygienic latrine facility 
(Nielsen Indonesia 2009). It became clear that building a market for low-cost hygienic latrine 
options was critical, but the barriers were significant. The supply market chain was highly 
fragmented and lacked clear standards to identify safe and hygienic latrines. Moreover, the product 
to be promoted was complex: different latrine components (the below-ground receptacle for waste;  
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Figure V.1.  SaniFOAM Framework 
the middle part interfacing with the user, such as a ceramic squat pan; and the above-ground 
structure for privacy) could be combined in a variety of ways for latrines of different costs, making it 
difficult to select a few standard options (Devine 2009). 
TSSM used this research to design a sanitation marketing component with the following 
features. The first set of activities sought to enhance supply through three key initiatives: (1) TSSM 
developed a customizable menu of low-cost options based on market research; (2) it trained and 
accredited providers and suppliers to boost their capacity to build and promote hygienic latrines 
using the menu of options devised by TSSM; and (3) it sought to promote a social franchising model 
that encouraged entrepreneurs to develop one-stop shops offering a full array of sanitation services. 
The second set of activities sought to boost demand by segmenting households based on their 
sanitation behavior and using targeted BCC to bolster rejection of open defecation and encourage 
latrine use, as well as increase demand for improved latrines by spreading awareness of low-cost 
options. 
The development time for sanitation marketing was longer than TSSM anticipated, 
which affected the program’s ability to appropriately sequence sanitation marketing with 
CLTS. Conducting background research and developing the interventions and tools for sanitation 
marketing took a long time. CLTS implementation had begun by 2007, but background research was 
not completed until the middle of 2008. This meant that the component was not ready for adoption 
for Phase 1 (implemented November 2007–June 2008), and the full bundle of interventions was not 
ready until into the implementation Phase 2 (September 2008–June 2009), and was only more fully 
integrated into Phase 3 (September 2009–March 2010). As a result, TSSM was not delivered as a 
holistic intervention in many of the districts as had been originally anticipated. 
Focus
Target population
Opportunity Ability Motivation
Sanctions/
enforcement
Social norms
Product attributes
Skills and 
self-efficacy
Values
Access/availability Knowledge Attitudes and beliefs
Affordability
Roles and decisions
Social support
Emotional/physical/
social drivers
Competing priorities
Intention
Willingness to pay
Desired behavior
• Opportunity:  Does the individual have the chance to perform the behavior?
• Ability:  Is the individual capable of performing it?
• Motivation:  Does the individual want to perform it?
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B. Competitive Supply Development 
TSSM focused on competitive supply development to facilitate suppliers and providers to offer 
a greater number of and more affordable high-quality latrine options. It sought to strengthen the 
private sector operating in rural areas sufficiently so that it could profitably and sustainably deliver 
affordable and attractive sanitation goods and services to household consumers. 
The TSSM team used market and consumer research to 
devise a range of low-cost hygienic latrine options. TSSM 
examined the range of options available in the market for 
different latrine components, examined their price points, and 
conducted research to see why household customers preferred 
certain options. Based on this research, TSSM started to devise 
different low-cost options for which suppliers could potentially 
build demand. Over time, the TSSM team developed an 
informed choice catalog that suppliers and providers could use to 
illustrate how to combine different latrine components to create 
options that were suitable for households’ budgets. This catalog 
also showed households how to adopt latrine improvements 
incrementally. The catalog was not ready in the initial rounds of 
mason training but appears to have been distributed in later 
rounds of training. The TSSM team introduced the lower-cost 
ceramic pans popularized by the program to the market. 
Next, TSSM focused on developing supply by conducting training of sanitation 
providers under the TSSM program. Initially, TSSM had intended to target the entire supply 
chain but, given resource and time constraints, it decided to focus on improving the skills of 
frontline providers (Frias 2008). TSSM initially opted to focus on masons. The market research 
study showed that although masons typically do not directly sell latrines, they can function as 
sources of information to households about latrine types to purchase and suppliers to visit. 
Moreover, although households often made simple pit latrines themselves or with the assistance of 
neighbors, they usually used masons for installation of more permanent latrines, particularly for 
installing the latrine pans and building the disposal system. Despite their potentially important 
influence on household sanitation decisions, masons often lacked in-depth knowledge of hygienic 
latrine options. Typically, they were informally trained members of the community who acquired 
sanitation masonry skills through learning by doing. (Our field visits indicated that many masons 
were farmers or construction workers doing masonry as a second job.) TSSM opted for the strategy 
of training masons to build their technical expertise. 
TSSM planned and executed a mason training and accreditation program to improve 
the technical skills of masons. The team requested districts to send two masons from each of the 
30 originally triggered hamlets. The training was developed and conducted in collaboration with ITS 
Surabaya, a leading technological training institute in East Java. TSSM sought to ensure that masons 
in every district received training to strengthen their formal training. At the very least, TSSM hoped 
to enhance masons’ capacity to recommend, promote, and install low-cost hygienic latrines using 
guidance from WSP’s market research. Accrediting trained masons and encouraging them to use 
WC-Ku Sehat (My Latrine Is Healthy) promotional stickers and branding materials developed by the 
TSSM program would hopefully enhance masons’ profiles to ensure households sought their advice. 
At best, TSSM hoped that training would transform some of the masons into entrepreneurs in the 
Poster comparing latrine prices 
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mold of the mason Pak Sumadi in Nganjuk district, who had developed a one-stop shop offering 
branded packages of low-cost options that the program was eager to have replicated (WSP 2010).15 
Unfortunately, the mason training effort failed to have the anticipated results. We heard 
from several stakeholders, including the trainers and the TSSM team, that these mason trainings 
seemed to have had limited results. According to the TSSM team, only 10 percent of trained masons 
actively promoted low-cost options. With a few exceptions, masons did not actively participate in 
sanitation committees or promote low-cost options. TSSM’s market research had indicated that 
households had ready access to a supply of sanitation goods and services. The value-added of its 
training centered on the promotion of low-cost hygienic options. A few masons we talked with 
reported that they had benefited from what they learned and used information from the training in 
helping households construct latrines. These masons found information on the appropriate distance 
of the septic tank from the water source and instructions on installing septic tanks especially useful. 
However, several others who went to the training did not end up using the information. Some 
indicated that it would have been useful if it contained a practical component. In most of the 
communities with trained masons we visited, household perceptions of costs of latrine options 
remained high and there was little awareness of lower cost-options. 
Mason training yielded limited results, in part because participants for mason training 
appeared to have been poorly selected. As noted, the TSSM team asked the districts to identify 
masons for training, two from each of the 30 triggered hamlets in each district. Districts usually 
wrote to subdistrict and village staff asking them to send candidates for training. Village heads, who 
often received the request to select candidates with very short notice, did not seem to have adequate 
knowledge of the intent of the training or the criteria to use to select appropriate candidates. In 
many instances, nonmasons with no particular interest in masonry attended the training. Village 
officials sometimes selected such persons, either because they received insufficient notice and had to 
quickly identify someone to send to the training or because selected masons refused to go because 
they did not want to lose their daily wages. A number of officials indicated that either no or 
insufficient per diem was offered to the masons. The master trainer from ITS Surabaya confirmed 
that many attendees were not well selected and often not only lacked a masonry background but 
many also had low capacity in general. As part of our site visits, we met several masons; although 
some were more capable than othersseveral primarily provided labor for latrine construction and 
likely lacked the business expertise to promote and market sanitation options to their community 
effectively. Indeed, in many communities, masons often have an agricultural background and acquire 
masonry skills on the side. A few exceptions, such as Pak Sumadi, did exist but these were rare and 
insufficient for creating change at scale. 
When initial attempts to create a corps of well-trained masons promoting low-cost 
options failed, TSSM shifted its attention to training sanitarians and focused on developing 
a social franchising model of “One-Stop” sanitation solutions. The TSSM team adapted the 
mason training and focused it on sanitarians and other business-minded individuals, hoping to create 
entrepreneurs who could effectively promote low-cost sanitation options. In particular, the TSSM 
                                                 
15 We heard about Pak Sumadi and his entrepreneurial skills from stakeholders in nearly every district we visited. A 
former mason, he had successfully devised several upgradeable models of latrines and improved sanitation options using 
local products. He had become quite popular, conducting many presentations and workshops on his approach and is 
featured in some WSP learning reports. 
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program wanted to replicate the social franchising model of the one-stop sanitation shop created by 
Pak Sumadi. To that end, it trained 14 one-stop shop providers from 14 districts. Trainees trained an 
additional seven providers (WSP 2010). During our field visits we heard that two people per district 
received entrepreneur training, so it was conducted on a smaller scale than mason training with 
fewer participants, but more intensively. People who attended the training seemed to find it useful, 
and we heard that a handful of active entrepreneurs seem to have emerged. 
Despite TSSM’s focus on entrepreneur training, it is unclear whether the program will 
be able to strengthen the market at scale. It appears that there still remained some problems with 
targeting individuals for entrepreneur training. One or two trainees we encountered were interested 
in developing a sanitation business but lacked adequate networks to enter the market. In Dampit 
subdistrict of Malang, for example, households complained that although low-cost options had been 
mentioned in passing during training, they heard no further information about such options 
subsequently. We discovered that the sanitarian who received the training was still trying to figure 
out how to establish a viable network of production and supply. Similarly, Bangkalan had sent a 
young, dynamic natural leader from Kokop for the entrepreneur training who was neither a mason 
nor a sanitarian. Although he valued the training and really wanted to become an entrepreneur, he 
did not have the resources or expertise to get started. He sought more time and support from the 
trainers and Pak Sumadi to get help in getting started. 
TSSM might have to devote more resources to identifying, training, and following up 
with an adequate number of sanitation suppliers to increase access at scale. First, TSSM 
might have to train adequate numbers of suppliers in each target district and subdistrict for there to 
be demonstrable impact on availability of low-cost options. Second, more careful screening of 
training participants will be necessary. Trainees will likely have to be more carefully selected for the 
training to have the anticipated returns. For example, this might require describing the training and 
its intent to stakeholders at the subdistrict and village levels and working closely with them to 
develop methods of identifying suitable candidates, instead of leaving selection to district officials as 
was done for mason training. Special attention should be paid to trying to encourage voluntary 
(demand-led) participation from sanitation providers. Third, in order to gauge the effectiveness of 
the training, the program will have to devote resources to tracking sanitation sales and services 
provided by the trainees and how they change over time. This will be necessary to determine if 
trained suppliers do indeed increase access to low-cost sanitation supply. All of this suggests that the 
training component might require substantial investment of time and resources to be effective at 
scale. 
In order to make this programmatically efficient, TSSM could conceivably adopt a 
phased approach, as was done for CLTS implementation. By adopting a phased approach, the 
program could focus on a few districts and subdistricts at a time and trigger a significant number of 
well-selected suppliers. This would increase the chances of there being a strong demonstration effect 
and building support for expansion of training in the future. By engaging district officials in this 
process and training them as master trainers, TSSM could build district capacity to phase in and 
deliver the training in the remaining subdistricts over time. 
Finally, any further improvements on the sanitation supply side might have to consider 
strategies for households unable to afford improved latrines. In most of the household focus 
groups that we held, households that did not own latrines listed cost as the primary barrier to 
building a latrine, and typically did not include sanitation as high on their list of spending priorities. 
Although this perception might have partly been driven by the fact that households were unaware of 
lower cost pour-flush latrine options, it was also driven by the high levels of poverty of certain 
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households and hamlets. Some of these households reported that they would have to save for 
several years in order to acquire a pour-flush latrine, and would have difficulty affording even low-
cost latrine options. Many of the households also appeared to rely on savings to finance 
expenditures on investments such as latrines, increasing the likelihood of sanitation construction 
plans getting disrupted by emergency expenditures on other items. (These general observations from 
focus groups are confirmed in our quantitative analysis described in Chapter VII.) 
Some subdistricts tried to help poor households gain access to latrines by establishing 
community revolving funds (arisans), as was observed in Perak subdistrict in Jombang. Other 
approaches have leveraged private sector support (also observed in Perak in Jombang), used 
community development funds earmarked for villages (observed in Pakisaji in Malang), or used in-
kind or cash support from within the hamlet (observed in several hamlets) to help fund latrine 
construction costs for poor families. Our discussions with the TSSM team in Indonesia indicate that 
they are aware of the need of adopting a differential approach for targeting poorer families that are 
unable to afford latrines and are investigating potential partnerships with other organizations to 
devise a solution as the program prepares for further scale-up. Our site visit observations suggest 
that systematic consideration of how to improve access to financing could be critical if the program 
is to achieve significant gains among poor communities, particularly in hamlets near rivers where 
there is resistance to adoption of pit latrines. 
C. Development and Dissemination of Sanitation Marketing Materials for 
Behavior Change 
TSSM’s market research had revealed that households were habituated to open defecation, did 
not consider sanitation a high priority, did not appreciate the link between defecation practices and 
disease, and thought that latrine ownership entailed high costs. To change these perceptions and 
attitudes, TSSM developed a range of BCC tools to encourage improved sanitation behavior. TSSM 
segmented the market of latrine users into three groups—(1) open defecators, (2) users of 
unimproved latrines, and (3) users of improved latrines—and created targeted strategies for each 
market segment. 
TSSM produced a range of sanitation marketing 
promotional materials to help eliminate open defecation, move 
households from the use of unimproved latrines to improved 
latrines by increasing awareness of features and standards of 
hygienic latrines, and popularize and reinforce latrine use. Next, 
we describe and assess the specific materials developed for each 
of these purposes. 
 To eliminate open defecation, WSP developed a range 
of promotional materials. The TSSM team developed posters 
and promotional materials, such as games, as well as marketing 
strategies to raise awareness of the dangers of open defecation 
and to promote latrine use. They created a signature character, 
―Lik Telek,‖ who personified open defecation and made him 
the centerpiece of the campaign to promote sanitation 
awareness. To increase ownership over the adoption of this 
sanitation marketing approach and longer-term sustainability, 
the program sought to develop sustainable distribution 
TSSM Lik Telek poster 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 56  
mechanisms. TSSM disseminated only a limited amount of the 
promotional materials for free, and instead offered districts a 
communication tool kit that contained ready-to-print materials 
along with a brochure of estimated costs of production for 
various templates. 
Adoption of these posters and other materials was 
limited among the districts we visited. The TSSM team 
spent substantial time and effort in developing and market 
testing attractive materials, such as the ready-to-print poster 
tool kit. However use of these materials seems limited so far. 
Districts officials in most districts we visited indicated they had 
received posters and stickers from TSSM but we saw limited 
evidence that these exact posters were disseminated widely at 
lower levels. Although we occasionally saw sanitation posters in 
the subdistrict Puskesmas, for the most part, many sanitarians 
and staff at lower administrative levels were not aware or 
familiar with TSSM posters. There were a number of reasons 
for the limited production and distribution of the posters and 
related marketing materials: 
 There were insufficient funds in the district budgets for sanitation promotion. 
Most districts had limited budgets for health promotion and several competing programs 
vying for promotional funds. With the exception of Jombang and, to a lesser degree 
Trenggalek and Bondowoso, most of the districts we visited did not allocate many funds 
for sanitation promotion. Instead, districts allocated their limited budgets to a few health 
issues that reflected high priorities for the district head and district health office. 
 The dissemination network for health promotion materials was weak. Sanitation 
and other health marketing campaigns are primarily conducted by the Health Promotion 
(Promosi Kesehatan [Promkes]) division of the health office. Provincial officials of the 
Health Promotion division indicated that there were severe shortages in the Promkes 
network of staff with Promkes positions in several Puskesmas left unfilled. Poor 
coordination at higher levels between the Health Promotion and Environmental Health 
offices, which was primarily responsible for implementing TSSM, further weakened the 
production and distribution of these materials. Thus, even when sanitation promotion 
materials were produced at the district levels, they were rarely seen at lower levels. 
 Districts appeared to prefer using their own sanitation marketing materials. Even 
those districts that invested in producing marketing materials often produced their own 
rather than use TSSM’s ready-to-print templates. We observed that a few districts 
dedicated resources to developing posters, stickers, and, on occasion, even videos. (The 
Jombang district had developed an impressive array of these materials and won a JawaPos 
autonomy award for innovation for these efforts.) However, these materials were 
independently designed and produced and did not use TSSM templates, and even in this 
district we did not see much trickling down of the materials to the lower levels. District, 
subdistrict, and village officials sometimes cited their unique local knowledge as a reason 
for developing their own marketing materials, which were often much simpler banners 
and stickers. 
Additional TSSM poster 
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To encourage households to 
upgrade from the use of 
unimproved latrines to improved 
latrines and to popularize 
perceptions of ideal latrines, 
TSSM developed informed 
choice catalogs. TSSM developed 
informed choice catalogs that 
would enable households to 
understand the features of healthy 
latrines, learn about options for 
adopting progressive approaches to 
latrine upgrades, and increase their 
awareness of low-cost options. 
These catalogs illustrated different 
combinations of latrine options, 
ranging from the lowest- to the 
highest-cost options for each of three latrine components: below-ground, ground-level, and above-
ground structures. The purpose of the catalogs was to help households ascend the sanitation ladder 
by increasing their knowledge of viable hygienic alternatives. The informed choice catalog seemed to 
have been used in training of sanitarians, masons, and entrepreneurs. 
 Those who saw the informed choice catalog considered it useful, but many had 
not seen it and thought it would have been useful if they had. Our impression from 
interviews with TSSM staff is that the informed choice catalog was to be disseminated 
during training and provided to facilitators, sanitarians, masons, and entrepreneurs so 
that they could use it to encourage households that had become ODF to ascend the 
sanitation ladder. The number of stakeholders who reported seeing the catalog varied. 
Those who had seen it thought that it was informative and potentially useful, but they 
had not yet used it, suggesting that guidance on its use might be necessary. 
 Careful consideration of the appropriate time to use the informed choice catalog 
might be necessary. Some stakeholders who had seen the catalog (or who we showed 
it to during our field visits) thought it would be useful to use during or soon after 
triggering and follow-up, when interest in exploring latrine options is most high. The 
TSSM program staff, on the other hand, indicated that they often introduced the manual 
to communities after the community had attained ODF and reached the first step of the 
sanitation ladder. The reservation against using it earlier, during the triggering phase, was 
that it might distract households from reaching ODF status through adoption of more 
basic options by encouraging them to focus on building costlier latrines. Indeed, our 
observations from field visits (and our analysis of quantitative data in Chapter VII) 
suggest that households in ODF hamlets had recently adopted cheaper and lower-quality 
latrine options. 
However, in some hamlets, especially those near a river, households are not likely to 
consider basic latrine options, such as pit latrines. In every district visited, we heard that 
facilitators found it very hard to create behavior change among households in hamlets 
close to a river. In these communities, households that currently defecate in the open are 
willing to defecate in permanent flush latrines but will not consider pit latrines. In these 
communities, it might be useful to introduce the informed choice catalog during or soon 
Pages from an information catalog
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after triggering to increase households’ awareness of low-cost options. Moreover, 
because facilitators are able to generate interest and galvanize community attention to 
sanitation most during the triggering and follow-up processes, some of this interest and 
momentum can wane after a community attains ODF status. Unless another milestone 
akin to ODF is created for adoption of improved latrines by the entire community, there 
might be insufficient incentives for facilitators in ODF communities to use the informed 
choice catalog to promote further behavior change. 
TSSM developed a logo and stickers to popularize shared 
perceptions and standards of hygienic latrines and encourage 
ODF attainment and adherence to latrine use. The logo was a 
thumbs-up sign accompanied by the slogan “WC-ku Sehat” (My 
Latrine Is Healthy). It was intended to be used for a range of 
purposes: to indicate to households which latrines met hygiene 
standards, to facilitate suppliers in branding and selling sanitation 
options meeting improved supply criteria, and to mark the houses of 
ODF households with latrines to increase pride of ownership of 
latrines. The WC-ku Sehat logo was made widely available and 
districts were encouraged to customize it as necessary. Although we 
saw these stickers in most districts or noticed that officials in 
subdistricts that had achieved good success frequently used the 
thumbs-up signal during our visits to hamlets, we 
rarely saw these stickers used at lower levels. For 
example, we rarely saw the stickers in use at Puskesmas 
or in villages or hamlets. Households did not seem to 
recognize it and we saw limited evidence that it had 
become a signal of latrine quality for households. 
Overall, TSSM attempted to use sanitation 
marketing to introduce some innovative approaches to 
strengthen the sanitation market in East Indonesia. 
However, its delayed implementation due to the time 
taken to prepare and develop tools and strategies, and 
the diluted application at lower levels, appears to have 
limited its impact. It appears that CLTS has driven 
most of the gains realized by TSSM at the household 
and hamlet levels, and there is potential for more gains 
by improving approaches to providing low-cost latrine 
options to communities. 
TSSM promotional sticker 
Sticker developed by Gresik district 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 59  
VI.  MEASURING TSSM RESULTS PROGRAM MONITORING DATA  
AND IMPACT EVALUATION 
WSP incorporated a variety of monitoring, evaluation, assessment, and learning activities as key 
components of the TSSM program. Such activities were necessary for measuring success, indicating 
areas of improvement, and maximizing learning about program progress and outcomes. In this 
chapter, we focus on two measurement activities: (1) program monitoring data to measure access to 
hygienic sanitation and track the number of ODF communities and (2) the independent impact 
evaluation to measure the health and economic impacts of the TSSM program. 
One of the early goals of this study was to reconcile some observed discrepancies between the 
program monitoring data and the longitudinal impact data. In fact, much of the impetus for 
conducting this study stemmed from the Foundation’s desire to investigate why the impact 
evaluation longitudinal data showed little difference in behavior-related variables for sampled 
households in the treatment and comparison hamlets, whereas in fact the TSSM program 
monitoring data would suggest more behavior change. 
To gain further insight on the nature and causes of the discrepancies between the two data 
sources, we sought to answer the following questions: 
 What is the magnitude of the divergence between results depicted by the TSSM program 
monitoring data and impact evaluation data? 
 What could account for this divergence? If it was the result of weaknesses in the 
program monitoring or impact evaluation data collection or approach, what could be 
done to strengthen these in the future? 
As we examined the data monitoring process as part of our field visits, we also sought to assess 
the effectiveness of the innovative stakeholder-led monitoring model that WSP piloted for TSSM in 
East Java: 
 To what degree did TSSM succeed in creating a sustainable, scalable, and effective 
mechanism of monitoring that produced high-quality data on sanitation outcomes? 
Which elements of this system worked well? How can the less effective elements be 
improved? 
 What key lessons learned in the implementation of the monitoring process are relevant 
for nationwide scale-up in Indonesia and replication in other contexts? 
To answer these questions, we focused on documenting the magnitude of the discrepancy 
between the monitoring and impact data sources for the impact evaluation locations. We conducted 
qualitative interviews with stakeholders at various levels of government to understand the processes 
by which monitoring data were collected and aggregated. We also studied the design for the impact 
evaluation and in our interviews with officials at the district and subdistrict levels sought to learn 
about their understanding of the process of selecting sites for randomization for the impact study. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section A, we summarize the results from 
our comparisons of the two data sources to help reconcile the apparent discrepancies. In Section B, 
we summarize our observations on how two districts understood and implemented the selection of 
sites for the impact evaluations. We then discuss some implications of the interpretation of impact 
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evaluation results and draw lessons for future impact evaluations of TSSM-type interventions. In 
Section C, we describe the TSSM monitoring mechanisms to examine their efficacy. Finally, in 
Section D, we suggest some avenues for improvement. 
A. Examining Divergences in Program Monitoring and Impact Evaluation 
Longitudinal Data 
Monitoring System. WSP has set up a monitoring system to gather information on 
households’ sanitation practices and the availability of hygienic latrines to learn about scale-up of the 
interventions in the three countries. As part of the TSSM program monitoring data, WSP defined 
key indicators. Those indicators consisted of information on the types of sanitation facilities that 
households accessed in the hamlets and whether a hamlet was ODF. Health volunteers at the hamlet 
level collected most of the data on the types of sanitation facilities. Subdistrict and district officials 
obtained and aggregated this information on a monthly or quarterly basis and transferred it to WSP 
staff in Jakarta. The latter in turn submitted the data to the Foundation to inform it of program 
progress and achievements. 
Impact Evaluation. WSP’s Global Impact Evaluation team in Washington, D.C., leads the 
impact evaluation. The team hired independent investigators to design and implement the impact 
study. The evaluation is part of a cross-country impact study of the Global Scaling-Up Rural 
Sanitation project being conducted in India, Indonesia, and Tanzania. Its purpose is to provide 
rigorous evidence of the effects of sanitation on a range of health and social outcomes. 
The evaluation of TSSM in East Java used a randomized design with allocation of hamlets into 
two groups: a treatment group eligible to receive the TSSM intervention and a control group that 
would not receive the program for about two years. The impact evaluation team focused on eight 
districts from Phase 2 of program implementation (Cameron and Shah 2010). Hamlets (dusuns) were 
the unit of assignment, and to generate adequate statistical power, the team needed a sample of 20 
hamlets in each of the eight districts included in the study, for a total of 80 treatment and 80 control 
hamlets. 
To select the sample for the evaluation, the evaluation team requested district officials to 
provide the names of at least 30 villages in each district that were potential candidates for the TSSM 
intervention.16 The team requested that district heads select villages that they expected would likely 
participate in the program based on district-specific selection criteria, such as sanitation and poverty 
levels, access to water, or prior exposure to water and sanitation interventions. Districts typically 
sent the team the names of 40 to 70 villages. From this set of villages, the evaluation team randomly 
selected 20 villages per district to be in the study sample (10 villages for the treatment group and 10 
for the control group, stratified by subdistrict). 
Because triggering occurs at the hamlet level, hamlets had to be matched to the villages. The 
evaluation team gave the names of the 20 study sample villages to district officials and requested 
them to select a hamlet in each village where triggering might potentially occur. After receiving the 
names of the hamlets, the evaluation team then notified district officials of the hamlets’ assignment 
status. That is, the team told district officials which were treatment hamlets and which were control 
hamlets (based on their prior randomization of the villages that matched the hamlet). The evaluation 
                                                 
16 As previously noted, villages are the larger administrative units, and usually consist of four to five hamlets. 
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team urged the district authorities to observe these designations and do all they could to avoid 
triggering the control hamlets. 
From the hamlets in the research sample, households were selected for baseline, end line (or 
follow-up), and monthly longitudinal data collection. Household listings were conducted in each 
hamlet using information provided by health volunteers to identify a universe of households with 
children younger than 2 years old in each hamlet.17 Thirteen households were randomly selected 
from each hamlet to participate in the baseline survey. These families also participated in a 
longitudinal survey conducted on more or less a monthly (or bimonthly) basis for more than a year 
starting in August 2008. The longitudinal surveys were necessary because of the sample size (or 
statistical power needs) required to measure the prevalence of diarrhea among children. A final 
follow-up (or end line) survey conducted in November and December of 2010 measured the full 
impacts of the program. 
Reconciling the Divergent Results. As noted earlier, results from the longitudinal data 
showed little difference in the sanitation behavior of households in treatment hamlets compared 
with those in control hamlets (Table VI.1). Households in treatment hamlets also showed low 
awareness of TSSM program activities. Yet, according to TSSM program monitoring data, about 44 
percent of the triggered hamlets had become ODF, suggesting that some behavior change might be 
expected. This raised concerns about the quality or validity of the TSSM program monitoring data, 
the impact evaluation results, or both, and the need to reconcile these findings. 
Our first step in reconciling the differences in findings across the two sources was to examine 
what the monitoring data showed in terms of ODF status by phase of implementation, as well as for 
the subset of hamlets included in the treatment sample. We observed that the ODF attainment rate 
for Phase 2 districts was much lower than the rates for Phase 1 and Phase 3 districts (17 percent in 
Phase 2 compared with more than 50 percent in Phases 1 and 3). In addition, the ODF attainment 
rate for hamlets in the impact evaluation treatment sample was even lower (11.3 percent). These 
findings suggest that the perceived discrepancies between the two sources of data are not as large as 
originally thought and indicate why the impact evaluation might not have picked up behavior 
change. 
Table VI.1.  ODF Rates for Different Samples of Hamlets 
 
Percentage of Triggered Hamlets  
That Became ODF 
Number of ODF Communities  
as a Fraction of Triggered  
Communities 
Total TSSM Sites 44.4 1,230/2,870 
IE Full Sample 11.3 9/80 
Triggered IE Sample 16.1 9/56 
Phase 2 16.6 166/999 
Phase 1 58.1 784/1,350 
Phase 3 53.7 280/521 
Source: WSP 2010a. 
IE = impact evaluation. 
                                                 
17 This was eventually extended to 5 years of age in some hamlets, as there were not adequate sample sizes of 
women with children younger than 2 in all hamlets. 
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Given these results, our next step was to determine why Phase 2 districts performed worse than 
other districts. As noted earlier, TSSM program implementation occurred in three phases with 
districts appointed to phases based on the order in which they expressed interest and marshaled 
funds for allocation to the program. It is likely that the most motivated districts and those willing to 
commit resources to sanitation were selected in Phase 1 and perhaps showed better performance. 
However, this leaves unanswered why the Phase 3 districts performed better than those in 
Phase 2. Based on discussions with resource agency staff and the TSSM team, we identified several 
possible reasons why Phase 3 districts could have outperformed their Phase 2 counterparts. 
First, by the time Phase 3 was implemented, the CLTS approach had been adopted as a pillar of 
the national sanitation and hygiene policy. All districts were more aware of the importance of 
sanitation and of CLTS in particular by then. This might have motivated Phase 3 districts to 
concentrate more on TSSM program implementation. The inclusion of sanitation indicators in 
JawaPos’ competition for district performance might also have intensified this focus. 
Second, some changes made to program implementation in Phase 3 might have contributed to 
greater ODF attainment. These changes included the following: 
 Just before Phase 3 implementation, WSP organized a meeting of all districts to share 
lessons learned by districts that had already implemented the program. Unlike districts in 
the earlier phases, Phase 3 districts had greater opportunity to learn from prior 
application of TSSM in East Java before starting program implementation. 
 The resource agencies slightly changed their strategy of district consultants’ engagement 
with districts in Phase 3. At the end of Phase 1, each district consultant continued to 
provide some support to his or her Phase 1 district as needed, while initiating the 
program in Phase 2 districts. The agencies followed a different division of labor during 
Phase 3, whereby the heads of the resource agencies focused on supporting the districts 
from the previous two phases. This left the district consultants to focus exclusively on 
their Phase 3 districts. 
 Refinement of targeting criteria could have enabled more effective leveraging of 
resources. Instead of selecting hamlets dispersed across the district, resource agencies 
worked with districts to concentrate on fewer subdistricts. This strategy made it easier 
for staff to move among different locations. 
 The sanitation marketing activities of the program took time to develop; they were more 
integrated into Phase 3 district activities. In particular, market research conducted for the 
sanitation marketing component might have strengthened triggering approaches in Phase 
3 hamlets. 
Finally, it is also possible that the site selection process, which differed in Phase 2 relative to the 
other phases, could have contributed to the range of ODF attainment. Site selection in Phase 2 took 
place well before districts were ready for program implementation. As we describe in more detail in 
Section B, it is possible that the whole process created some confusion on the part of district 
officials. Furthermore, we heard of major delays in passing the budget the year that Phase 2 districts 
implemented TSSM, so the program might have had less implementation time for Phase 2 districts. 
We also attempted to understand why the ODF attainment results for the impact evaluation 
hamlets were so low, and whether any features related to random assignment or the impact 
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evaluation design might have affected the performance. Our qualitative examination revealed several 
possible reasons these hamlets might have shown poorer performance. 
 Impact evaluation communities had poor fidelity to treatment assignment. About 
30 percent of the treatment hamlets were not triggered, and about 15 percent of the 
control communities were triggered (Table VI.2). As described in detail in the next 
section, low rates of triggering might be due to a different site selection process in Phase 
2, as well as the lack of clear comprehension on the part of district officials about the 
evaluation design. Given that a significant portion of the treatment hamlets were never 
triggered, combined with the fact that some control hamlets were triggered, it is not 
surprising that differences between treatment and control hamlets were lower than 
expected. Among triggered hamlets, ODF attainment was 16 percent (9 of 56). 
Table VI.2.  Triggered and ODF Status, by Treatment and Control Hamlets in the Impact Sample 
 Treatment Control 
Original Sample 80 80 
Triggered Sample 56 12 
Not Triggered 24 70 
ODF (of Those Triggered) 9 1 
Source: WSP 2010a. 
 The sampling approach taken for the impact evaluation might have further 
diluted the team’s ability to pick up program results. The impact team conducted 
baseline surveys by sampling households with young children in the hamlets in the study 
sample. Our examination of the monitoring data and subsequent discussions with WSP 
staff and district-level officials revealed that triggering did not always take place at the 
hamlet level. Rather, sometimes triggering occurred at administrative units lower than a 
hamlet (that is, neighborhoods of a hamlet referred to as RWs [Rukun Wargahs, or 
administrative neighborhoods] or RTs [Rukun Tetanggas, or household clusters]). Because 
the impact evaluation sample was drawn from all households with young children from 
the entire hamlet, it is possible that some portion of the households in the survey sample 
lived in neighborhoods that were not triggered and hence were not exposed to the 
intervention. 
 Some indicators included in the survey might not have been optimal for detecting 
program exposure. Our focus groups with households revealed poor brand recognition 
of the TSSM program. For example, although a household member could eventually 
recognize a description of program activity after considerable prompting, he or she did 
not often necessarily recognize that the TSSM program was responsible for the activity. 
Nor was the individual familiar with the terminology used by TSSM to describe key 
activities and milestones (for example, triggering and social maps). Many of the questions 
in the survey related to program exposure explicitly asked about the TSSM/SToPs 
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program by name; therefore, those questions might not have elicited accurate 
responses.18 
B. Lessons Learned for Impact Evaluations of Programs Being 
Implemented at Scale 
Our examination of the impact evaluation design and sample sheds light on considerations to 
keep in mind when evaluating complex programs such as TSSM, in which the goal is application at 
scale. Such interventions rely on the actions of implementers in several districts and at various levels 
of government within each district, which can lead to a great deal of program diversity as well as the 
need to engage multiple stakeholders. We start with some general lessons regarding evaluation of 
projects such as TSSM and to ensure that the evaluation occurs as planned. Next, we focus on how 
to ensure that the impact evaluation sample is representative of a scaled-up intervention and 
determine what questions the impact evaluation can answer. 
1. Ensuring Effective Execution and Implementation of the Evaluation 
Although random assignment is the gold standard of evaluations, it is considerably trickier to 
implement for large-scale, complex projects. Maintaining fidelity to assignment is particularly hard 
when program implementation responsibilities spread across myriad partners and implementation 
methods and staff capacity vary significantly across and even within districts. 
Where the local context and capacity is so varied, it is important to understand the 
program context fully to identify the full range of implementing stakeholders relevant to 
study execution. In TSSM, implementation authority was tiered. District officials were usually 
involved in helping with the site selection process for the evaluation. Ultimately, however, program 
implementation took place at the hamlet level. Therefore, subdistrict officials, such as the sanitarian 
and other health center staff and village officials, typically led the implementation. Both high-level 
decision makers at the district level and lower-level officials at subdistrict and hamlet levels 
responsible for the frontline program execution have to understand the evaluation purpose and 
design; they must also appreciate the importance of following guidelines related to treatment and 
control communities. 
Our field visits indicated insufficient or mistaken knowledge of the evaluation design 
among stakeholders at all levels. District officials varied widely in their understanding of research, 
random assignment, and what preserving the integrity of random assignment implied. Subdistrict 
officials, such as the sanitarian and other health center staff and village officials, were even less likely 
to know and understand what random assignment meant or which hamlets were treatment and 
control hamlets. We visited two districts that were part of the TSSM impact evaluation and tried to 
learn from district- and village-level officials about their understanding of the selection process of 
hamlets for assignment status. In both districts, district-level officials were aware that there were 
treatment and control hamlets. However, there was a great deal of confusion (and sometimes 
mistaken notions) regarding the process of selection, who selected the hamlets, which hamlets were 
                                                 
18 In addition, there might be issues about the quality of the longitudinal data itself. Local health volunteers (cadres) 
usually collected these data; although trained in data collection, the volunteers were not professional staff of the data 
collection firm. In addition, they lived in the same hamlet as the respondents and might have experienced ―data 
collection fatigue‖ from gathering such information on a frequent basis, which could have affected the data quality. 
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part of the impact evaluation sample, and what these hamlets represented. At the lower levels of 
administration, there was a considerably greater lack of knowledge (and usually no knowledge) about 
all of this. 
District officials in one impact district we visited remembered something about there being 
treatment and control sites, but they did not remember the list provided by the impact evaluation 
team that indicated treatment and control hamlets. In fact, some district-level staff were truly 
convinced that they had selected the treatment and control hamlets themselves. Only after we 
probed repeatedly on the issue and asked them to look for the old paperwork that showed the 
assignment status did they realize that the team had  provided the list to them. This confusion might 
have existed because we conducted our visits almost two years after random assignment had 
occurred. Nonetheless, the fact that officials clearly thought they had selected the treatment hamlets 
indicates that they neither understood the research design nor the random nature of the selection of 
treatment and control hamlets. More effort early on to ensure that critical stakeholders understand 
what the treatment and control hamlets were, how they had been chosen, and why it was important 
to preserve their status might have caused these officials to appreciate the importance of ensuring 
that hamlets were triggered (or not) as planned. 
It is critical for the evaluation to monitor program implementation regularly and 
carefully to learn about deviations from the plan. In large-scale projects, especially those in 
developing countries, implementation often deviates from what is planned. In a program such as 
TSSM in Indonesia, the decentralized context of the program’s implementation and the number of 
partners at different levels who determine whether and how the intervention is administered can 
make a big difference. For example, the TSSM program had a specific approach to recruiting 
hamlets for triggering: hamlets expressed demand for the intervention and districts selected among 
them based on identified criteria. In reality, the selection of hamlets varied substantially across the 
districts: selection was usually top-down and districts modified their selection criteria over time and 
in different ways. Because TSSM provided technical assistance and relied on districts to implement 
rather than having centralized implementation, we would expect heterogeneity of treatment and 
service delivery approaches. It is therefore important to create mechanisms to track program 
implementation carefully.19 
Close cooperation between the evaluation and program implementation teams is 
necessary to ensure thorough knowledge of program design and to build support for the 
evaluation. Concern for maintaining independence of the evaluation can sometimes lead to limited 
engagement between the impact evaluation team and implementation partners. However, successful 
impact evaluations require close and ongoing collaboration between these teams. The collaboration 
is essential to ensure that the evaluation team thoroughly understands program design and any 
changes to the design. Conversely, the implementation team must fully understand the evaluation 
design and alert the impact evaluation team about any deviations from original plans. 
                                                 
19 Having an external process evaluation can also help toward this purpose by providing important information to 
facilitate the evaluation’s execution and inform program implementation. TSSM’s implementation was complex and 
depended on the cooperation of a variety of stakeholders at various levels of governance, each of which had differing 
levels of capacity and resources, and was implemented in diverse district settings. Building in a strong external process or 
implementation analysis from the start could have strengthened program staff’s ability to detect issues early and helped 
with course corrections. It would also provide the impact evaluation information on changes in implementation and 
more contextual information that could inform survey design and interpretation of results. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 66  
In the case of the TSSM program, adequate collaboration between the impact and TSSM teams 
might not have occurred early in the project. The impact evaluation team reached out directly to 
districts to discuss their requirements for sites for the impact evaluation. More intensive engagement 
with the TSSM implementation team began only when the evaluation team realized that not all 
treatment hamlets were receiving the intervention. Our discussions with the TSSM team indicate 
that they were not aware of the specific needs of the impact evaluation team and sent regular reports 
as requested by the impact team on the status of the hamlets based on information it obtained from 
the districts. Not understanding the evaluation design and the meaning of treatment and control 
status, village officials sometimes substituted hamlets when they decided a hamlet was difficult to 
trigger, assigning a different hamlet to ―treatment‖ status. More direct engagement of the TSSM 
implementation team on the needs of the evaluation and increased coordination with them could 
have led to more TSSM oversight of the process and greater preservation of hamlets’ treatment 
status. 
2. Ensuring the Impact Evaluation Sample Is Representative of Overall Program Scale-Up 
The issues identified thus far are somewhat straightforward and can be avoided or resolved with 
careful planning. A more complicated question is how to create an evaluation sample that is 
representative of a scale-up program. The approach to selecting sites for the impact evaluation could 
affect how representative that sample is of overall program implementation. This has a number of 
implications, which we describe next. 
Site selection in impact evaluation districts for the TSSM program was conducted using 
a different approach compared with other districts. The usual process of selecting hamlets 
involved the resource agency staff and district officials holding road shows at various 
government/administrative levels to generate program awareness. For example, district officials held 
road shows to inform subdistricts (and sometimes villages) about the program. However, because 
the impact evaluation had to collect baseline data before program implementation, Phase 2 districts 
had to select communities well in advance (four to five months) before program implementation 
began. If the program had been truly demand responsive, as had been anticipated, then the districts’ 
approach to selecting communities for the impact evaluation would have not been representative of 
how the program was actually implemented. However, because in many cases, selection of 
communities ended up being more of a top-down process, rather than purely demand driven, 
district selection of hamlets might not have been as different. Nonetheless, even with a top-down 
approach for selecting villages and hamlets for triggering, some amount of information sharing 
would have taken place before selection and district level officials might have made more informed 
selection choices and could have factored in likely demand for the program better than was possible 
for the impact evaluation sites. 
The impact evaluation site selection process might not reflect the targeting strategies 
that districts ultimately adopted. Phase 2 districts used criteria specified by TSSM to select sites at 
the outset for the impact evaluation. These criteria, however, were not the same ones that the 
districts ended with as they tried and tested different strategies before settling on an approach they 
deemed most successful. The fact that the targeting strategy evolved over time contributed to the 
impact evaluation sample not being representative of the full set of triggered hamlets in the districts. 
In many districts we visited, district officials started with a dispersed targeting approach, but soon 
moved to taking a more clustered approach to triggering because they realized that this had a bigger 
demonstration effect. For instance, in Jombang, district officials focused more on ensuring Perak 
subdistrict became ODF, rather than focusing equal effort on each isolated hamlet that was 
originally triggered. Isolated and remote hamlets that were more difficult to influence quickly did not 
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often receive the attention and resources that the more purposively selected communities received. 
To the extent the former were part of the impact sample, this practice might explain why some of 
those hamlets did not get triggered or become ODF if triggered. In our visits to most districts, we 
observed limited success in getting all original 30 hamlets ODF, although there were pockets of 
villages or subdistricts in every district that had become ODF. 
Because of the evolving implementation, the impact evaluation sample is not likely to be 
representative of the ultimate district implementation strategy and might not capture a representative 
picture of overall program performance. The sample will demonstrate only how TSSM works when 
assigned to specific sites irrespective of its level of interest in the program and in isolation of 
improvements in the district strategy and capacity. It is more a test of whether a set of hamlets 
assigned to the program show impacts, rather than a test of the effectiveness of scale-up. 
Future impact evaluations of TSSM-type interventions with a focus on scale-up should 
carefully consider the approach and timing of sample selection. Impact evaluations often need 
to have sites identified early so baseline data can be collected. However, program staff might soon 
realize that those early sites are not the ideal places to start implementing the program and desire to 
change course. In pilot programs, focusing on the initial sites is less of an issue because the goal is to 
test the effectiveness of the intervention. However, for programs at scale, the ability of districts to 
create and develop strategies that improve over time are integral to scale up and determine overall 
success. Evaluations should either (1) consider sequencing their study so that site selection can occur 
when program implementers have had time to develop an understanding of the program and their 
targeting strategy (and possibly test and refine it) or (2) consider alternative, well-executed quasi-
experimental designs. For example, as programs roll out, triggered communities can be matched 
with other similar communities and their outcomes examined. Although less rigorous than 
randomized studies, such quasi-experimental studies might be better able to build on program 
targeting strategy and provide a better sense of program effects. Finally, given that the whole TSSM 
effort is to learn about scale-up, other evaluation designs that try to measure take-up rates in 
different districts and understand the reasons for take-up will also be important in assessing program 
success. 
C. Examining TSSM Monitoring Mechanisms 
WSP established a monitoring system for tracking TSSM progress and results that drew on the 
participation of stakeholders at various levels of the program. The monitoring system was distinctive 
in that it placed monitoring responsibility on local officials from the beginning, rather than opting 
for independent monitoring mechanisms. WSP’s objective in adopting this system was to create a 
culture of data tracking and data use at these administrative levels. It was hoped that demonstrating 
the feasibility of collecting sanitation data and its utility for policy and program decisions would 
result in districts’ being willing to continue data collection after TSSM ended. 
The TSSM implementation manual explains in detail the monitoring activities envisioned by the 
program at the hamlet/village, subdistrict, district, provincial, and central levels. The flow of 
monitoring data was intended to be bottom-up. Volunteers and other village or hamlet residents 
would conduct participatory monitoring of TSSM program progress in their communities on an 
ongoing basis, gathering data on changes in defecation practices and disposal of the feces of children 
younger than 3. They would use colored paper to mark progress made on the façade of the 
monitored houses and on the social map, leaving indicators of baseline progress untouched. The 
district facilitator would provide on-the-job training for these community stakeholders so they could 
conduct participatory monitoring in an effective manner. 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 68  
According to the TSSM implementation manual, subdistrict officials and Health Center 
(Puskesmas) staff were to gather this information and record progress from all intervention villages 
on a monthly basis. They were also supposed to verify the information by conducting monitoring 
visits to households with updated statuses and send the verified data to the district. Subdistrict-level 
officials (primarily the sanitarians) received a template, the LB-1 form (see Appendix C), that 
enabled documentation of the types of sanitation access among households in the hamlet, 
disaggregated by latrine type and by household wealth. Monthly data collection aimed to capture 
defecation behavior change, disposal of children’s feces, and hand washing with soap. WSP also 
devised several additional forms for use by subdistrict and health center staff in collaboration with 
natural leaders in the hamlets to conduct the following data collection activities: ODF verification 
and certification upon the hamlet’s request, ongoing tabulation of investments in latrines by 
households, and quarterly data collection on craftsmen providing sanitation services. After achieving 
ODF, subdistrict, Puskesmas, and district officials were responsible for documenting the change in 
sanitation conditions in the hamlet six months after ODF status and sharing these findings. 
The TSSM team developed template forms ranging from LB-1 to LB-10 to assist in each of 
these monitoring and data collection activities. To facilitate data collection, TSSM over time also 
invested in developing a short message system- (SMS) based system. 
In our visits to each of the six districts, we tried to understand data collection—both in terms 
of the process and reporting—and how stakeholders might have used these data at the various 
administrative levels. Although all districts used a bottom-up process to collect monitoring data, 
with volunteers (cadres) being the primary source of obtaining the information, we observed that the 
approach to data collection was not systematic and the periodicity of reporting was not regular. 
Changes made by the TSSM team to the data collection forms also created some additional 
confusion among the district and subdistrict officials who aggregated the information. Despite this, 
we did not see systematic over-reporting of latrine construction or ODF status (which was originally 
a source of concern when the impact evaluation and monitoring data both seemed to show 
divergent results). Next, we elaborate on our findings related to the monitoring data. 
Officials focused mostly on gathering data on household access to sanitation and 
progress toward ODF attainment. The most frequently collected sanitation indicators that we 
observed in monitoring reports related to access to sanitation, which was obtained through the LB-1 
form (or some close variant of it). We observed that the data collection was not consistent across 
districts and often not even across subdistricts within a district. In a few instances, such as the 
Wringinanom subdistrict of Gresik, we observed that officials maintained even more detailed 
information; for example, health center village reports contained information on hamlet 
expenditures on latrines. However, in most places we saw little evidence of the regular occurrence of 
data collection on the additional indicators recommended by the TSSM manual, such as the disposal 
of feces of children younger than 3, sanitation suppliers, and household expenditure on latrines. 
Sanitation data was collected through a bottom-up process mostly using reports from 
hamlet health volunteers (cadres), but there was little systematic monitoring by subdistrict 
or district officials. Generally, the flow of information about progress toward ODF outcomes 
involved health volunteers/facilitators updating staff at the subdistrict health center, either directly 
or through the village head or midwife. The subdistrict then transferred this information to the 
district. Although data collection of sanitation indicators occurred in all places, we observed little 
systematic monitoring by subdistrict and district staffs and, in general, the reporting was not done 
periodically. The process of obtaining the information at the hamlet level was frequently based on 
the health volunteer hearing someone in the hamlet had built a new latrine and reporting that to the 
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midwife or sanitarian. The sanitarian then reported this information upward, either on a regular basis 
or when requested. The health volunteer would likely visit the specific household to confirm reports 
of latrine construction. However, verification by the sanitarian was far less frequent. 
TSSM had mixed success introducing an SMS reporting system to encourage more 
regular reporting. This new reporting systemaimed to encourage more regular reporting by 
simplifying the process of submitting and aggregating data, and eliminating the travel and time costs 
required for submission of paper updates. Hamlet- or subdistrict-level facilitators could use mobile 
phones to text updates on sanitation using a format specified by WSP; they also submitted real-time 
updates on sanitation progress in lieu of monthly or quarterly reporting. A district-based server 
received and aggregated the data in the text messages into the existing database. During our field 
visits we observed a range of attitudes toward this system. Some sanitarians liked this reporting 
system and thought it saved them time. Others had heard about it and waited for training. Still 
others had either not heard about it or had difficulty using it. We heard a number of reports of 
duplicative efforts. Facilitators provided updates using the SMS reporting system but still had to 
submit paper reports. In a few instances we interviewed facilitators who said they used an SMS 
system but actually texted updates notifying staff at the Health Center or district levels who manually 
updated records, rather than adopting the TSSM automated SMS. Among the districts we visited, 
there was limited evidence of district-level ownership of this system so it is unclear how useful it will 
be in the future. 
Sanitation access indicators to be collected also evolved over time, which created some 
confusion and might have affected data quality. Sanitation access indicators initially consisted of 
four classifications—improved latrine, unimproved latrine, sharing, and open defecation—reflecting 
the type of latrine and ownership status. More than two-and-a-half years into program 
implementation, the TSSM team reduced the number of classifications to three and changed them to 
the following: permanent latrine, semipermanent latrine, and open defecation. This facilitated closer 
alignment between TSSM indicators and the Joint Monitoring Programme classification system; 
officials also hoped it might better capture households’ progress up the sanitation ladder. 
Officials in several districts and subdistricts reported that they found the new latrine categories 
(permanent and semipermanent) confusing, although according to WSP staff, they made this change 
partly in response to district requests. As a result, data collection often used the old indicators at 
lower (hamlet) levels in almost all districts. Officials at subdistrict or district levels subsequently 
reclassified the data to fit the new template. They did not always do this with sufficient accuracy or 
discretion. For example, in some cases districts reclassified all shared latrines as permanent even 
though they had no data to confirm the types of latrines that were shared and TSSM trainings 
instructed that districts classify such latrines as open defecation. TSSM is conducting ongoing 
training on these indicators, so this problem might be less pervasive in the future. 
The initial forms also classified households and their ownership of different of types of latrines 
by wealth status (high, medium, and low). Input from village or hamlet leaders often formed the 
basis for these classifications. It is unclear how accurate these were. They might have been accurate 
at baseline, when these forms were created, but we anticipate that updates on latrine use by health 
volunteers would not have accurately captured changes in latrine access by household wealth. This 
detailed level of information, which is not always accurate, unnecessarily adds to the complexity of 
the form. (TSSM eventually phased out disaggregation by wealth when introducing the SMS-based 
monitoring system.) 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 70  
Despite little independent verification by district or subdistrict officials, we did not 
observe any systematic over-reporting of latrine construction or ODF status in the program 
monitoring data. As noted, there was very little systematic verification conducted of the data, 
although ad hoc visits from subdistrict health center staff occurred in some instances. We saw little 
evidence, however, that the hamlet-level volunteers or facilitators had incentives to provide false 
reports of latrine construction. We suspect that they more likely made reports when latrines were 
built but not when they broke down or were abandoned, simply because the latter might have been 
less noteworthy events in the hamlet (which might lead to slight overstatement of the conditions of 
latrines in the hamlet). However, given that those with latrines would eventually repair or build new 
ones, we do not expect these differences to be large in magnitude. Our field visits also suggest that, 
for the most part, places reported as ODF in the monitoring data had shifted to universal latrine use. 
Because the districts had stopped reporting to WSP when they perceived the TSSM program had 
ended, we observed instances in which more communities had become ODF than were reported in 
the TSSM program monitoring data. 
The impetus for tracking outcomes also waned when hamlets achieved ODF status. For 
the most part, we did not encounter post-ODF self-assessments of the kind described in the TSSM 
manual. Indeed, we found that even routine monitoring in the hamlets became a less urgent priority 
after achievement of ODF status. The exceptions were in villages or subdistricts that had achieved 
ODF and were very proud of having attained that status; often, those villages or subdistricts served 
as role models for other communities or external visitors. Some type of monitoring was more 
frequent in such hamlets and villages. If continued monitoring decreases after hamlets attain ODF 
status, it will be difficult to track any continued progress up the sanitation ladder or regressions back 
to open defecation among community members. 
D. Lessons Learned About Program Monitoring 
Although the TSSM monitoring program seems to have met some of its basic goals, the data 
appear to have been gathered largely for WSP. Also, the data gathering requirements were more 
complex than needed. However, given the importance of monitoring and eventually improving 
sanitation indicators, we suggest some ways to improve the collection of program monitoring data. 
Monitoring takes considerable effort, and providing the volunteers with incentives or 
token compensation could help systematize the gathering of information. In several districts 
we visited, subdistrict facilitators indicated that motivating the health volunteers to conduct regular 
monitoring and maintain data quality in the absence of any token payment is difficult. The health 
cadres at the hamlets are volunteers who frequently consider their job to include helping with 
weighing babies and assisting the midwife as necessary. Asking them to collect systematic data on 
sanitation adds to the work they do without compensating them in any way. Jombang was one of the 
few districts in which we observed collection of sanitation indicators on a monthly basis through 
house-to-house visits. However, that district had leveraged the TSSM data collection effort to the 
data collection needed for the Jumantik program (dengue fever elimination) for which volunteers 
received a small monthly stipend to visit households and check their toilets and wash rooms for the 
prevalence of mosquitoes around bodies of water. In that district, we saw volunteers meticulously 
maintaining records on sanitation indicators. It is likely that offering even token payments to cadres 
for tracking key sanitation indicators might be difficult, given the likely bureaucratic hurdles and 
difficulty of obtaining agreement from each district health department. However, it would be worth 
exploring. Another option is to explore and pursue partnerships with existing health programs that 
leverage stipend payments for data collection. Nonmonetary rewards and incentives—such as 
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certificates of recognition by political authorities or periodic invitations to workshops—could be 
considered. 
Training on monitoring data collection should explicitly target health volunteers. 
Although frontline health volunteers (cadres) collect much of the data, training on collecting 
monitoring data and the indicators was provided mostly to sanitarians or other subdistrict officials. 
Training cadres or volunteers so they clearly understand the purposes and use of the data they collect 
and how they should collect it could be an effective way of ensuring better data collection. In 
addition, training might confer social rewards of increased recognition and status among hamlet 
members and reinforce the key effort that the cadres play in gathering important information. 
Simplifying the monitoring indicators that are collected might reduce the burden and 
encourage more regular data collection. The complexity and number of TSSM monitoring 
indicators might have impeded districts’ ability to gather accurate data and report it to WSP. For the 
TSSM program, districts had to provide information on a set of indicators relating to households’ 
access to sanitation facilities (reported by type of facility) and disaggregated by household wealth. 
District staff often found it onerous to complete TSSM reporting because these indicators 
sometimes differed from existing sanitation indicators collected by districts and they required 
disaggregation by wealth. In Gresik for example, the district collected information classified by the 
features of the latrines (goose-neck and so on). Districts therefore sometime had to do additional 
work to aggregate the data in the format required by WSP, reducing their incentive to report on 
additional non-WSP sites that they triggered by themselves. Keeping data requirements to a 
minimum could increase compliance with the data collection protocols. At the aggregate level, 
indicators can include the number of hamlets triggered and the number that became ODF. At the 
hamlet level, they can simply include the number of households still openly defecating and the 
number of those with access to and using latrines. Additional information on types of latrines and 
improvements could be collected on an as-needed basis through surveys of samples of communities. 
Mechanisms must be established to ensure that districts collect sanitation data from 
lower levels and send it to national-level stakeholders. Without some request or requirement to 
send data to the provincial or national levels, districts could either collect the data but not send them 
to relevant stakeholders at higher levels (as we observed in Jombang and Trenggalek) or they could 
stop collecting or aggregating these data (as occurred in Bondowoso, Bangkalan, and Malang). In 
many of these places, district officials indicated that they stopped providing the data as soon as the 
TSSM resource agencies stopped requesting them to send data to WSP. The national sanitation 
committee members indicated that though they regularly requested data from districts, they have 
limited authority and leverage to compel districts to submit data regularly. District-level aggregation 
sometimes failed to occur even when detailed monitoring data existed at lower levels.20 
                                                 
20 Occasionally, we saw more current and carefully documented data at the subdistrict and village levels compared 
with the district level. In Malang, the district reported outdated figures on triggered and ODF villages, whereas 
subdistricts had meticulous records indicating that many more villages had been triggered, along with tabulations of 
resulting changes in sanitation access. Similarly in Gresik, although the district seemed to be up to date on overall 
figures, it reported limitations in its ability to aggregate the data due to personnel constraints. At the village and 
subdistrict levels, however, we saw village-specific progress reports replete with maps, figures, and triggering dates. 
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One approach to improving the TSSM monitoring system is to build local government capacity 
for data use. For example, subdistricts and villages might be able to use monitoring data to request 
funds. Similarly, the planning department staff at the province or district levels (Bappeda), which are 
in charge of fund allocation, usually did not directly receive the TSSM monitoring data. Such 
information could have been useful for their planning purposes. In a few villages and subdistricts 
(for example in the Wringinanom subdistrict of Gresik) and in Trenggalek district, we saw 
facilitators and village officials make effective use of data on changes in sanitation access and 
changes in diarrhea incidence to build community support and commitment for eliminating ODF. 
Building incentives and capacity for data use could facilitate more effective monitoring of TSSM on 
an ongoing basis. 
Another approach would be to include the attainment of other milestones in addition to 
reaching ODF. The impetus to achieve ODF status drives much of the tracking of TSSM outcomes. 
When that is achieved the focus on tracking outcomes wanes, even though the TSSM philosophy is 
that communities should shift their focus to moving up the sanitation ladder to attain total 
sanitation. In the absence of concerted programmatic efforts, including rewards and incentives for 
achieving these next targets, it is unlikely that tracking of continued progress up the sanitation ladder 
will occur. 
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VII.  HOUSEHOLD SANITATION PRACTICES AND BEHAVIORS 
To complement the qualitative evidence described in earlier chapters, we conducted a 
household survey designed to collect information on latrine access as well as knowledge, attitudes, 
and practices relating to sanitation among rural communities in East Java. Specifically, we gathered 
information from a random sample of households from 36 hamlets (6 hamlets in each of the six 
districts we visited as part of our qualitative site visits). Seventeen of these hamlets were declared 
open defecation free (ODF), and 19 were non-ODF hamlets. 
This chapter describes the results of this quantitative data collection effort and the findings 
from the subsequent analysis. In Section A we explain the purpose of this analysis; we follow by 
presenting our approach to data collection (Section B) and describing the characteristics of the 
analysis sample (Section C). In Sections D to F we present our main descriptive findings on various 
aspects of sanitation access, knowledge, attitudes, and practices in the surveyed hamlets. Finally, in 
Section G, we examine key factors correlated with latrine access and open defecation behavior. 
A. Purpose of the Quantitative Analysis 
The primary purpose of our analysis is to gain a more systematic understanding of the extent to 
which households in these rural communities have access to latrines and practice hygienic 
defecation, as well as to identify the factors related to latrine access and defecation behavior. In 
addition to these core outcomes, we obtain information from households on where they received 
their knowledge on sanitation practices and whether they are aware of any sanitation-related 
programs in their communities. We chose not to ask exclusively or explicitly about the TSSM 
program (known locally as SToPS), because qualitative information from our field visits suggested 
that its ―brand‖ recognition was low. We did, however, ask households some general questions 
about their awareness of sanitation programs and whether they received knowledge about sanitation 
practices in community meetings and other forums. 
Although our analysis focuses on the overall sanitation situation in the surveyed hamlets, we 
also look at differences in access to latrines and in defecation practices based on a hamlet’s ODF 
status. Specifically, we examine whether there are any observable differences in sanitation access and 
behavior among residents in hamlets that have been declared ODF versus hamlets that are not ODF 
(though some of these might have been triggered). Furthermore, the absence of differences in 
sanitation practices between these two sets of hamlets would call into question the standards used to 
designate a hamlet ODF and/or the duration for which behavior change resulting from the program 
persisted, whereas the existence of differences would suggest that programs to promote ODF 
attainment at the hamlet level are worthwhile. 
Because hamlets were not randomly selected as part of an experimental evaluation, any 
differences we observe in practices across the two types cannot be directly attributed to the TSSM 
program. Hamlets that became ODF could differ significantly from the non-ODF hamlets. For 
example, ODF hamlets might differ on observable characteristics (such as being in wealthier 
villages) or in some other, unobservable, ways that affect sanitation behavior but are difficult to 
capture. Nonetheless, observable differences provide useful information about any differing 
practices among households in these two types of hamlets. We make a crucial distinction regarding 
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causality by interpreting differences between ODF and non-ODF hamlets with caution and not 
simply attributing all observed changes to TSSM.21 
B. Data Collection Approach 
We developed a survey instrument to address key dimensions of sanitation in the rural 
Indonesian context. We collected inputs from several sources to develop this instrument, including 
previous surveys on sanitation and context-specific knowledge and information gained through our 
field visits and focus groups. The instrument was refined through an iterative process that included 
input from two international sanitation consultants. It was piloted by Survey Meter, our local data 
collection partner, and appropriate revisions were made based on the findings of the pilot to arrive 
at the final version.22 
The hamlets in our sample were selected from the six districts we had visited as part of the 
qualitative data collection process in fall 2010. As noted in Chapter I, in each of the six districts, we 
selected two subdistricts, and within each subdistrict we selected three to four hamlets that we 
visited (usually in one or two villages). We tried to visit both ODF and non-ODF hamlets (including 
those that were and those that were not triggered). Our final list of sites selected for household 
surveys included 36 hamlets, of which about half were ODF and half were not. (We used primarily 
program monitoring data to define hamlets as ODF or non-ODF.23) A list of the surveyed hamlets 
by ODF status is in Appendix B. 
We obtained a household listing for each hamlet from the hamlet head, and the research team 
randomly selected 20 households for surveying, with replacement households randomly selected in 
case of nonresponse. The survey was administered by Survey Meter during the second and third 
weeks of January 2011. 
C. Sample Description 
The distribution of households across the six districts in the sample is presented in Table VII.1. 
Within each district, 20 households in each of six hamlets were surveyed, yielding a total of  
120 households per district and 720 overall. The sample is about equally divided between ODF and 
non-ODF hamlets. 
                                                 
21 In cases with large observed differences, it is reasonable to conclude that the TSSM program contributed to such 
differences to some extent by encouraging hamlets to become ODF, although the precise magnitude of the contribution 
is difficult to quantify. 
22 A copy of the survey instrument can be provided upon request. 
23 Two of the 36 hamlets selected for the survey had a discrepancy in ODF status between the monitoring data and 
data from our field visits. For these 2 hamlets we updated the program monitoring status accordingly. In addition, 
Survey Meter had to replace 2 selected hamlets that it could not identify in the field, and for which information on ODF 
status was not available from program monitoring data. For these, we used the information reported on ODF status 
from the field visit by Survey Meter. The final ODF status for the analysis was therefore determined by the program 
monitoring data in 32 hamlets, by our field visit data in 2 hamlets, and by Survey Meter data in the remaining 2. As a 
sensitivity check of our results, we reran the analysis, dropping the four hamlets for which we did not use the program 
monitoring data. The main results were substantively similar. 
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Table VII.1.  Sample Distribution, by District and ODF Status 
 Hamlets  Households 
District Total ODF Non ODF  Total ODF Non ODF 
Bangkalan 6 4 2  120 80 40 
Bondowoso 6 1 5  120 20 100 
Gresik 6 5 1  120 100 20 
Jombang 6 2 4  120 40 80 
Malang 6 2 4  120 40 80 
Trenggalek 6 3 3  120 60 60 
Total 36 17 19  720 340 380 
 
For a better understanding of the sample and setting, we present some basic sample 
characteristics. Specifically, these include characteristics of the household head, selected dwelling 
characteristics, and measures of household wealth. As seen in Table VII.2, the average head in our 
sample is a 50-year-old male who heads a family of four and has almost six years of formal education 
(corresponding to the completion of elementary school in Indonesia). Almost 90 percent of 
household heads are employed, largely in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. 
We also asked households for information on selected components of their wealth. Household 
wealth is likely to be particularly important for latrine access and use, because in our focus groups, 
cost was often cited as a barrier to latrine construction. In addition, wealthier households might have 
access to better information on sanitation or have different attitudes regarding the importance of 
good sanitation practices. The median monthly income reported by households in our sample is 
almost Indonesian Rupiah (Rp) 900,000, which includes all sources of cash and in-kind income 
(Table VII.3). This translates into a monthly income of about U.S $100 (or $150 in Purchasing 
Power Parity terms24). However, this measure of income is fairly crude and should be viewed with 
caution. Some households might have purposely misreported their income to gain some perceived 
advantage, for example, if they believed that low-income families would be targeted for assistance. 
Others might simply have failed to recall all sources of income accurately. 
                                                 
24 The Purchasing Power Parity dollar exchange rate accounts for the difference in price levels between Indonesia 
and the United States. 
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Table VII.2.  Characteristics of Household Head (Percentages Unless Otherwise Noted) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Household Size     
1 2 14.6 13.8 15.3 0.589 
3 24.9 27.1 22.9  
4 24.9 25.6 24.2  
5 or more 35.7 33.5 37.6  
(Mean number) 4.2 4.1 4.2 0.759 
Household Head Characteristics     
Male 88.2 88.8 87.6 0.675 
Age     
Age < 30 4.9 5.0 4.7 0.555 
30 age < 45 33.2 33.6 32.9  
age < 65 46.0 47.8 44.5  
 15.9 13.6 17.9  
(Mean age) 49.8 49.2 50.4 0.408 
Education     
< 7 years 73.2 74.6 71.8 0.713 
7 9 years 13.8 13.6 13.9  
> 9 years 13.1 11.8 14.2  
(Mean years) 5.7 5.6 5.9 0.538 
     
< 7 years 73.2 72.6 73.7 0.768 
7 9 years 15.5 16.8 285  
> 9 years 11.3 10.5 285  
(Mean years) 5.8 5.8 5.7 0.895 
Occupational Status     
Self employed without employees 22.5 20.6 24.2 0.787 
Self employed with unpaid/ 
nonpermanent employees 21.6 22.4 20.8  
Day laborer 18.8 20.6 17.1  
Employee 18.4 19.8 17.1  
Not working 10.2 8.3 11.8  
Othera 8.6 8.3 8.9  
Field of Employment for Those Currently 
Employed:     
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 54.0 48.6 59.1 0.122 
Grocery, retail, restaurant, and hotel 13.5 13.5 13.4  
Manufacturing and processing 10.5 14.5 6.9  
Public service 10.1 8.4 11.6  
Otherb 11.9 15.1 9.0  
Sample Size 601 720 285 340 316 380  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
a employed with permanent paid employees and day laborer. 
b
communication; and finance, insurance, rental, building, land rental, and company services. 
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Table VII.3.  Dwelling Characteristics and Household Wealth (Percentages Unless Otherwise Noted) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Dwelling Characteristics     
Number of Roomsa     
1 4 22.2 18.5 25.5 0.502 
5 6 40.4 41.5 39.5  
7 8 26.7 28.8 24.7  
More than 8 10.7 11.2 10.3  
Mean 6.1 6.3 5.9 0.117 
Material of Walls     
Brick or concrete 77.1 75.6 78.4 0.794 
Bamboo 12.6 13.5 11.8  
Wood 10.0 10.9 9.2  
Other 0.4 0.3 0.5  
Household Wealth     
Income (Rp 000s)b     
0 499 32.2 29.1 35.0 0.385 
500 999 21.7 23.8 19.7  
1,000 1,499 13.8 11.5 15.8  
More than 1,499 32.4 35.6 29.5  
Median 888 941 836 0.297 
Mean SES indexc 4.66 4.64 4.67 0.926 
Sample Size 591 720 327 340 264 380  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
aIncludes rooms for storage, cooking, and sleeping, but not rooms or huts for keeping animals. 
bThe sum of income from all sources, including in kind income. 
cSocioeconomic status (SES) index ranges from 0 to 10. See text for details of index construction. 
To address these concerns regarding the accuracy of self-reported income, we also construct, 
for use in the analysis, a broader socioeconomic status (SES) index: a composite variable that 
includes data on a variety of household and dwelling characteristics. The variables include income, 
the number of household members per room, years of education and employment status of the 
household head, an indicator for the house having brick or concrete walls, indicators for ownership 
of various durable goods, the number of various types of farm animals owned, and the value of 
goods held by a household business. Specifically, we use Principal Components Analysis to identify 
common variation in a set of variables relevant in determining an SES-type of indicator and 
optimally weight each of these variables to obtain an aggregate SES index25 (Appendix D, Table D.1 
shows the weights for each component and the distribution of the final index). We rescale the SES 
index on a range of 0 to 10, with higher values indicating higher SES; we also use this variable in 
subsequent analysis to divide the sample into SES quartiles. 
As described earlier, one potential concern we have in comparing sanitation behavior in ODF 
and non-ODF hamlets is that the two types of hamlets might have very different characteristics (for 
example, non-ODF hamlets could be substantially less wealthy). In that case, it would be difficult to 
interpret any observed sanitation-related differences as the effects of the program, because the 
                                                 
25 This index is based on the methodology used by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and in the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (Rutstein and Johnson 2004). 
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differences could be due to these inherently different characteristics. (In the example, one would 
expect less wealthy hamlets to have lower latrine access regardless of program exposure.) However, 
tables VII.2 and VII.3 show that ODF and non-ODF hamlets are remarkably similar across the 
range of characteristics that we consider. None of the differences in these characteristics are 
statistically significant, and we expect that they are unlikely to drive any differences in behavior that 
we observe. However, we cannot rule out that there are, between these hamlets, important 
unobservable differences not captured in our survey (for example, differences in the strength of 
community leadership), so again we are careful not to attribute observed differences to the effects of 
the TSSM program alone. 
D. Latrine Access, Latrine Characteristics, and Defecation Practices 
A critical step toward a hamlet’s becoming ODF is for households to have adequate access to 
latrines. Features of the latrines are also likely to influence how they are used and where people 
defecate. We start by describing levels of latrine access, proceed to describe the characteristics of the 
existing latrines, and end this section with defecation practices of residents in these hamlets. We also 
examine differences in access and practices between ODF and non-ODF hamlets. 
1. Latrine Access 
 The majority of households either own a latrine or have access to a shared latrine. 
In aggregate, more than 80 percent of the households own a latrine or have access to a shared 
latrine (Figure VII.1 and Table VII.4). Nearly two-thirds of the surveyed households own a latrine; 
another 13 percent have access to a latrine owned by another household. Use of a communal latrine 
is uncommon (about 5 percent of households); 18 percent of the households have no access at all to 
a latrine. The vast majority of latrines for those with access are located close to the residence, with 
about half inside the house and another third within 10 meters of the house. 
Figure VII.1.  Latrine Access Across All Hamlets 
18%
13%
5%
64%
No access
Share - other house
Share - communal
Own
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Table VII.4.  Latrine Access and Ownership (Percentages Unless Otherwise Noted) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Has access to latrine (owns or shares) 82.2 96.5 69.5 0.001*** 
Mode of Access for All Respondents     
Has access to latrine:     
Owns a latrine 64.3 77.1 52.9 0.000*** 
Shares latrine with other household 13.3 17.1 10.0  
Shares communal latrine 4.6 2.4 6.6  
No access to latrine 17.8 3.5 30.5  
Distance of Latrine from House for All 
Those with Access (Independent 
Observation)     
Inside house 49.5 44.3 55.9 0.391 
Outside house     
Fewer than 5 meters 17.5 19.3 15.2  
6 10 meters 16.8 18.7 14.4  
11 50 meters 15.4 17.1 13.3  
More than 50 meters 0.8 0.6 1.1  
Reason for Not Owning or Sharing a 
Latrine for All Those Without Accessa     
Too costly 90.6 100.0 89.7 0.003*** 
Satisfied with current situation 39.8 16.7 42.2 0.067* 
Other priorities 30.5 33.3 30.2 0.840 
No physical space 12.5 16.7 12.1 0.721 
Sample Size 128 720 12 340 116 380  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
aBecause respondents could select up to three options, percentages do not sum to 100. Other categories are all less 
than 10 percent. 
 Latrine access is significantly higher in ODF compared with non-ODF 
hamlets. 
We observe clear differences in rates of latrine access by hamlet ODF status: just under  
4 percent of households in ODF hamlets have no access to a latrine, whereas just over 30 percent 
have no access in non-ODF hamlets (Table VII.4). The almost universal access to latrines in ODF 
hamlets is consistent with the TSSM program’s intent to improve latrine access as an essential step 
to eliminating open defecation. Among those with access to a latrine, we do not observe any 
differences between ODF and non-ODF hamlets in the proximity of the latrine to the house. 
 Cost is reported as the most common reason for not having a latrine. 
Cost is by far the most common reason cited for not owning or for sharing a latrine by those 
without access and appears still to be an important barrier to latrine adoption. Among those without 
access, almost 90 percent reported high cost as the main reason they did not have a latrine. In 
addition, in non-ODF hamlets—where latrine access is far lower—only about 40 percent of those 
without access to a latrine reported being satisfied with the current arrangement (open defecation). 
This implies that about 60 percent were dissatisfied with open defecation, which suggests in turn 
that many of them would like to have access but face barriers to obtaining it—especially cost. At the 
same time, about 30 percent of those without access in non-ODF hamlets report that they have 
other priorities besides investing in latrines. Therefore, there is scope for further demand-side 
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programming even though cost, a supply side constraint, is the major barrier to access. These results 
coincide with the findings from our qualitative focus groups in which households without latrines 
cited cost as the primary barrier to latrine access and use.  
2. Characteristics of Existing Latrines 
Latrines can transmit disease if they are in poor condition or their disposal systems do not 
handle waste properly. We examined key characteristics of latrines both by asking respondents the 
characteristics of their latrines and through independent observations conducted by data collectors 
implementing the surveys.26 
 The flush latrine is the most prevalent type. Septic tanks and pits are equally 
prevalent as disposal systems. Few existing latrines dispose of waste directly 
into the open, but many have features that could still result in contamination. 
Overall, about two-thirds of the latrines that people own are the flush type; the remaining third 
are nonflush (Table VII.5). About 45 percent use a septic tank as the disposal system (primarily, 
households with a flush latrine). Almost half the respondents have a pit disposal system, about 25 
percent use an unlined pit, and nearly 20 percent use a brick-lined pit. 
Although few latrines dispose of waste directly into the river or in the open, the common use of 
unlined pits is a concern to the extent that waste could seep through the soil and contaminate 
sources of drinking water such as wells. This poses a significant risk, because the majority of 
households use wells for their main water source, as seen in Table VII.5. Indeed, independent 
observation suggests that 44 percent of households with latrines have the source of final disposal of 
waste within 10 meters of their household’s water source, which could easily lead to contamination.27 
Lids are important features of pit latrines, as they can prevent insects from entering the latrine 
and transmitting diseases. We find that overall about 44 percent of households with a pit latrine 
report that it has a lid. This percentage is similar across ODF and non-ODF hamlets. Therefore, 
although the definition of ODF requires that pit latrines have lids, we find that this was not the case 
in practice for many of the pit latrines in the hamlets declared ODF. With regard to other selected 
features of a latrine that promote good hygiene and prevent disease transmission, slightly more than 
half the latrines have a floor that is smooth and easy to clean, more than three-quarters of flush 
latrines have a water seal, and just slightly under two-thirds of pit latrines do not have holes in the 
floor that could allow insects to enter. 
Overall, although most of latrines in these hamlets are therefore of a type that promotes good 
hygiene, there are still concerns that a substantial fraction of the existing latrines could still result in 
                                                 
26 For many of these latrine characteristics, we have information from self-reports and independent observations 
by the surveyor. In a few hamlets, however, some of the independent observations were inadvertently not conducted. 
Because a separate analysis showed the answers from these two sources to be almost identical in cases in which both are 
reported, we present only the self-reports in Table VII.5. 
27 We can also look at the percentage of latrines that have an appropriate disposal system for the existing 
environmental conditions. Pits are not appropriate where the water table is high, and unlined pits are not appropriate 
where the soil is sandy (that is, porous). Based on these criteria, about 8 percent of latrines have an inappropriate 
disposal system that could cause contamination. 
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Table VII.5.  Latrine Characteristics (Percentages) 
 
Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Latrine Characteristics     
(Self reports)     
Latrine Type      
As percentage of all respondents     
Flush/pour flush 55.8 55.6 56.1 0.000*** 
Nonflush 26.4 40.9 13.4  
No access to a latrine 17.8 3.5 30.5  
As percentage of those with latrines     
Flush/pour flush 67.9 57.6 80.7 0.010*** 
Nonflush 32.1 42.4 19.3 0.010*** 
Disposal System (Among Those with 
Latrines)     
Septic tank 45.3 41.5 50.0 0.147 
Open disposala 3.5 1.2 6.4  
Pit     
Unlined pit 25.2 33.8 14.4  
Brick/concrete lined pit 19.1 14.3 25.0  
Bamboo lined pit 5.6 6.7 4.2  
Other lined pitb 1.4 2.4 0.0  
Total pit 51.2 57.3 43.6  
Main Source of Drinking Water for All 
Those with Access:     
Well 54.7 52.3 57.6 0.619 
Piped into house 20.8 19.9 22.0  
Bottled water 12.7 17.1 7.2  
Tap 10.7 9.5 12.1  
Distance from final disposal of feces to 
observation)     
10 meters or fewer 44.1 43.9 44.3 0.288 
10 50 meters 43.1 39.1 47.5  
50 meters or more 12.8 17.0 8.2  
Otherc 0.8 0.9 0.8  
Slab     
Percentage of latrines with slab 97.1 95.7 98.9 0.151 
Material used (among those with slabs):     
Concrete 80.7 74.8 87.7 0.074* 
Otherd 19.3 25.2 12.3 0.074* 
Walls     
Percentage of latrines with walls 96.3 96.0 96.6 0.837 
Material used (among those with walls):     
Brick or concrete 68.6 58.7 80.8 0.019** 
Bamboo 15.8 20.3 10.2  
Sack, plastic, or cloth 11.2 14.0 7.8  
Othere 4.4 7.0 1.2  
Roof     
Percentage of latrines with roofs 77.0 70.4 85.2 0.034** 
Material used (among those with roofs)     
Tile 70.4 75.3 65.3 0.204 
Asbestos 16.0 13.4 18.7  
Otherf 13.6 11.3 16.0  
Lid     
Percentage of pit latrines with lids 44.2 45.3 41.2 0.693 
Material used (among pit latrines with lids)     
Bamboo 81.1 82.1 78.3 0.230 
Plastic bucket 3.3 1.5 8.7  
Otherg 15.6 16.4 13.0  
Sample Size 90 720 67 340 23 380  
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Table VII.5 (continued) 
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
aOpen disposal to river, ditch, gutter, pond, or open space. 
b  
c m and rainwater. 
d  
e  
f  
g tile. 
contamination of water sources and disease transmission. These concerns include latrines that have 
waste disposal close to the household’s main source of drinking water; disposal systems, especially 
pits, that are inappropriate for environmental conditions; and latrines that lack key hygienic features, 
such as pit latrines without lids. The situation suggests that further information is needed regarding 
hygienic features of latrines even in hamlets where their use is already widespread. 
 Although rates of latrine access are higher in ODF hamlets, latrines in these 
hamlets are more likely to be pit latrines and to have more basic 
characteristics compared to those in non-ODF hamlets. 
We observe some important differences in the types of latrines that exist in ODF and non-
ODF hamlets. Although Table VII.4 showed that rates of latrine access are significantly higher in 
ODF hamlets (97 versus 70 percent), about the same fraction of residents in both types of hamlets 
has access to flush latrines (Table VII.5). The difference in latrine access stems from households in 
ODF hamlets having greater access to nonflush latrines. 
This finding is consistent with the intent of the TSSM program, in which households were 
encouraged to build any type of latrine—even a rudimentary type—as a first step to improving 
sanitation practice, rather than wait until they could afford to build a flush latrine. Indeed, a separate 
analysis indicates that the SES of those with access to latrines in ODF hamlets is lower than in non-
ODF hamlets. This suggests that hamlet members who struggled to afford a flush latrine—typically 
those of lower SES status—were drawn into basic pit latrine ownership to a greater extent in ODF 
hamlets. This higher rate of pit latrine ownership is the main driver behind higher overall rates of 
latrine access in these ODF hamlets. 
Other latrine characteristics also tend to be more basic in ODF hamlets, where households are 
more likely to have simple unlined pits than lined pits or septic tanks. Furthermore, although latrines 
in both types of hamlets tend to have walls, they are more likely to be made of bamboo or cloth in 
ODF hamlets and of brick or concrete in non-ODF hamlets. Similarly, latrines in ODF hamlets are 
less likely to have a roof and a concrete slab relative to latrines in the non-ODF hamlets. Again, this 
is consistent with the program’s focus on encouraging the construction of basic latrines as a first 
step to improved sanitation practice, which took place to a greater extent in ODF hamlets. 
3. Condition of Existing Latrines 
The cleanliness and condition of the latrines can be an important determinant of sanitation 
outcomes for several reasons. First, clean latrines in good repair might be more likely to be used 
even if cleanliness is the subjective assessment of the household, because perceptions matter for 
Improving Sanitation at Scale: Lessons from TSSM Implementation  Mathematica Policy Research 
 83   
behavior. Second, latrines that are dirty can spread contamination, potentially negating the benefits 
of their use relative to open defecation. Third, the current condition of latrines has implications 
regarding sustainability, because latrines that are poorly maintained might eventually fall into a state 
of neglect that renders them unusable. 
 A substantial fraction of the existing latrines are in poor or dirty condition. 
One in five households (20 percent) with access to a latrine report that their latrine is in bad 
physical condition (Table VII.6). Fifteen percent believe that their latrine is dirty. These figures are 
higher for independent observation by the surveyors: 29 and 30 percent, respectively. Roughly one 
quarter of surveyors reported that they could observe feces around the latrine; these exposed feces 
could well lead to contamination. Again this suggests that, even where latrines are present, there is 
still room for further improvements in hygiene and that it is important to reinforce the message of 
the need to maintain the quality and cleanliness of existing latrines. 
We see some slight differences in latrine cleanliness by a hamlet’s ODF status: latrines in non-
ODF hamlets generally appear to be in better and cleaner condition than those in ODF hamlets.  
 
Table VII.6.  Latrine Condition/Cleanliness (Percentages) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Latrine Condition/Cleanliness     
Physical Condition     
Latrines in bad overall condition as 
percentage of all latrines:     
Self report 20.3 25.0 14.4 0.032** 
Independent observation 28.9 35.8 20.5 0.037** 
Components in bad condition as percentage 
of each component (independent 
observation):     
Slab 21.3 28.1 13.1 0.008*** 
Lid 31.6 37.9 17.2 0.043** 
Walls and roof 26.5 34.4 16.9 0.008*** 
Cleanliness     
Latrine is dirty as percentage of all latrines:     
Self report 15.2 17.7 12.1 0.253 
Independent observation 29.9 34.3 24.6 0.115 
Other aspects of cleanliness as percentage of 
all latrines (independent observation):     
Feces visible 23.4 21.7 25.4 0.466 
 35.2 38.5 31.1 0.275 
Other hygiene related features as 
percentage of all latrines (independent 
observation)     
Floor smooth and easy to clean 56.5 54.4 59.1 0.513 
No holes in floor (among pit latrines) 62.6 62.6 62.7 0.984 
Water seal (among flush latrines) 78.3 72.9 83.1 0.013** 
Sample Size 95 592 66 328 29 264  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
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These results might reflect the fact that the program encouraged residents in ODF hamlets to build 
basic pit latrines, which tend to be harder to keep clean.28 This result underscores the need for post-
ODF follow-up. As discussed in Chapter IV, our qualitative site visits suggest that households in 
ODF villages with higher levels of post-ODF follow-up are more likely to maintain hygienic latrines. 
4. Defecation Practices 
Access is an important component of improved sanitation, but defecation practices determine 
whether improved outcomes are attained. 
 Exclusive latrine use is almost universal in hamlets that were declared ODF, but 
almost 40 percent of those in non-ODF hamlets openly defecate. 
Overall, more than three quarters of the respondents report having exclusively used a latrine in 
the previous week, whereas about one in five did not use one at all (Table VII.7). Very few 
respondents had access but still openly defecated: just under 2 percent had access to a latrine but did  
 
Table VII.7. Defecation Behavior (Percentages) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Defecation Behavior by Respondent in the 
Past Week     
Used latrine exclusively 76.9 94.4 61.3 0.000*** 
Open defecation     
Always no latrine access 17.8 3.5 30.5  
Always latrine access 1.9 0.9 2.9  
Sometimes 3.3 1.2 5.3  
Open Defecation Locationa     
River or stream 91.0 73.7 93.2 0.133 
Ditch or irrigation canal 6.6 26.3 4.1 0.079* 
Woods or forest 3.6 0.0 4.1 0.224 
Stools of Young Children     
Children younger than 5 years old present in 
household  30.3 26.8 33.4 0.083* 
Disposal of stools among households with 
children younger than 5     
Latrine 62.4 76.9 52.0 0.015** 
River 28.9 13.2 40.2  
Other open disposal 8.7 9.9 7.9  
Disposal of stools among households with 
children younger than 5 and latrine access    
 
Latrine 76.0 78.7 73.3 0.351 
River 16.8 11.2 22.2  
Other open disposal 7.3 10.1 4.4  
Sample Size 166 720 19 340 90 380  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
aBecause respondents could select all that applied, percentages do not sum to 100. Other categories are all less than  
4 percent. 
                                                 
28 A separate analysis shows that pit latrines are substantially more likely to be reported as dirty by surveyors 
relative to flush latrines (65 versus 13 percent) and more likely to have a noticeable smell of feces (76 versus 16 percent). 
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not use it at all, and only about 3 percent had access but used it only sometimes. Almost all of those 
with access to latrines therefore tend to use them, even though many are in a poor or dirty condition 
(as shown in Table VII.6). 
There are large differences in latrine use by hamlet ODF status: 94 percent of people in ODF 
hamlets exclusively used latrines in the previous week, whereas only 61 percent in non-ODF hamlets 
did so. This confirms that there is a difference in sanitation behaviors between ODF and non-ODF 
hamlets, the concerns about the hygiene of the existing latrines discussed in the previous subsection 
notwithstanding. 
 The vast majority of open defecation takes place in the river, as does a substantial 
percentage of the disposal of young children’s stools. 
Focusing on non-ODF hamlets—where almost all open defecation in our sample takes place—
a river or stream is by far the most common location for open defecation (93 percent). This poses a 
health risk to these communities even though very few households report obtaining drinking water 
directly from the river (under 1 percent, as shown in Table VII.5). Health risks could arise because 
river water contaminates drinking water in wells or is the source of piped water, or because of other 
contact with river water (for example, through bathing in the river). 
A substantial percentage of households with young children dispose of their children’s stools in 
the river (29 percent across all hamlets). However, the percentage is much lower in ODF hamlets 
(13, versus 40 percent in non-ODF hamlets), a difference that reflects largely the greater access to 
any type of latrine in the ODF hamlets (and that is consistent with the behavior change information 
communicated by the TSSM program). Access to a latrine dramatically reduces disposal of children’s 
stools in the river. For instance, in non-ODF hamlets only 22 percent of those with latrine use the 
river, compared with 40 percent of all respondents with young children. These findings reflect the 
results for respondents’ own defecation in that those with access to latrines tend to use them. 
E. Latrine Construction and Costs 
A key aim of the TSSM program was to encourage latrine construction, both by increasing 
demand for latrines and by lowering costs. In this section, we examine latrine construction among 
households and the related costs. We look first at the household’s decision to invest in latrine 
construction and investigate the timing of the construction, household contributions, and the main 
funding sources used. We also look briefly at latrine repair and improvement, as this reflects 
households’ willingness to continue investing in latrines and affects sustainability. Finally, we 
investigate actual and perceived costs of latrine construction to understand the extent to which they 
might affect household’s decisions. 
 Almost half of latrines were built within the time span of the TSSM program in 
ODF hamlets, compared with about 37 percent in non-ODF hamlets. 
Of the households with access to a latrine (either owned or shared), a significant fraction  
(44 percent) report that their latrine was constructed within the previous three years, which is within 
the time span of the TSSM program (Table VII.8). There are important differences between ODF 
and non-ODF hamlets, with latrines more likely to be constructed recently in the former. This is 
consistent with the TSSM program encouraging households to build latrines, particularly in hamlets 
that eventually ended up ODF. 
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Table VII.8.  Latrine Construction (Percentages Unless Otherwise Noted) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Latrine Construction      
Time of construction     
Past 3 years 43.9 49.1 37.4 0.118 
Earlier 56.1 50.9 62.6 0.118 
Contributions to construction by owners     
Money 83.6 84.4 82.6 0.665 
Materials 38.2 47.7 25.9 0.009*** 
Labor 78.0 78.6 77.1 0.750 
Contributions to construction by sharers     
Money 25.6 28.8 22.2 0.359 
Materials 20.2 30.3 9.5 0.021** 
Labor 69.8 71.2 68.3 0.770 
Main sources of funding as percentage of 
those contributing money     
Personal savings/income 86.0 88.8 82.2 0.091* 
Othera 14.0 11.3 17.8 0.091* 
Latrine Repair/Improvement     
Type of work in past year as percentage of 
all those with access to a latrine     
Repair  6.6 6.4 6.8 0.841 
Improvement 2.2 1.5 3.0 0.291 
Sample Size 129 152 66 328 63 264  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
a  
 Latrine construction is funded mainly out of household savings and income. 
Most households that own latrines contributed to the construction with money and labor, 
whereas fewer contributed materials (Table VII.8). Those who share rather than own latrines were 
more likely to contribute labor. This suggests that although sharers are expected to contribute to the 
latrine construction in return for access, the bulk of the money is supplied by the actual owner. The 
vast majority of funding for latrine construction (86 percent) comes from personal savings or 
income rather than other sources (such as loans), which suggests that in practice, families invest in 
latrines only after accumulating sufficient savings. Thus, not having a stock of savings is clearly a 
barrier to latrine construction. 
 After latrines are constructed, few households spend further resources on repair 
or maintenance. 
Fewer than 10 percent of those with access to a latrine reported spending on any improvements 
and repairs in the previous year. At the same time, as noted earlier, more than 20 percent of those 
with access believed that their latrine was in bad physical condition. This suggests that latrines are 
viewed as a one-time investment and that there is a reluctance to make further investments to 
maintain them, an obvious concern for sustainability. 
 Actual and perceived costs for flush latrine construction are very high relative to 
income, but are far lower for nonflush latrines. 
Table VII.9 shows that for those who do not own a latrine, the median perceived costs of flush 
latrine construction are Indonesian Rupiah Rp 1,500,000, or about US $170 (US $250 in Purchasing 
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Power Parity terms). These perceived costs, which are identical across the two types of hamlets, 
represent for nonowners about 2.5 months of median household income, which most view as very 
expensive. They are about 20 percent higher than the median actual construction costs reported by 
current owners, which could reflect the fact that the latter were often incurred several years ago 
(when nominal costs were lower), or that the flush latrines that exist have features different from 
those of the hypothetical flush latrine that we described in the question (which included a septic tank 
but excluded walls and a roof).29 
As expected, costs—both actual and perceived—are substantially lower for nonflush latrines. 
Because perceived costs are only about 0.3 months worth of median income for nonowners, fewer 
than one in four nonowners view them as extremely costly. However, although nonflush latrines are 
less costly (so that one might expect them to be more common than flush latrines), we have shown 
that they are actually far less common, especially in non-ODF hamlets. This fact ties into our focus 
group findings in non-ODF hamlets: we frequently heard that people did not want to construct a 
nonflush latrine despite being aware of their affordability, because they viewed them as unsanitary or 
inconvenient to use. 
 Most nonowners have considered constructing a latrine, but only half of these 
have firm plans to do so, and even fewer consider it a priority for their 
households. 
To obtain an idea of the future path of latrine construction in the surveyed hamlets, we also 
examine households’ plans for further latrine construction and improvements by current ownership 
status. Of owners, about 25 percent have considered making improvements to their current latrines; 
a similar percentage have considered building an entirely new latrine (of the same or a different 
type). About 56 percent of current sharers have considered building a new latrine; 73 percent of 
those without access have considered doing so. Consistent with the current situation in which flush 
latrines are much more common than nonflush latrines, very few of those without access plan to 
construct nonflush latrines (especially in non-ODF hamlets), even though they are far cheaper. 
Although these plans for latrine construction seem encouraging, it is unclear whether these 
households will be able to achieve their goals. First, only about half of each group has firm plans to 
undertake this construction in the following year. Second, many of these households might be 
unable to overcome the cost barriers (particularly to flush latrine construction) identified previously. 
As shown earlier, more than 85 percent of respondents report personal savings or income as the 
main source of funding for latrine construction, yet only 25 percent believe that they could access 
their savings for latrine construction or improvements. A significant proportion of respondents 
(more than 40 percent) report having access to at least one other source of funding that could 
alleviate this credit constraint, such as loans, repayment schemes, and village savings schemes. 
However, it is unclear whether they could obtain enough money from these sources to fully fund 
respondents (more than 40 percent) report having access to at least one other source of funding that 
could alleviate this credit constraint, such as loans, repayment schemes, and village savings schemes.  
 
                                                 
29 Interestingly, actual construction costs for flush latrines are higher in ODF hamlets, which again could be related 
to the fact that latrines in ODF hamlets are newer on average and therefore incurred higher nominal costs. It could also 
reflect greater awareness of costs among those in ODF hamlets if sanitation issues were discussed more in them. 
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Table VII.9.  Latrine Costs (Percentage Unless Otherwise Noted) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Latrine Costs     
Flush latrines     
Flush latrines as a percentage of all latrines 67.9 57.6 80.7 0.010*** 
Median actual costs for those with flush 
latrines (Rp 000s) 1,200 1,400 1,070 0.206 
Do not own any latrine     
Median estimated costs for a basic 
version (Rp 000s) 1,500 1,500 1,500 1.000 
View of costs     
Very costly 66.4 75 65.5 0.753 
Somewhat costly 28.1 25 28.4  
Not costly 5.5 0.0 6.0  
Nonflush latrines     
Nonflush latrines as a percentage of all 
latrines 32.1 42.4 19.3 0.010*** 
Median actual construction costs for those 
with nonflush latrines (Rp 000s) 100 117 55 0.041** 
Do not own any latrine     
Median estimated costs for a basic version 
(Rp 000s) 200 200 200 1.000 
View of costs     
Very costly 23.4 33.3 22.4 0.853 
Somewhat costly 61.7 50 62.9  
Not costly 14.8 16.7 14.7  
Thought about latrine construction     
Currently own latrine     
Improve current latrine 25.1 19.8 31.8 0.308 
Build new latrine (same type) 9.5 9.9 9.0  
Build new latrine (different type) 13.8 14.9 12.4  
Plans for construction in next year 46.4 46.2 46.7 0.946 
Currently share latrine     
Improve current latrine 11.6 12.1 11.1 0.463 
Build new latrine (same type) 35.7 27.3 44.4  
Build new latrine (different type) 20.9 24.2 17.5  
Plans for construction in next year 51.1 64.3 39.1 0.019** 
Currently no access to latrine     
Build flush latrine 62.5 58.3 62.9 0.313 
Build nonflush latrine 10.2 16.7 9.5 0.313 
Plans for construction in next year 46.4 55.6 45.5 0.528 
Access to funding sources for 
construction/improvement     
Personal savings 25.7 29.1 22.6 0.102 
Other sources     
Affordable loans 28.8 28.2 29.2 0.904 
Deferred payment 24.6 26.2 23.2 0.624 
Village savings scheme [arisan] 16.4 16.5 16.3 0.981 
At least one source 52.5 54.1 51.1 0.900 
At least one source besides savings 42.1 41.5 42.6 0.694 
Latrine is one of top 3 spending priorities 14.7 12.9 16.3 0.281 
Sample Size 88 720 9 340 34 380  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
a  
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latrine construction or the extent to which they are willing to commit to sanitation with borrowed 
funds (only 15 percent of households named sanitation as one of their top three spending priorities). 
It is therefore likely that despite households’ intentions, other demands on their limited resources 
will dominate spending on latrine construction. 
F. Knowledge and Attitudes 
The patterns of latrine ownership and use that we observe in the data are likely shaped to a 
large extent by the knowledge and attitudes of the respondents regarding sanitation. We examine 
two aspects of knowledge: (1) general knowledge about sanitation, and the sources of this 
knowledge; and (2) knowledge about sanitation gained through specific community mechanisms, 
such as community events and other means. As discussed earlier, because we found low brand 
recognition in our earlier field visits, we purposefully phrased our questions to avoid referring 
directly to the TSSM program. Finally, we look at attitudes toward open defecation among the 
respondents, as they could have an impact on behavior. 
 Respondents generally have a high degree of knowledge about sanitation, except 
regarding the health hazards of openly defecating either in the river or far from 
where people live. 
The average respondent has a relatively high degree of knowledge about sanitation, scoring 4.9 
out of 6.0 on the questions we asked regarding open defecation and its health risks (Table VII.10).30 
The most common sources relied upon for advice on sanitation are health center staff (27 percent), 
family (21 percent), and hamlet head (15 percent). Detailed analysis shows that the only questions 
with which a substantial number of respondents had some difficulty were ―As long as you defecate 
far from where people live, defecating in the open is not a health problem‖ (70 percent answered 
correctly) and ―Defecating in the river is not a health problem, because the river carries away the 
feces‖ (54 percent answered correctly). This suggests that an important gap in knowledge exists 
regarding the transmission of contamination and diseases from open defecation when feces do not 
visibly contaminate the immediate environment. Because we saw earlier that the vast majority of 
open defecation takes place in the river, this implies that a lack of information regarding the health 
hazards of defecating in the river might still be a particularly important barrier to eliminating open 
defecation. 
                                                 
30 Respondents had to select ―agree‖ or ―disagree‖ for each of a series of statements such as ―As long as you do 
not touch feces directly, defecating in the open is not a health problem.‖ The full set of questions and the percentage 
answering them correctly are presented in Table VII.10. 
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Table VII.10.  Knowledge and Attitudes (Percentages Unless Otherwise Noted) 
 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
General Sanitation Knowledge     
Percentage showing correct knowledge of health risks of 
open defecation:      
touch feces directly, defecating 
 94.7 97.6 92.1 0.001*** 
 93.2 96.8 90.0 0.018** 
becaus  54.0 64.1 45.0 0.009*** 
 70.0 76.8 63.9 0.012** 
to defecate in 
 91.9 94.1 90.0 0.006*** 
 85.4 90.5 80.7 0.065* 
Knowledge score on 6 point scale 4.9 5.2 4.6 0.006*** 
Main source for advice about sanitation     
Health center staff 27.1 22.9 30.8 0.024** 
Family 21.0 25.9 16.6  
Village/hamlet head 15.3 14.4 16.1  
Village midwife 10.4 15.9 5.5  
Othera 26.3 20.9 31.1  
Exposure to Information About Sanitation     
     
Event held in past 3 years 41.8 49.1 35.3 0.079* 
Attended event (as percentage of all respondents) 19.4 20.9 18.2 0.613 
Timing of event:     
Past year 68.6 74.3 61.4 0.158 
2 years ago 21.7 15.6 29.5  
3 years ago 9.7 10.2 9.1  
Usefulness of event as percentage of those attending     
Very useful 73.6 77.5 69.6 0.617 
Somewhat useful 23.6 19.7 27.5  
Not useful 2.9 2.8 2.9  
Saw stickers or posters on sanitation 24.6 25.9 23.4 0.604 
Other events attended in past 3 years     
Religious events or meetings 82.6 82.9 82.4 0.889 
 12.1 14.7 9.7 0.224 
Activities by Posyandu officers 32.8 32.9 32.6 0.950 
Other hamlet meetings 40.3 41.8 38.9 0.607 
Sanitation discussed at other events in past 3 years as 
percentage of all respondents     
Religious events or meetings 12.9 14.1 11.8 0.667 
 6.4 7.6 5.3 0.431 
Activities by Posyandu officers 10.0 11.2 8.9 0.617 
Other hamlet meetings 14.3 15.9 12.9 0.535 
House visits experienced during past 3 years by     
Health center staff 22.1 28.5 16.3 0.005*** 
Community health worker staff 31.4 35.9 27.4 0.272 
Village midwife 22.9 30.9 15.8 0.021** 
Hamlet officials 51.9 58.8 45.8 0.021** 
Other government officials 13.4 15.6 11.3 0.195 
Sanitation discussed during house visits in past 3 years as 
percentage of all respondents     
Health center staff 9.6 15.9 3.9 0.004*** 
Community health worker staff 13.2 18.2 8.7 0.074* 
Village midwife 8.5 14.7 2.9 0.02** 
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 Total 
ODF  
Hamlets 
Non ODF  
Hamlets p Value 
Hamlet officials 13.6 20.3 7.6 0.014** 
Other government officials 4.4 7.6 1.6 0.006*** 
Attitude Toward Others Who Openly Defecate     
Strongly disapprove 44.7 51.5 38.7 0.004*** 
Disapprove 50.7 46.8 54.2  
 1.3 0.6 1.8  
Think it is acceptable 3.3 1.2 5.3  
Sample Size 140 720 71 340 69 380  
Notes: p Values are for the test of differences between ODF and non ODF hamlets, using a t test for means and 
a chi squared test for distributions. They adjust for clustering within hamlets. 
a members, community health workers, government 
officials, media, and common knowledge. 
 Knowledge about sanitation is higher in ODF hamlets than in non-ODF hamlets. 
Sanitation knowledge is significantly better in ODF hamlets (0.6 points higher on the 6-point 
knowledge scale), which is consistent with the idea that the program successfully disseminated 
information about good sanitation practices to a greater extent in these communities. Specifically, 
people in ODF hamlets have a smaller knowledge gap about the dangers of defecating in the river 
and openly defecating far from where people reside. Reliance on health center staff is somewhat 
lower in ODF hamlets, whereas reliance on other family members is higher. In these hamlets, more 
people might have gained information about sanitation from the program and could have 
internalized it and supplied it to their family members. 
 About 40 percent of respondents recall a triggering meeting having been held in 
their community, but only half attended the event. 
We asked about the triggering event indirectly, by referring to ―… a community event [held in 
the past three years]… where health center or district officials came specifically to discuss sanitation 
and use of latrines.‖ The results in Table VII.10 show that about 42 percent of respondents report 
that such a meeting was held, although only about half of these (19 percent of all households) 
actually attended the meeting. The majority of these meetings were reported as being held in the 
previous calendar year, 2010, although this could reflect recall bias to some extent if the ability to 
recall the event faded over time. 
As expected, a substantially larger percentage of respondents in ODF hamlets report that a 
triggering event was held compared with non-ODF hamlets (49 versus 35 percent). It is not 
surprising that some respondents in the non-ODF hamlets recalled triggering, as some of these 
hamlets might actually have been triggered, or respondents may have recalled a similar event as a 
triggering event. Overall, the percentage that actually attended a triggering event across the two types 
of hamlets is similar. One in four respondents report seeing stickers or posters about sanitation or 
latrine use, although we cannot be certain what fraction of these were the TSSM stickers and posters 
aimed at increasing demand for latrines as opposed to other types. 
Table VII.10 (continued) 
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 Information about sanitation is also obtained to a lesser extent through other 
community events and home visits by various people within the community, such 
as health workers. 
We also asked more generally about sanitation-related information obtained through other 
community mechanisms. First, we asked about various events that are typically held in these hamlets 
and whether sanitation was discussed at these events in the past three years. A substantial fraction of 
respondents reported attending events such as religious meetings, activities held by Posyandu 
officers, and other hamlet meetings. However, relatively few of these meetings included discussions 
about sanitation. For example, 83 percent of all respondents attended religious meetings, but only  
13 percent of all respondents attended religious meetings at which sanitation was discussed. 
Second, we asked similar questions about visits to respondents’ homes by certain key 
individuals within the community. Again, visits by people such as community health workers 
(cadres) and hamlet officials were common, but visits at which sanitation was discussed were much 
less common. This confirms our qualitative finding that follow-up sanitation monitoring was 
infrequent and suggests there are good opportunities to use existing community mechanisms to 
provide information about sanitation. We also note that visits by various categories of health 
workers are more common in ODF hamlets, as are visits at which sanitation was discussed. This 
could partly be because these health workers were required to make such visits as part of their role 
in tracking ODF status. Although we cannot make causal attributions, we do observe a relationship 
between sanitation monitoring and sanitation information provided through this mechanism and 
ODF status. 
 The vast majority of respondents disapprove of open defecation by others within 
their community. 
Virtually all respondents report disapproving (51 percent) or strongly disapproving (45 percent) 
of open defecation by other community members (Table VII.10). These findings are consistent with 
the earlier observation that respondents are generally knowledgeable about the fact that open 
defecation is undesirable. However, a caveat is that they might not be fully aware of the risks of 
defecating in the river and might not even consider it to be open defecation in the same way as 
defecating on the ground within the community. The substantially higher rates of strong disapproval 
in ODF hamlets are consistent with greater knowledge of the health hazards of open defecation in 
these hamlets and potentially with the role of the TSSM program in focusing on these issues. 
G. Factors Related to Latrine Ownership and Defecation Behavior 
The previous sections presented a descriptive analysis of the patterns observed in the data; this 
section focuses on isolating factors correlated with latrine ownership and defecation behavior in a 
regression framework. We estimate logit models for latrine ownership and for open defecation 
behavior, which are each regressed on a set of independent variables that could plausibly be 
correlated with them. 
An important caveat to the interpretation of the results in this section is that the estimates are 
all correlations and do not allow us to make any causal statements about the effect of any factor on 
ownership and defecation behavior. For example, if we find that households with a lower SES are 
less likely to own latrines, we cannot necessarily conclude that improving SES status would lead to 
greater latrine ownership. It might simply be that households with lower SES tend to live in more 
remote hamlets far from sources of latrine construction materials, and that this is why they do not 
own latrines. Nevertheless, identifying readily observable factors that are correlated with ownership 
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(or open defecation) is still useful, because it allows easy identification of specific subpopulations at 
which future interventions can be targeted. 
1. Factors Correlated with Latrine Ownership 
Table VII.11 presents the results for latrine ownership, where the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator that takes the value 1 for those who own latrines and 0 for those who share or do not have 
access to latrines. We include a specification with variables that are most likely to be correlated with 
latrine ownership, including household head age and gender, the household SES quartile, an 
indicator for having a river in the hamlet, an indicator for high perceived latrine use in the 
community, an indicator for high perceived latrine construction costs, a set of indicators for the 
score on the six sanitation knowledge questions in the survey, and a set of district indicators to 
account for district-specific factors. Because the coefficient estimates from the logit model are 
difficult to interpret, Table VII.11 reports the predicted probabilities of ownership. These can be 
directly interpreted as the probability of ownership for a given group of individuals with a specific 
characteristic, adjusting for differences in other characteristics.31 We also report the p-values from 
the logit regression, which identifies the variables that are statistically significant predictors of latrine 
ownership.32 
 Latrine ownership is significantly lower in households with younger heads and 
lower SES status, for those who perceive low latrine use in their hamlets, and for 
those with lower levels of knowledge about sanitation. 
The results in Table VII.11 suggest that households with younger heads (especially heads under 
45) are significantly less likely to own latrines. This is consistent with the previous evidence that 
latrine construction in this setting typically requires an expensive payment out of household savings: 
younger families might not have accumulated sufficient resources. There are strong differences in 
the probability of latrine ownership by SES quartile. Compared with the wealthiest quartile (quartile 
4), in which the predicted probability of ownership is nearly 90 percent, ownership in the other 
quartiles is significantly less likely. Ownership is predicted to be about 67 percent for quartile 3,  
58 percent for quartile 2, and only 47 percent for quartile 1 (the poorest quartile). This suggests that 
programs or approaches to increase latrine ownership should be targeted at households with 
younger heads and lower SES status. 
Although we hypothesized that having a river in the hamlet might decrease the probability of 
ownership because a convenient mode for open defecation existed, the difference in predicted 
probabilities for this variable is small and is not a statistically significant predictor of ownership.33 
There is a large difference in the probability of ownership based on whether respondents perceive  
 
                                                 
31 The other characteristics are set to their mean values for these calculations in tables VII.11 and VII.12. 
32 We adjust the p-values for clustering at the community level to account for correlation among respondents living 
in the same community. For groups of indicator variables (for example, indicators for SES quartile), we also report the p-
value from the test that all indicators in the group are jointly significant as predictors in the model (for example, that SES 
quartile is a significant predictor of latrine access). 
33 There is also a possibility that surveyors might have perceived the concept of having a river differently. In many 
Indonesian hamlets, there are several types of rivers, including the irrigation ditch that runs through the hamlet and 
considerably larger rivers that run past several hamlets and villages. 
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Table VII.11.  Predicted Probability of Latrine Ownership (Logit Regression) 
Dependent Variable: Owns Latrine Mean 
Predicted  
Probability of  
Owning a Latrine  p Value 
Independent Variables     
Head male 88.2 68.9 0.428 
Head female 11.8 64.1 n.a. 
Age of head   0.011** a 
Age <30 4.9 54.5 0.042** 
 33.2 56.7 0.007*** 
 46.0 73.9 0.605 
 15.9 76.8 n.a. 
Household SES quartile   0.000*** a 
Quartile 1 (poorest) 25.0 46.7 0.000*** 
Quartile 2 25.0 58.3 0.000*** 
Quartile 3 25.0 66.6 0.000*** 
Quartile 4 (wealthiest) 25.0 89.7 n.a. 
River in hamlet    
Yes 79.3 68.5 0.920 
No  20.7 67.6 n.a. 
Other community members using latrine:    
 78.6 73.9 0.000*** 
Some  21.4 44.1 n.a. 
Perceived costs of basic flush latrine    
Costly  92.2 66.7 0.106 
 7.8 83.5 n.a. 
Knowledge of health risks of open defecation   0.026** a 
Score 0 4 31.7 60.1 0.009*** 
Score 5 28.5 66.5 0.054* 
Score 6 39.9 75.2 n.a. 
Pseudo R2  0.259  
Regression p Value  0.000***  
Sample Size  719  
Notes: The table shows predicted probabilities from a logit model. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for 
latrine ownership. The independent variables are as listed in the table and also include a set of district 
indicators. For each independent variable, the predicted probability is from the fitted logit model and sets 
all other variables to their mean values. The p values are for the test of significance for each variable in the 
the omitted category for each set of 
variables. 
a
p Value for the test of the joint hypothesis that all indicators in this group are equal to zero. 
    *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, two tailed test. 
  **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, two tailed test. 
***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, two tailed test. 
n.a. = not available. 
latrine costs to be high, but this variable is not statistically significant. However, the remaining 
variables that we consider are statistically significant and suggest that latrine ownership is more likely 
for respondents who perceive widespread latrine use in their community and for those who score 
higher on the sanitation knowledge scale. 
2. Factors Correlated with Open Defecation 
Table VII.12 presents the results for open defecation, defined as open defecation in a one-week 
reference period, as the dependent variable. This indicator is 1 for those with no latrine access as 
well as those few who own a latrine (including owners and sharers) but did not use it exclusively in 
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the previous week. It is 0 for those who had access to a latrine and exclusively used it in the previous 
week. For this analysis, we use a set of independent variables similar to those in Table VII.11 but 
instead focus on respondent characteristics rather than those of the household head. Open defecation 
is a more individual decision compared with latrine construction, which is likely to be decided upon 
at the household level. The full set of independent variables includes individual gender; a set of age 
and education indicators; an indicator for working in agriculture, forestry, or fisheries34; the 
household SES quartile; an indicator for having a river in the hamlet; an indicator for high perceived 
latrine use in the community; a set of indicators for the score on the 6 sanitation knowledge 
questions in the survey; and a set of district indicators. As before, we report predicted probabilities 
and p-values from the logit regression. 
Table VII.12.  Predicted Probability of Open Defecation (Logit Regression) 
Dependent Variable: Openly Defecated in Past Week Mean 
Predicted  
Probability of  
Open Defecation p Value 
Independent Variables     
Male 52.1 8.0 0.290 
Female 47.9 9.8 n.a. 
Age   0.263b 
Age < 30 14.2 14.4 0.177 
 40.1 9.5 0.600 
 35.1 6.9 0.702 
 10.6 7.8 n.a. 
Education   0.000*** b 
< 7 years 16.0 5.8 0.028** 
7 9 years 15.7 3.0 0.000*** 
> 9 years 68.3 12.3 n.a 
Works in agriculture, forestry, or fisheriesa   0.949b 
Yes 42.1 9.2 0.903 
No 35.8 8.3 0.828 
Industry missing 22.1 8.9 n.a. 
Household SES quartile:   0.032** b 
Quartile 1 (poorest) 25.0 13.2 0.018** 
Quartile 2 25.0 8.5 0.139 
Quartile 3 25.0 11.4 0.006*** 
Quartile 4 (wealthiest) 25.0 4.6 n.a. 
River in hamlet    
Yes 79.3 13.3 0.000*** 
No  20.7 1.6 n.a. 
Other community members using latrine    
 78.6 6.2 0.000*** 
 21.4 28.3 n.a. 
Knowledge of health risks of open defecation   0.000*** b 
Score 0 4 31.7 25.1 0.000*** 
Score 5 28.5 12.4 0.000*** 
Score 6 39.9 2.7 n.a. 
Pseudo R2  0.464  
Regression p Value  0.000***  
Sample Size  720  
                                                 
34 We hypothesized that people in this industry would spend more time outdoors and might be more likely to 
defecate openly. However, industry was reported only for those currently employed. To avoid dropping people who 
were not employed, we set this indicator equal to 0 where it was missing and added another indicator for missing data. 
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Table VII.12 (continued) 
Notes: The table shows predicted probabilities from a logit model. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for 
open defecation in the previous week and includes those who used latrines only sometimes as open 
defecators. The independent variables are as listed in the table and also include a set of district indicators. 
For each independent variable, the predicted probability is from the fitted logit model and sets all other 
variables to their mean values. The p values are for the test of significance for each variable in the logit 
variables. 
aZero for those not reporting industry. 
b
p Value for the test of the joint hypothesis that all indicators in this group are equal to zero. 
    *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, two tailed test. 
  **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, two tailed test. 
***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, two tailed test. 
 Open defecation is significantly more prevalent among those with less education 
and those from households in the poorest SES quartile. Having a river in the 
hamlet, perceptions of limited use of latrines by others in the community, and 
lower levels of knowledge about sanitation are also significant predictors of open 
defecation. 
The results in Table VII.12 suggest that those under 30 are most likely to defecate openly, 
although none of the age indicators is statistically significant. We also find that less-educated 
respondents are significantly more likely to defecate openly compared with those with more than 
nine years of formal education (corresponding to the completion of junior high school). However, 
working in agriculture, forestry, or fisheries is not a significant predictor of open defecation, even 
though these occupations presumably involve more time spent outdoors, potentially far from a 
convenient latrine. 
Respondents in households outside the wealthiest quartile are far more likely to defecate openly 
relative to this quartile, although only the quartile 1 and quartile 3 indicators are statistically 
significant. The other variables that we consider are all significant predictors of open defecation at 
the 1.0 percent level of significance. These include having a river in the hamlet, which increases the 
predicted probability of open defecation from 1.6 percent to 13.3 percent, consistent with the 
previous evidence that defecation in the river remains a major concern. Perceptions of greater use of 
latrines in the community and correct knowledge about sanitation are also both significant 
predictors of a lower probability of open defecation. 
An important step to reducing open defecation could be to target program resources to specific 
households and individuals that have a high probability of open defecation. Our analysis suggests 
that this includes youth, the less educated, households outside the wealthiest quartile, and those who 
have easy access to a river for defecation. One option could be to target awareness campaigns at 
these groups—for example, through youth groups or education programs at the junior high school 
level. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The TSSM program sought to implement a novel approach in East Java to eliminate open 
defecation and increase access to improved sanitation at scale. It aimed to deliver a holistic 
intervention that would simultaneously strengthen supply and demand for sanitation, as well as 
strengthen the enabling environment in which the sanitation intervention was delivered. TSSM’s 
goals were to deliver the program in a sustainable and scalable way by making local districts its 
primary implementation partners. 
In this chapter, we first summarize our overall observations on TSSM implementation. We then 
briefly describe some of the lessons learned that might help to further refine the TSSM approach, in 
order to help this promising program achieve its targets for large-scale ODF gains and increased 
access to improved latrines. 
A. Overall Observations of TSSM Implementation 
Program implementation varied a great deal, as did the outcomes that resulted. In all 
districts, we saw pockets of great success that achieved ODF outcomes, but how large these areas 
were and how many hamlets they encompassed varied significantly. A few districts and subdistricts 
were very committed to the program and focused on expanding it over time to ensure ODF 
communities in their entire district. These places had high levels of capacity and cross-sectoral 
commitment to the program and took a fairly strategic approach to program implementation. They 
made significant financial and human resource investments in TSSM implementation and scale-up 
and saw strong results. However, in several locations, we saw weaker program implementation and 
limited scale-up. These districts typically dedicated fewer resources and lacked capacity and 
motivation for program implementation. 
The viral spread of TSSM assumed in WSP’s theory of change did not occur, increasing 
the burden on district and subdistrict staff for program expansion. In most cases, concerted 
and fairly top-down efforts by districts and subdistricts—rather than demand from villages—drove 
program expansion. As a result, the program placed significant burden for expansion and follow-up 
on district—and especially subdistrict—officials and staff. These activities required additional 
resources, which were often in scarce supply. 
The CLTS component of TSSM, rather than sanitation marketing, largely drove the 
results that occurred. The TSSM team took some time to conduct research and develop tools and 
strategies for the sanitation marketing component. Its delayed implementation, combined with its 
weaker application, appears to have limited the impact of this component. Households in almost all 
the hamlets in which we conducted focus groups were unaware of low-cost latrine options. Our 
survey indicates that most households tended to have high estimates for the cost of pour-flush 
latrines, and these high costs are significant impediments to latrine ownership. As a result, it appears 
that the CLTS component has driven most of the gains realized by TSSM at the hamlet and 
household levels. 
Implementation deviated substantially from TSSM-prescribed procedures. Despite 
TSSM’s development of a detailed manual describing how to implement the different components 
of the program, there was substantial deviation from prescribed procedures. At some level, a degree 
of deviation was to be expected because the program was locally implemented. In a few cases, such 
as implementation of the triggering event and who conducted the triggering, such changes might not 
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have mattered very much. Occasionally, deviations even led to innovations that made the program 
more effective (for example, joint triggering or triggering of clusters). However, these deviations 
sometimes led to weak implementation of critical program components. For example, they could 
have contributed to insufficient resource assessment and budgeting at higher levels, insufficient 
follow-up with triggered communities or trained masons at lower levels, lower sectoral coordination, 
and coordination at different levels. 
In places where the program succeeded (and communities were declared ODF), access 
to latrines was higher and covered poorer households. Our household survey indicated near-
universal access to latrines in ODF hamlets compared with non-ODF hamlets (96.5 versus 69.5 
percent). In comparison to households in non-ODF villages with access to latrines, many of the 
households in ODF villages with latrines had lower socioeconomic status and were more likely to 
have access to more basic pit latrines. Many households in the ODF villages had gained access to 
latrines since the TSSM program began. Although we cannot establish causality due to the lack of 
random assignment of study participants, it is plausible that the TSSM program had some influence 
on latrine access decisions. 
Latrine use was also higher in ODF hamlets than in non-ODF hamlets. Based on our 
household survey, household focus groups, and transect walks through hamlets, we found that 
households in communities declared ODF appeared to be using latrines to defecate. We did not find 
evidence of people defecating in rivers or outdoors, nor did we observe feces in public places. Our 
household survey confirmed these findings, indicating that 94 percent of households in ODF 
hamlets exclusively used latrines to defecate in the past week compared with 61 percent in non-
ODF communities. 
However, the quality of the latrines did not always meet TSSM quality standards for 
blocking contamination routes. In our site visits and observations of latrines, we noted that 
although some latrines were well sealed and hygienic, others had features that would permit the 
spread of disease (for example, poor quality, broken, or no lids on pit latrines). Our household 
survey revealed that fewer than half of the pit latrines in households in ODF sites had lids. 
Moreover, in many locations, households seemed to associate ODF with simply defecating in a 
latrine rather than defecating in a sufficiently hygienic latrine. Our site visits suggest that general 
latrine maintenance and household awareness of hygienic latrine standards seemed to be higher in 
places where implementation efforts were better coordinated and contained more follow-up. 
B. Recommendations Going Forward 
In addition to our general observations of the TSSM implementation, we have identified some 
lessons learned and recommendations for the program to consider as it goes forward. These lessons 
pertain to the following areas: 
 Preparing local governments for TSSM implementation 
 Implementing CLTS at scale 
 Developing and implementing sanitation marketing 
 Creating a sustainable and useful monitoring system 
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1. Preparing Local Governments for TSSM Implementation 
 Conduct program advocacy to create high levels of buy-in among multiple 
stakeholders, especially the bupati. 
Because TSSM requires substantial investment from a wide range of stakeholders at all levels, it 
is important to generate broad-based support for the program. Strong and ongoing program 
advocacy targeted to the district heads (bupati) is especially necessary because their support can 
motivate stakeholders at every level of government to devote the substantial time, effort, and 
resources required to make the program a success. 
 Create strong coordination mechanisms to ensure program success. 
TSSM implementation is strongest when there are high levels of multisectoral coordination at 
all administrative levels. It will be important to identify specific steps necessary to ensure this 
coordination and to identify the responsibilities of the relevant stakeholders. 
 Ensure adequate commitment of resources for implementation at all levels. 
TSSM requires significant resources at different levels for various aspects of TSSM 
implementation and follow-up. Districts might need technical assistance in anticipating what the 
required levels and types of resources needed for implementation of various components will be at 
district, subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels. They might also need assistance in budgeting 
adequately to meet these needs and in identifying existing resources to leverage. 
2. Implementing CLTS at Scale 
 Build capacity to conduct strategic selection of triggering locations. 
Areas that saw strong results were strategic about how they chose and sequenced subdistricts, 
villages, and hamlets for program implementation. In particular, choosing geographically clustered 
places; conducting concentrated triggering in those places (that is, triggering all hamlets in target 
villages); and conducting joint triggering (that is, facilitators from multiple villages trigger each village 
together) appear to result in greater success in facilitating ODF attainment. These strategies generate 
greater program momentum and competition among villages, allow better leveraging of resources, 
and facilitate sharing of program knowledge. 
 Introduce targeting of specific groups. 
The program could consider developing targeted approaches tailored to specific households 
and people who have a high probability of open defecation. Based on our analysis, this includes 
youth, the less educated, households outside the wealthiest quartile, and those living near a river. For 
example, the program could develop youth education programs at schools. 
 Conduct and devote resources for post-triggering follow-up. 
Triggering on its own was rarely sufficient for changing household sanitation behavior. Both 
attainment and maintenance of ODF outcomes depended on the degree to which there was post-
triggering follow-up (that is, repeat socialization of TSSM messages and targeted follow-up with 
households through monitoring visits). These extra steps can entail substantial time and/or travel 
costs and require devoting explicit resources to them for consistent progress to occur in target areas. 
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 Stress health benefits to improve hamlet and household demand for sanitation. 
Publicizing the health benefits of improved sanitation (for example, showing data on declining 
diarrhea rates) can be a useful complementary strategy. In the few places that took this approach, we 
observed that it strengthened commitment to implementing TSSM and increased household 
willingness to access improved sanitation. Our qualitative and quantitative findings indicate that it 
might be useful to focus attention on the health risks of defecating in water (rivers, irrigation canals, 
ponds, and so on). Households do not fully appreciate the health risks of defecating in bodies of 
water and consider such behavior less risky than openly defecating on the ground. Because 
defecating in rivers is the most prevalent method of open defecation, it might be worthwhile to pay 
special attention to illustrating the links between river defecation and diseases such as diarrhea. 
3. Developing and Implementing Sanitation Marketing 
 Adopt a phased approach to training of suppliers/providers; concentrate on 
training and following up with larger numbers of carefully selected sanitation 
suppliers/providers concentrated in a few locations. 
For the supply-strengthening component of TSSM, more careful planning is necessary about 
what it would take to improve delivery at scale. It seems unlikely that triggering a few entrepreneurs 
in each district would result in improvements at scale, even if those entrepreneurs were well selected. 
Similar to the phased approach adopted in CLTS, TSSM might target a few districts and subdistricts 
at a time and concentrate its supply training efforts in these administrative units. This would 
facilitate dedication of resources for more careful selection of trainees and would enable the 
program to conduct a greater degree of follow-up and monitoring of trainees, which would help to 
gauge whether or not training improves the supply of low-cost options at scale. These places could 
serve as pilots for learning. 
 Improve distribution mechanisms of sanitation marketing materials. 
For the demand-strengthening component of TSSM, more strategies and mechanisms have to 
be identified to disseminate sanitation promotion materials and informed choice catalogues. We 
recommend dedicating greater effort to distributing the informed choice catalogue, because many 
local stakeholders found that useful but often seemed to prefer developing their own posters and 
other promotion materials. 
 Deliver training and sanitation promotion more intensively for poorer hamlets 
and soon after triggering for households near a river. 
Both components of sanitation marketing should focus more intensively on poorer households 
and hamlets. For very poor households, cost can be a prohibitive constraint on upgrading to 
improved latrines, so additional strategies to help with financing will be necessary. Low-cost options 
should be introduced earlier and promoted more vigorously (soon after triggering) for households 
near a river that are usually averse to basic pit latrines and want to transition directly from open 
defecation to improved latrines. 
4. Creating a Sustainable and Useful Monitoring System 
 Improve district capacity for data collection and use. 
Data collection at lower government levels, even when it occurs, is usually reported upward 
only when there is regular demand at higher levels. However, district officials are likely to request 
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data regularly from lower levels and exercise data quality control only if they perceive they will derive 
some benefit from the data. Future implementation of TSSM might have to include strong technical 
assistance helping various government levels not just on what data to collect or how, but also on 
how to use the data for various administrative and tracking purposes. 
 Simplify monitoring indicators for more effective use of scarce district resources. 
In the interim, while districts are still strengthening capacity for data collection, it might be 
useful to reduce and simplify the indicators on which monitoring data are collected. (These can 
include simple indicators, such as whether households use a latrine or not and whether communities 
have been triggered and attained ODF.) This would facilitate more frequent and systematic data 
collection by reducing the burden on frontline stakeholders (such as village health staff or hamlet 
health volunteers), who are responsible for data collection. 
 Provide greater support for volunteers who form the front line of data collection. 
To improve the quality of data collected, frontline data collectors should receive additional 
training and, if they are volunteers, they should receive token compensation to motivate them. 
Alternatively, the program could leverage funding from other health programs that might already 
provide such compensation for volunteers for monitoring. 
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LIST OF STAKEHOLDER INFORMANTS 
National Level Stakeholders 
Total Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing (TSSM) program staff and partners 
World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP) staff and team in Jakarta 
Sectoral 
Ministry of Health (Depkes) staff 
Ministry of Planning (Bappenas) staff 
Other 
PLAN International 
UNICEF 
Province Level Stakeholders 
TSSM program staff and partners 
TSSM Regional Coordinator 
Resource agency staff, including marketing specialists, team leaders, district consultants, 
and training staff 
Sectoral 
Provincial health office staff, including Environmental Health Office and Health 
Promotion Office staff 
Provincial planning office (Bappeda) staff 
District Level Stakeholders 
Political 
District head (bupati) and staff 
Sectoral 
District Health Office (Dinkes) 
District Environmental Health Office (Kesling) 
District Planning Office (Bappeda) 
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Health promotion officer 
Subdistrict Level Stakeholders 
Political 
Subdistrict head (camat), secretary, and other staff 
Sectoral 
Staff of Subhealth Center (Puskesmas), including sanitarians and health promotion officers 
Family Movement coordinator 
Economy, Development, and Women Empowerment (Ekbang) staff 
Education Office staff 
Family Welfare Movement (PKK) leaders 
Other 
Sanitation suppliers and providers 
Village Level Stakeholders 
Political 
Village head (kepala desa) and secretary 
Sectoral 
Village midwife 
Other 
Mason 
Hamlet Level Stakeholders 
Political 
Hamlet heads, RW heads, RT heads, and other local officials 
Sectoral 
Health volunteers (cadres) 
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Table B.1.  Qualitative Study Locations 
District Subdistrict Village Dusun 
Jombang Ndiwek Kwaron Nglerep 
Jombang Ndiwek Kwaron Sukopuro 
Jombang Mojoagung Johowinong  Plosorejo Dusun  
Gresik Wringinanom Sumberame Sidomukti  
Gresik Wringinanom Sembung Sumberploso  
Gresik Kedamean Katimoho Katimoho 
Gresik Kedamean Katimoho Dukuh 
Malang Dampit Dampit Dampit Barat 
Malang Dampit Sukodono Kampung The 
Malang Dampit Sukodono Petung Sigar 
Malang Pakisaji Wonokerso Blau Dusun  
Malang Pakisaji Wonokerso RW 1 
Trenggalek Gandusari Wonoanti Manggis  
Trenggalek Gandusari Gandusari Pundensari  
Trenggalek Tugu Gondang Setono  
Trenggalek Tugu Gondang Kebonsari  
Trenggalek Tugu Ngepeh Ponggok  
Bondowoso Grujugan Kabuaran  Krajan Selatan  
Bondowoso Grujugan Dadapan  Krajan Timur  
Bondowoso Maesan Tanah Wulan  Krajan 2  
Bondowoso Maesan Suco Lor  Suco Lor  
Bangkalan Kokop Bandang Laok  Dusun Baktalbak  
Bangkalan Arosbaya Karang Pao  West Karang Pao  
Bangkalan Kokop Katol Timur Bukol 
Jombang Perak   
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Table B.2.  Quantitative Study Locations 
District Subdistrict Village Dusun 
Bangkalan Kokop Bandang Laok Baktalbak 
Bangkalan Kokop Katol Timur Bukol 
Bangkalan Kokop Kokop Torsabih 
Bangkalan Arosbaya Karang Paoh Karang Paoh Barat 
Bangkalan Arosbaya Tengket Binteng 
Bangkalan Arosbaya Tambegan Tambegan Barat 
Bondowoso Grujugan Dadapan Giwang 
Bondowoso Grujugan Dadapan Krajan Barat 
Bondowoso Grujugan Kabuaran Krajan Selatan 
Bondowoso Maesan Tanahwulan Krajan 2 
Bodowoso Maesan Tanahwulan Selatan Tenggir 
Bondowoso Maesan Suco lor Suco 
Gresik Kedamean Katimoho Katimoho 
Gresik Kedamean Katimoho Dukuh 
Gresik Kedamean Slempit Slempit 
Gresik Wringinanom Sumberame Sidomukti 
Gresik Wringinanom Sembung Sumberploso 
Gresik Wringinanom Pedagangan Pedagangan 
Jombang NDiwek Kwaron Nglerep 
Jombang NDiwek Kwaron Sukopuro 
Jombang Ndiwek Bulorejo Kedaton 
Jombang Mojoagung Johowinong Ploserejo 
Jombang Mojoagung Johowinong Johowinong 
Jombang Mojoagung Tanggalrejo Tanggalrejo (desa) 
Malang Dampit Sukodono Petung Sigar 
Malang Dampit Sukodono Kampung Teh 
Malang Dampit Dampit Dampit Barat 
Malang Pakisaji Sutojayan RW02 
Malang Pakisaji Wonokerso RW 1 
Malang Pakisaji Permanu Blau 
Trenggalek Gandusari Wonoanti Manggis 
Trenggalek Gandusari Gandusari Pundensari 
Trenggalek Gandusari Ngrayung Plagen 
Trenggalek Tugu Gondang Setono 
Trenggalek Tugu Gondang Kebonsari 
Trenggalek Tugu Ngepeh Ponggok 
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Table C.1.  Expenditure on TSSM by District, 2007 2010 (US Dollars) 
District FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 Total 
Bangkalan $33,333 $11,111 $25,000 $11,111 $80,556 
Banyuwangi $0 $16,667 $11,111 $13,333 $41,111 
Blitar $0 $14,444 $2,000 $0 $16,444 
Bojonegoro $0 $0 $3,333 $15,000 $18,333 
Bondowoso $0 $22,222 $33,333 $1,444 $57,000 
Gresik $0 $0 $0 $16,667 $16,667 
Jember $29,222 $44,444 $88,889 $889 $163,444 
Jombang $0 $7,556 $5,556 $15,000 $28,111 
Kediri $4,091 $26,667 $8,889 $15,000 $54,647 
Lamongan $0 $0 $0 $3,333 $3,333 
Lumajang $6,667 $27,222 $94,444 $12,222 $140,556 
Madiun $0 $4,444 $0 $10,000 $14,444 
Magetan $0 $2,778 $8,333 $16,667 $27,778 
Malang $0 $3,333 $0 $5,556 $8,889 
Mojokerto $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Nganjuk $7,000 $27,222 $16,556 $0 $50,778 
Ngawi $2,222 $4,889 $10,833 $0 $17,944 
Pacitan $2,778 $2,778 $0 $667 $6,222 
Pamekasan $15,556 $11,111 $16,111 $11,111 $53,889 
Pasuruan $6,667 $15,444 $11,111 $15,000 $48,222 
Ponorogo $0 $16,667 $8,333 $1,444 $26,444 
Probolinggo $5,556 $5,556 $16,667 $0 $27,778 
Sampang $0 $16,667 $38,889 $27,778 $83,333 
Sidoarjo $0 $0 $5,556 $2,778 $8,333 
Situbondo $8,889 $10,556 $25,000 $10,000 $54,444 
Sumenep $5,556 $5,556 $15,667 $30,000 $56,778 
Trenggalek $14,667 $47,778 $44,444 $1,222 $108,111 
Tuban $0 $8,333 $19,444 $8,333 $36,111 
Tulungagung $26,667 $6,889 $3,333 $5,556 $42,444 
 
Source: WSP 2010b. 
Note: Data provided by WSP were in Indonesian Rupiah. All amounts were converted to US Dollars at 
the rate of 9000 IDR/1 USD. 
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Table E.1.  Principal Components Analysis (Percentages Unless Otherwise Specified) 
Variables Total 
ODF  
Communities 
Non ODF  
Communities 
Weight in SES  
Index 
Household Characteristics:     
Household members per room (mean) 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.19 
Household has brick/concrete walls 77.1 75.6 78.4 0.32 
Household Head Characteristics:     
Years of education (mean) 5.7 5.6 5.9 0.37 
Employment status:a     
Not working 10.1 8.2 11.8 0.05 
Self employed 22.6 20.9 24.2 0.05 
Self employed with unpaid family 
helpers 21.5 22.4 20.8 0.15 
Self employed with paid employees 7.6 7.6 7.6 0.11 
Employee 18.3 19.7 17.1 0.25 
Day laborer 18.8 20.6 17.1 0.19 
Household Wealth:     
b, c 888 941 836 0.31 
Value of stock of goods held by 
b 200 205 190 0.11 
Durable goods ownership:     
Radio 37.4 36.5 38.2 0.20 
Television 79.9 81.5 78.4 0.31 
Refrigerator 19.7 18.8 20.5 0.32 
Bicycle or rowboat 58.5 58.5 58.4 0.27 
Motorcycle or motorboat 66.9 65.6 68.2 0.33 
Car or truck 4.9 5.0 4.7 0.19 
Number of farm animals (mean):     
Cows, bulls or buffalo 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.06 
Goats or sheep 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.07 
Poultry 3.8 3.8 3.8 0.13 
Rescaled SES Index:d     
Mean 4.66 4.64 4.67 n.a 
Standard deviation 1.85 1.89 1.82 n.a 
Max 10 9.75 10 n.a 
Min 0 0 0.53 n.a 
Sample Size 718 718 718 718 
Notes: Principal Components Analysis (PCA) following the methodology of Filmer and Pritchett (2001) 
and Rutstein and Johnson (2004). 
aOmitted category is unpaid family worker. 
bLog of the monetary amount used in PCA analysis. 
cThe sum of income from all sources, including in kind income. 
dSES index rescaled to a range of 0 to 10. 
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